CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 2.1. Introduction This chapter undertakes a review of literature to address the critical challenges of energy poverty, universal access and climate change. Globally, the generation of electricity is the highest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2024:3). The energy sector in South Africa is responsible for emitting 420 Mt CO2 through the generation of electricity utilising its fleet of coal-fired power stations, equating to more than 50% of the country’s CO2 emissions (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:56). The Framework Convention on Climate Change (2023:3) has acknowledged that human activities are primarily responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases which have directly led to global warming, causing the temperature to rise by 1.1 °C. The majority of the countries globally are signatories to the 2015 Paris Climate Accord with the fundamental goal of restricting global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels with a preference of 1.5°C (Allen & Overy, 2023:36; Vandyck et al., 2023:1; IEA, 2021:10; Creecy, 2022:2; Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023:5; Bloomberg, 2021:5). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:2) contends that, even if all the countries adhere to their self-imposed carbon reduction through their respective nationally determined contributions (NDCs), global temperatures are anticipated to rise by between 2.4°C and 3°C. The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:55) supports this notion and further concludes that the world is far off target to achieving these ambitious goals. However, power generation is leading the sector in transitioning to cleaner energy sources and reducing its carbon footprint globally (IEA, 2024:3). Baker and Phillips (2019:182) assert that access to electricity in South Africa is comparable with the high levels of poverty and socio-economic inequality. Lack of access to electricity has forced communities to resort to using unclean, unsafe and unhealthy energy sources which have compounded the challenge of deforestation and global warming (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). The Gender Snapshot (2023:17) advocates for an accelerated transition to low carbon cookstoves which could reduce deaths from indoor air pollution by 6.5 million and can primarily benefit woman who are poorer, categorised by low levels of literacy and are older, with the presumption they are more inclined to utilise biomass fuels and are exposed to the detrimental effects on their health. Universal access to electricity will minimise household reliance on solid fuels and positively contribute to combating climate change and improve public health while reducing the pressure on the public health system (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:2). Cameron et al. (2020:16) echoes similar sentiments and further adds that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is crucial to address the existential threat of climate change and environmental degradation. 2.2. Key Definitions 2.2.1. Definitions: Energy Poverty Longe (2021: 2) defines energy poverty as the “lack of access to sustainable and affordable clean energy services.” In South Africa, the prevalent polluting energy sources utilised for lighting are paraffin and candles, and for cooking are firewood, paraffin, coal, and animal dung (Longe, 2021: 2). Energy poverty is also defined as “the inadequate access to affordable, modern and/or sustainable energy services” (Ngarava et al., 2022:1; Casta˜no-rosa et al., 2019b; Crentsil et al., 2019). Ye and Koch (2021:5) describe energy poverty as “the situation wherein household basic energy needs cannot be met.” Baker and Phillips (2018:182) posit that access to electricity must not be viewed in isolation but viewed against the backdrop of affordability as grid connection does not automatically translate to affordability and utilisation. Mohlakoana (2021:3) summarises energy poverty “as the inability to meet one’s energy needs, especially the needs directly impacting the household.” The term utilised in developed countries is fuel poverty and is defined as “insufficient monetary resources to pay for energy needs, measured through affordability” (Ngarava et al., 2022:1). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:16) define energy poverty as “the gap between the amount of energy that facilitates higher levels of development, and the amount that can be accessed, is called energy poverty.” The World Economic Forum describes energy poverty as ‘a lack of access to sustainable modern energy sources and products’ (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:16). Although South Africa has a superior electrification rate in Africa, energy poverty is estimated to hover around 43% and energy poverty can be translated to not “meeting their basic energy needs and are therefore being denied a fundamental human right” (Mohlakoana, 2021:1). Energy is considered to be a basic human right although not explicitly contained in the South African Constitution or related literature but is implied in the constitution and is globally accepted. Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) posit that energy-poor means “they rely upon harmful fuel sources like biomass-generated fire for their cooking and heating.” The United Nations in Policy Brief 08 on accelerating SDG 7 achievement defines “energy poverty as lack of access to electricity and clean cooking fuels or technologies (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:3). Energy poverty is “the state of being deprived of certain energy services or not being able to use them in a healthy, convenient, and efficient manner, resulting in a level of energy consumption that is insufficient to support social and economic development” (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:2). Bouzarovski et al. (2021:2) adopts “a broad definition of energy poverty: a condition in which a household is unable to secure a socially and materially needed level of energy services in the home.” 2.2.2. Definitions: Universal Access Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) is a commitment by signatories of the United Nations and Paris Agreement to ensure access to reliable, affordable and modern forms of energy for all their citizens by 2030 (Radka, n.d:1). Romero-Ramos et al. (2023:1) posits that access to energy plays a critical role in promoting economic growth, social engagement and development of communities. Energy access is defined by the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change as “access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses” (Kumar et al., 2019:1). According to the Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, “access to electricity is defined as the ability of the end user to consume electricity for desired services” (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) define universal access “to mean that the household is now connected to the infrastructure that carries electricity – such as a formal connection to the electricity distribution grid or a home-based solar system.” Ledger (2021:1) states that universal access is “the ability of all South African households to access sufficient quantities of affordable, clean (non-polluting) and safe energy is directly related to both an improvement in households’ standard of living, and the country’s ability to achieve its decarbonisation target.” The United Nations report (2021:1) states that “achieving universal access to sustainable, reliable, affordable, and modern energy must also be an integral part of the just energy transition and be embedded in countries' climate commitments and their strategies and actions for net-zero-energy systems.” However, Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) argue that the focus on electrification rates in many countries is justifiable due to the retarded rate of electrification but access to energy forms one component and does not guarantee utilisation. Access to electricity “refers to the percentage of the population with access to electricity” (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2020:22). The study further proposes that to promote access to electricity where terrain is a hindrance and infrastructure is underdeveloped, solar PV provides an alternative, cost-effective option to achieve universal access. 2.3. System Theories The United Nations and World Bank opted for a multi-tier energy access tracking framework to address definitional and implementation challenges (Kumar et al., 2019:167). The multidimensional context of energy access holistically incorporates dimensions such as capacity, reliability, affordability, duration, safety, efficiency, availability and quality. The expanded definition further incorporates criteria for clean cooking such as safety, health, convenience, quality, affordability and availability. 2.3.1. The Real Option theory The Real Option theory applies to investment projects and the financial assessment can minimise risks to which the project may be exposed to. If alternatives are identified early in the implementation phase, such projects will increase in expected value and lead to a successful project (Trigeorgis and Reuer, 2017). In contrast, the Theory Based Policy Analysis theory applies to policy design cycle concerning renewable energy support schemes and determines the effectiveness and consistency from a national perspective. The application enables policymakers to generate policy based on a convoluted set of factors affecting implementation (Liptow and Remler, 2012). 2.3.2. The Concept of Assemblage Theory Kumar et al. (2019:167) explain “the concept of assemblage is increasingly advanced across the social sciences as a means through which the complex and interwoven relations of and between the social and material can be interrogated.” The conceptual approach is intuitively valid as demonstrated by Walker and Day’s analysis of household energy vulnerability as assemblage. Kumar et al. (2019:167) further enhance this position by encouraging assemblage thinking as being viewed in the context of energy access. Sustainability is consistently associated with three formidable pillars, economic, environmental and social, although the environmental/ecological pillar remains the dominant sustainable pillar (University of Alberta, 2013; Gómez de Segura, 2013:31; Jaramillo et al., 2018:2). The built environment physical characteristics could form a springboard for the integration of renewable energies such as solar cities (Huang and Cast´an Broto, 2018; Akrofi and Okitasari, 2023:21). The spatial distribution and landscape of the built environment has a significant bearing on sustainable energy transition theories and the theoretical underpinnings of sustainable transitions which can enhance their analytical strength (Akrofi and Okitasari, 2023:21). 2.3.3. Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DOI ) In seminal work published by Rodgers (1962), the diffusion of innovation framework clearly stipulates that a consumer must pass through different stages before accepting or rejecting new technology (Rodgers, 1962). Akrofi and Okitasari (2023:21) argue that Rodger’s theory (2003) identified the social system as the driving force for adopting innovations. The theory further expands to state that diffusion of innovation is confined within a social system, the social structure will shape its adoption as well as the individual’s behaviour. Menzli et al. (2022:2) postulate that DOI is extensively utilised in numerous disciplines and the actors have a crucial role in influencing the innovation system to obtain a positive outcome. According to Outcault et al. (2022:2), numerous studies have built on Rodger’s theory (either explicitly or implicitly) and has been cited more than 140,000 times in the academic literature. The DOI theory has been widely utilised to examine the effect of adoption of technology in diverse fields including information technology, agriculture, energy and medicine. Palm (2022:1) posits that the diffusion of innovation process whereby innovative technology is embraced by a rising number of stakeholders in society serves as a vital link to economic, social and ecological sustainable development. The rapid diffusion of renewable energy technology is a necessity to mitigate against climate change. The diffusion trends are shaped by different factors which will influence policy making and how business leaders facilitate diffusion. Akrofi and Okitasari (2023:21) state that several studies (Schulte et al., 2022; Simpson Clifton, 2017; Thomas et al., 2021) utilised the diffusion of innovation theory and applied the theory to residential solar PV systems with the key determinant of social factors featuring prominently. Outcault et al. (2022:1) supports the diffusion of innovation theory to promote growth in the solar PV market coupled with other interventions. An in-depth understanding of DOI will support a superior understanding of how the technology characteristics impact customer endorsement and acceptance will lead to improved designs, policies and programmes. Menzli et al. (2022:2) advocates for the utilisation of DOI to determine which factors impact on barriers to innovative technology and which factors can be leveraged to support enablers of this technology. 2.3.4. Normative Ethical Theory Löfquist (2020:711) raises the question of whether universal access to electricity should be a universal human right. Access to electricity is a fundamental requirement for raising the standard of living, bridging the inequality gap and ascending out of poverty. There is a clear distinction between access to energy and access to electricity, with the latter providing essential energy to power up light bulbs, computers and promote clean energy for cooking. Frigo et al. (2021:1) advocates for the sufficient supply of electricity, which is uninterrupted and stable, affordable to the masses and of a superior quality. A large number of countries around the globe experience energy poverty while other countries are consuming beyond what could be declared as sufficient, an imbalance giving rise to injustices. The reality of universal access to energy is that it is not a human right although there are fundamental contractual rights embedded in societies, an argument underpinned by Normative Ethical theory (Löfquist, 2020:1). Frigo et al. (2021:1) acknowledges the current inequalities and supports that possibility of establishing an additional human right to access to energy through the theoretical foundation of the Capabilities Approach (CA). Although not explicitly stated as a human right, the United Nations through the Paris Agreement in 2015, with all signatories committing to achieve universal access to energy by 2030 (Nowak et al., 2022:2). Roussos (2022:1) concurs that modelling can be utilised in formal ethics to determine the consistency of findings or the compatibility of predetermined conditions. The challenge of researching without a model is grounded in determining precisely what ethical principles suggest. Löfquist (2020:712) emphasizes that normative ethical theories provide a different perspective in analysing the probability of categorizing access to electricity as a human right. Löfquist further asserts that renown theorists such as Henry Shue, Martha Nussbaum, Jack Donnelly and John Rawls developed normative ethical frameworks and have delved deeply into defining human rights as well as the content thereof. Frigo et al. (2021:3) promotes ethics as the cornerstone to address energy transition to combat climate change while simultaneously, responding to energy injustices by interrogating energy usage, by whom and why (for what purpose). Normative ethics theory forms the basis for synthesizing energy poverty, access to rights theory and energy consumption. Urquidez (2023:160) explains normative ethical theory as principals of moral conduct which govern human behaviour by steering moral decision-making in the setting of personal and interpersonal relations. Burgess-Jackson (2021:231) shares a similar view and states that normative ethical theory provides an explanation or account, describing why certain acts hold the characteristics that they do. These characteristics refer to fairness, rightness, justice, goodness and praiseworthiness. Ethics otherwise known as moral philosophy falls under the ambit of philosophy with the primary function of defining justifiable moral norms, simply stated how things should be (Urquidez, 2023:160). Löfquist (2020:712) concurs with Urquidez elaborating on the purpose of normative ethics to improve a society through moral, cultural and material changes. Normative ethical theory provides a foundation for right-making characteristics whilst substantiating reasons for such actions (Burgess-Jackson, 2021:231). The reasoning behind such actions supports an individual who is inclined to do the right thing but may not know what is the right thing and therefore the knowledge of what is right will influence the individual to act accordingly. Although the South African constitution does not overtly state the right to have access to electricity, other rights guaranteed in the Constitution cannot be provided for satisfactorily without access to electricity such as right to decent healthcare, right to education etcetera (Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:5). In the findings of the court, the judge stated that the deficiency in providing electricity was nothing short of a breach of the Constitution and the Minister of Electricity was issued with specific instructions to remedy the situation. The South African Constitution as well as the Bill of Rights outlines the rights and duties of citizens and delineates government structure at all levels (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:19). The South African constitution mandates government and by extension the municipalities to provide basic services to all citizens which includes electricity (Implementation Guidelines for INEP 2020:10; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:8). There are many diverging views with respect to the right to energy but access to energy has been accepted as a basic human right which must be affordable, clean, reliable and sustainable (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). The Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023 (2023:35) found that load shedding in South Africa was a clear breach of rights as protected in the Bill of Rights. 2.3.5. The Researcher’s View The pronouncement therefore stands that access to electricity should be declared a right, to improve an individual’s standard of living in a modern society whereby the lack of access will stunt socio-economic growth, development and inclusivity. Arguments which compare access to electricity as a basic human right will not be a just and fair comparison, as a person can live without electricity but will not enjoy the same quality of life. The right in the context of electricity should be viewed as a contractual right and that every citizen should have access to electricity. Sustainable energy solutions, which do not infringe on other human rights, will serve as a springboard to achieve the target of achieving universal access to electricity by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2050. Sustainable energy solutions include mature technologies such as SSEGs where costs have fallen considerable over the last decade. Households with SSEGs could also divert excess energy back to the grid, where grid connection is possible and receive renumeration for exporting energy. The energy exported back to the grid could plug the energy deficit experienced by the State-owned entity Eskom and curtail the rolling blackouts locally known as load shedding. From a policy perspective, government will be mandated to introduce policies to support universal access to energy as a right and make a concerted effort in achieving this target. 2.3.6. Theoretical Model for the Implementation of SSEGs Source: Author’s own design • A comprehensive policy framework should be developed to align renewable energy implementation and industrialisation to ignite the local manufacturing industry to produce solar PV (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). The policies and programmes should be designed in such a manner which optimise local conditions and country specific (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • Economic diversification should be driven at a national, regional and local level with all three arms of government endorsing this policy and aligning their long-term strategy to achieve a low carbon economy (Cameron et al., 2020:32). • The implementation of the employment, industrial and climate policies must be assessed and monitored to determine if milestones are being met and progress is being maintained (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). • Skilling and developing members of the community to actively participate in the manufacturing and installation of renewable energy is of paramount importance (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). Clear guidelines and a skill development plan must encompass funding, a clear programme with deliverables and job placement. • Training centres, TVET Colleges and Universities must play a crucial role in education and training as well as innovation, research and development (Semelane et al., n.d.:50). New design concepts and functionality can deliver increased efficiency and longer duration output leading to continued long-term growth and economic prosperity. • The role of local politics and a broad spectrum of stakeholders must be incorporated in comprehensive and proactive planning phase to minimise resistance to the transition to SSEG (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). Social dialogue and social consensus must be an integral part of policy decisions and implementation throughout every step of the transition process to SSEGs (Cameron et al., 2020:32). To accomplish these objective calls for strong political leadership with a clear vision, solid business and political leadership and political will (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • A communication strategy which is comprehensive must be established to reach all stakeholders (Cameron et al., 2020:32). Information campaigns will eliminate uncertainty and misinterpretation and raise social awareness, promoting the cause for renewable energy to save the planet from global warming (Falcone, 2018: 654). Information campaigns must utilise the channels of social media, seminars, workshops, websites and reporting. • Government must become the financial anchor for the implementation of SSEG and will have to fund a sizable share of the cost of solar PV (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). Government subsidies to support the implementation coupled with concessional loans and funding from wealthy countries will ease the burden on the community and fast-track the project. • Although policies and programmes should focus on gender equality and social justice, marginalised and vulnerable groups such as low-income household living in poverty should not be excluded (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • Scientific collaboration and technological advancements through research and development will enhance the implementation and promote unique solutions on a scale which incorporates all stakeholders (Falcone, 2018: 654). The process will enhance integration and synchronisation across supply chains and manage the challenges of complexity as well as supply and demand of raw materials. 2.3.7. Hypotheses Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between environmental awareness and energy cost management, indicating that individuals who are more aware of environmental issues are better at managing their energy costs and consumption patterns. Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between energy cost management and support for renewable energy employment and policies, indicating that individuals who manage their energy costs effectively are more likely to support renewable energy initiatives and related policies. Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between environmental awareness and support for renewable energy employment and policies, suggesting that individuals with higher environmental awareness are more likely to support initiatives related to renewable energy and associated policies. 2.4. Energy Policies 2.4.1. Government’s Intervention in Alleviating Energy Poverty (FBE and FBAE) Baker and Phillips (2019:182) posits that access to electricity must not be viewed in isolation but viewed against the backdrop of affordability as grid connection does not automatically translate to affordability and utilisation. The free basic electricity (FBE), free basic alternative energy (FBAE) and inclining block tariffs (IBT) programmes were designed by government to address energy poverty (Longe, 2021:6; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:2) added the Integrated National Electrification Plan (INEP) to the bouquet of programmes implemented by government. The South African government introduced the free basic electricity (FBE) in 2004 to address the challenge of affordability by providing low-income households with 50 kWh of free electricity per month (Baker and Phillips, 2019:182; Ye and Koch, 2020:11). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:25) argue that government’s assumption of households merely consume 50kWh should be the barometer for affordability is erroneous and misguided and does not envisage households require substantially more electricity to elevate themselves out of poverty. le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:4) also dispute the amount allocated to indigent households and cite the programme administered by the City of Cape Town in the Western Cape. For customers consuming less than 250 kWh per month, the customer is provided with 60kWh free electricity per month and for customers consuming between 250–450 kWh per month, customers receive 25kWh free electricity (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:8) state that particularly metros offer higher FBE such as eThekwini municipality which allocates 65kWh to indigent households, and the Polokwane and Tshwane municipalities both provide 100kWh. According to Eskom Integrated Report (2022:136), free basic electricity is the “amount of electricity deemed sufficient to provide basic electricity services to a poor household (50kWh per month).” The provision of the FBE was designed to assist customers meet their basic energy requirements monthly with the option of purchasing additional electricity to supplement their energy needs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:182). Ye and Koch (2020:11) adds that FBE and FBAE also serves to influence their energy choices and the amount spent of energy. However, the FBE proved to be wholly inadequate to meet their basic needs and is depleted before the end of the month (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). Longe (2021:6) argues that despite government’s interventions to alleviate energy poverty, the rollout of the programme was inadequate and did not benefit all intended recipients. The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:14) concurs and municipalities must ensure effective implementation of the programme and enhancement of households who should be benefiting from the programme. However, municipal income has been depressed in the aftermath of the migration of paying customers descending into poverty and qualifying for free basic services (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:3). The FBAE programme was designed to provide a source of energy to low-income households that had no connection to the electricity grid (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:109). The FBAE alternatives to electricity programme include LPG, fire gel, paraffin, coal and solar home system (Ye and Koch, 2020:11). The results of a survey conducted by Longe (2021:6) found that only 6% of respondents benefited from the FBAE programme for the purchase of paraffin. The utilisation of paraffin is a harmful and dangerous energy fuel and the source of many shack fires, hence should have been discouraged and withdrawn from the bouquet of FBAE options (Longe, 2021:10). However, 22 municipalities in 2018 supplied free solar electricity systems to approximately 113 200 households as part of their FBE programme (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). Cozzi et al. (2022:113) advocates for increasing the affordability of electricity to promote economic, social and health benefits and supporting households climbing the energy ladder. The initiatives implemented by government (FBE) has had a positive impact in reducing the level of energy poverty (Ye and Koch, 2020:31). Ye and Koch (2020:31) further contend that households should receive 150 kWh per month which would translate to a reduction in energy poverty severity index from 58% to 29%. Longe (2021:18) advocates for FBE to be raised from 50 kWh to 100 kWh due to the electricity tariffs rising by double digits since inception until now. In respect to the FBAE programme, Longe proposes that the amount of R56.29 should be justifiably increased to an amount that is less than 10% of their income, as per equation below: “Proposed FBAE = Monthly energy expenditure - 10% of household monthly income” The FBAE income should be utilised to purchase clean sources of energy and recipients should be discouraged from purchasing paraffin, candles and firewood (Ye and Koch, 2020:11). Eskom has proposed that levers at governments disposal should protect low-income households against the rising cost of electricity, demonstrated by reviewing the FBE model which may contribute significantly to the reduction of energy theft and illegal connections (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:32). According to “The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis” (2022:3), electricity tariffs increased by 753% between 2007 to 2021 while inflation rose by 134%, translating to a five-fold increase in the cost of electricity in real terms. Municipalities are faced with a tough balancing act of recouping the cost from the customers while protecting poor households and maintaining affordability (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). The municipality’s electricity revenue stream accounts for 30% of the total operating revenue but Ledger (2021:25) disputes this figure, claiming not all billed accounts are serviced by customers. Ledger (2021:26) avers that local government debt has drastically risen from less than R130 billion at the end of the 2016/17 financial year to over R230 billion at the end of December 2020, a cumulative increase of R50 billion from March 2020. The depletion in revenue generated by municipalities has also been triggered by a rapid decline in paying customers who fell into the vicious cycle of poverty and balancing the surge in poor households registering for indigent benefits (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:3). The burden of ever-increasing number of indigent households further strains the limited municipal revenue with 3,6 million registered as indigent and receive free basic services, as reported in 2019 (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:3). Cozzi et al. (2022:113) attributes the high levels of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa to the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, the Covid-19 global pandemic and the rising levels of inflation globally, which impacts on the ability of households to service payments for electricity consumption. Guan et al. (2023:304) concurs with Cozzi et al. and further argued that the cost of goods and services were indirectly impacted by the crisis. As a result of the multitude of crises, the debt owed to municipalities ballooned from R20 billion in March 2020 to R27 billion, with household debt accounting for 72% (Ledger, 2021:26). More than three-quarters of the sub-Saharan population who were connected to the grid could not afford the extended bundle of electricity usage while 150 million couldn’t afford the essential bundle (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:25) has reported that some key municipal stakeholders surmised the electricity supply function as a loss-making revenue component. The 2021-22 assessment of municipalities found that 39% of municipalities are guilty of investing 1% or less of the value of their infrastructure on maintenance and repair, a fraction of what should be spent (Hausmann et al., 2023:66). Furthermore, the state of the municipalities has been condemned to being dysfunctional as a consequence of a skills deficit and lack of managerial capacity, high debt levels and theft of infrastructure (The Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:25). Electricity tariffs in some African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan are designed to be affordable to people living in extreme poverty who are in a position to pay for an essential bundle of electricity services (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). Electricity in Zimbabwe is subsidised and costs between $0.04–0.06/kWh (Kuhudzai, 2021:26). Ledger, 2021:26) posits that the Auditor-General of South Africa’s analysis indicates that 60% of household debt can be recovered by municipalities. Municipalities are expected to invest precipitously in developing world class cities in an endeavour to attract investors but face mandatory policy compliance and pressure to deliver services to indigent communities (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). The national government has also adopted the stance that municipalities must have effective revenue collection mechanisms in place and customers must be compelled to service their municipal debt to enable municipalities to claw themselves out of distress (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). However, Ledger (2021:25) argues that although tariffs have been rising steeply, the level of service delivery has been steadily declining. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:25) states that municipalities are expected to play a crucial role in energy efficiency and demand-side management programmes but also incorporate the role of regulating and incentivising SSEGs and storage. Ledger (2021:28) argues that due to lack of oversight of nationally funded programmes, the municipality may actually fund fewer households with free basic services compared to the funds received from the national budget. Although funds were allocated for free basic services, Treasury requires municipalities to verify if recipients are authenticated as the process can be subjected to abuse by political parties (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). Ledger (2021:28) also believes that the balance of the funding can be redirected to the general revenue budget and utilised as per the municipality’s own directives. Ye and Koch (2020:12) disputes this theory and states that Eskom and the municipalities should continue to encourage indigent households who qualify for FBE to claim their monthly energy allocation. A study by Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:8) revealed that in 2018, 49 municipalities out of a total of 213 in the country were providing FBAE, where grid connections were not feasible. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) advocates for the intervention of government to subsidise the transition by protecting low-income households from rising electricity prices by retaining the free basic electricity (FBE). 2.4.2. Why is Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) most critical? Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) is a commitment by signatories of the United Nations and Paris Agreement to ensure access to reliable, affordable and modern forms of energy for all the citizens (Radka, n.d:1; Longe, 2021:1). Achieving universal access through SDG 7 paves the way for the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy and opens a window of opportunity for billions of people globally (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). Cozzi et al. (2022:106) argues that Africa did not create a solid foundation to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 7) for universal access to modern energy by 2030. The impact of Covid-19 further derailed Africa’s plans of progressing towards the ultimate goal of SDG 7 (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:99). Government policies will have to be realigned and additional policies established to achieve universal access by 2030 (Cozzi et al., 2022:106). If the status quo does not change significantly according to the International Energy Agency, an astronomical 860 million vulnerable people residing in rural areas will not have access to clean and renewable energy (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:30). Baker and Phillips (2019:178) argue that the introduction of the independent power programme (IPP) to accelerate the transition from fossil-fuels to renewables, have not disrupted energy production in a substantial way nor did the introduction support the achievement of SDG 7 in a meaningful way. Radka (n.d:1) is however optimistic and believes the SDG 7 has laid a solid foundation to achieve the eradication of poverty, mitigate the effects of climate change and attain these goals in a sustainable manner. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:4) assert that the lack of access to clean, modern and safe forms of energy is closely linked to poverty and is well documented through the SDG 7. The goal of SDG 7 is to achieve universal access to clean and safe energy by 2030 and underpins the attainment of many of the other SDGs including but not limited to eliminating poverty and eradication of hunger (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2; Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:9). Access to electricity has the potential to provide a broad spectrum of both economic and non-economic benefits to the citizens (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). The benefits extend to people’s well-being, including economic welfare, ameliorating their quality of life, better educational opportunities, improved health, and better utilisation of time management (United Nations, 2021:1). The demographic trajectory indicates that the population in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow at an alarming rate, while the state faces the burden of providing decent schooling and healthcare (World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results: 2022:1). The attainment of these objectives will have significant influence on the quality of education and lead to a rising number of well-paid employment opportunities (Kuhudzai, 2021:21). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was core to transiting South Africa to a democratic state and fundamentally laboured to rebuild the economy while delivering services to benefit all the citizens (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). The focus of the programme was also to provide equal access to energy services to citizens who were previously denied access, thereby signifying the first crucial step in bridging the gap between the rich and poor (Hausmann et al., 2023:94). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:9) assert that SDG 7 has a bearing on achieving many of the other SDGs such as food security, eradication of poverty, improving the health and minimising the impact on the environment and mitigating the effects of climate change. The dominant consensus amongst scholars suggests that an increase in energy consumption is a strong indicator of an improvement in the quality of life and raising the standard of living (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:9). Sub-Saharan Africa has been classified as having the lowest electricity connections rates globally and politicians should enforce adherence to existing policies to ensure elevated investments in achieving universal access (Jeuland et al., 2021:6). Although developing countries face rising cases of energy poverty, UNCTAD has established that 13% of population in developing countries worldwide are without access to electricity (Allen & Overy, 2023:37). Puig et al. (2021:1) advocates for SDG7 and SDG13 to be achieved simultaneously as both goals are inextricably linked, as fossil fuels to some extent, will be utilised in achieving universal access in developing countries. Developing countries are experiencing a dilemma of exploring untapped fossil fuel reserves and drive economic development or transition to cleaner fuels and renewable energy and face financial headwinds (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:38). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) advocates for technology-level renewable energy sources that should take precedence over fossil fuel technology as solar PV and wind have a distinct advantage. This renewable energy technology can be deployed in the absence of the grid and at any scale, as evidenced by micro-grids (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5). The Afrobarometer survey found that government performance rating was predictably dismal when measured against providing reliable electricity, with half of those participating in the survey willing to pay higher tariffs for improved services (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:1). Clark (2021:2) states that the advantages of attaining SDG7 will lead to alleviating time poverty, economic empowerment, change social norms and will be a key driver of safety of women and elevated maternal health. The 17 SDGs are so intertwined to drive economic, social and sustainable development but SDG7 has been widely recognised as the single, most critical SDG that underpins the rest of the SDGs (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). Opponents believe that vast majority of citizens are unable to service their electricity requirements due to excessively priced electricity tariffs and advocate for low-cost energy production driven by a political agenda (Michaelowa et al., 2020:8). Clark (2021:2) counters this stance by stating that sustainable energy sources costs have been on a downward trajectory to such an extent that the cost-benefit analyses of electrification may favour renewable energy. Global public debt has spiralled to 92.6% of world GDP and has impeded investment in developing countries with SDGs being the sacrificial element in the national budget (South Africa Economic Outlook, 2024:5). Achieving access to energy plays a significant role in shaping the approach to incorporate sustainable development and climate change (Michaelowa et al., 2020:12). Reflecting on this approach, Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) states that access to energy cannot be divorced from social, economic and ecological goals and should rolled out in a sustainable manner. Universal access to electricity must endure a transition that is just, inclusive, sustainable and comply with the Paris Climate Agreement and in turn will sustain the economy (United Nations, 2021:1). 2.4.3. Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) is the South African roadmap for the energy sector was updated in 2019 and specifies the energy mix leading to the net-zero energy transition by 2050 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57; IRP, 2019:8). The IRP 2019 was approved by cabinet and was crucial in providing direction to add a mix of energy to the generation fleet to meet the anticipated demand in future (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:32). The plan incorporated the ideology of a sustainable future through the acquisition of least-cost, secure and reliable supply of energy, lowering GHG emissions, environmental sustainability and water use (Semelane et al., n.d.:57). The IRP as contemplated under the Electricity Regulation Act is a legal document providing direction of South Africa’s energy generation and designed with the ambition of meeting the country’s growing energy demand while sustaining industry standard reserve margin (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:22). The IRP (2023:28) purported that the review is the basis of establishing three distinguishable objectives comprising of the reduction in carbon emissions, security of supply and providing affordable energy. The minister stated that the IRP2019 is South Africa’s guiding policy framework for energy generation and the theoretical energy mix is designed to overcome the challenges of a low-carbon transition (Minister of DMRE, 2021:3). At the time of publishing the IRP2019, the GreenCape (2021:10) found the commitment of the DMRE comforting as the projection for adding wind energy was 14,400 MW, solar PV consisted of 6,400 MW, 4000MW of embedded generation and 2000MW of battery storage. Opponents argue that South Africa had a credible Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2010) and the country should have stuck to the plan and not be influenced by activist ideologies and other thought experiments (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). The South African national power utility is acutely impacted by the transition and must decommission 10 500W of coal-fired power stations by 2030 and a further 35 000 MW by 2050 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57; Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:12). Delays in implementing the original plan has fuelled the national energy disaster while South Africa is searching for impactful short-term solutions to arrest the energy crisis (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:14). The draft 2016 IRP drew responses from major industry players who reflected on the descending costs of renewables and concluded that renewables will be the least cost future of energy generation and objected to the addition of nuclear or coal (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:149). Supporting Just Transition (2020:14) supported the realisation that cost of coal fired energy has been surging while renewable energy costs have decreased significantly, to the point whereby levelized energy cost of in-service and new build coal-fired projects were more expensive than renewables. The GreenCape (2021:16) found the implementation of IRP2019 would boost the economy and create significant job opportunities as more than 14 million solar panels and 3,600 wind turbines would be required amongst other items. The Zimbabwe Renewable Energy Policy 2019 has provided a clear path to attaining energy security in a sustainable manner by including substantial amount of renewable energy (1,100 MW by 2025 or 16.5% of renewables from the total generation) to the generation landscape (Kuhudzai, 2021:23). The South African transition has prompted investors and the private sector to disinvested in “dirty fuel” sources and reinvest in renewable energy. The renewable energy mix is anticipated to consist of hydro, photovoltaic (PV), wind and concentrated solar power (CSP) will constitute 31 230 MW of the total installed capacity by 2030 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57). 2.4.4. Energy Justice The principles of a just transition must encapsulate procedural, distributive, and restorative justice in the planning and decision-making processes (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:31). The transition will fundamentally have to address the triad of inequality, poverty and unemployment without exacerbating the current situation (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:6). Energy justice comprises of three critical elements, namely distributive justice, procedural justice and restorative justice (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8). Hall et al. (2018:773) further elaborates on distributional justice which is concerned with the distribution of environmental benefits and drawbacks as well as responsibilities. Procedural justice relates to decision-making procedures that produces just and fair outcomes, and fair representation ensuring individuals are protected from physical threats and have equitable political rights (Hall et al., 2018:773; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:74; The Presidential Climate Commission Report, 2023:19). Restorative justice addresses historical harm suffered by individuals, communities and the environment and the steps taken to remedy the injustice against deprived and marginalised communities (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:91). Procedural justice is a dimension which highlights the need to address the process and aim of maintaining a process which is fair and inclusive (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8, Patel, 2021:9). The process is implemented in a manner which recognises marginalised and vulnerable groups who are included in the decision-making processes at various stages (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:18). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:74) posits that procedural justice embodies workers, communities and small businesses being entrusted to have a voice and exemplify how they shape their future and maintain their livelihood. Newell et al. (2022:3) supports an inclusive process and argues that the top-down approach undermines their ability to resolve existing energy equalities. Citizens and consumers have an integral role in the decision-making processes and should actively participate in processes such as the location of transmission power lines or nuclear waste disposal sites (Milchram et al., 2018:1247). The Presidential Climate Commission Report (2023:17) lamented over the consultations conducted before the closure of Komati plant which did not meet the threshold of being inclusive and participatory to demonstrate compliance with procedural justice. The second aspect of energy justice is distributive justice which focuses on a fair allocation of resources in a society (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8; Patel, 2021:9). The aim of distributive justice is to address the direct impact arising from the transition process and direct attention to the issue of “double inequality” rooted around the responsibilities of who bears the cost followed by the impact in relation to who should benefit and how should they benefit (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:18; Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8). Milchram et al. (2018:1252) asserts that transparency plays a vital role in addressing both procedural and distributive justice. Montmasson-Clair (2021:8) postulates that distributive justice should encapsulate steps to mitigate losses emerging from the process to creating benefits to improve the lives of the stakeholders in a manner that leaves them better off. Newell et al. (2022:2) warns that in the absence of meaningful commitment from government and businesses, recommendations generated from the process will merely provide a veneer of procedural legitimacy without achieving distributional justice. While distributive justice primarily focuses on the distribution of costs between consumers and suppliers, this relationship is also relevant between different groups of customers (Milchram et al., 2018:1253). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:12) concurs that decisions relating to distribution of costs and benefits should be fair and just. The third aspect is restorative justice which addresses past, present and future harm to communities, individuals and the environment and to generate a framework to ameliorate the position of disenfranchised communities and damage to the environment (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8, Patel, 2021:9). The offending parties and the offended discuss the impact of the harm or damages in a neutral setting and negotiate a just and fair settlement to remedy the situation (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:74). Tension between a just and rapid implementation compounds the process as trade-offs cannot ingrain and entrench injustices, although participatory process will inherently slow down the process but ultimately favour a just and equitable transition (Newell et al., 2022:3). Restorative justice has also been applied to climate change in the context of harm attributed to energy generation through the combustion of fossil-fuel and the emissions of harmful GHG (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:23). Planning a just transition to renewable energy provides an opportunity to address social and governance risks while developing infrastructure that is stable, reliable, affordable and sustainable (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12). Developing countries face a dilemma of abandoning vast quantities of richly available fossil fuel which could propel their economies to competitive heights and pursue renewable energy by maintaining a low carbon footprint (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:38). The Just Transition Principles incorporating procedural, distributive, and restorative justice in the energy sector will mitigate poverty, inequality, and unemployment to ensure a just transition (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12). Creecy (2022:3) advocates for workers and communities to be at the heart of the transition as a prerequisite to enable them to benefit from the establishment of new industries and technology while ensuring that no one is excluded. 2.4.5. Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels Governments and lenders globally came under immense pressure to cease initiating and funding certain fossil-fuel projects with coal-fired power plants distinctly identified as the key sector due to be phased out (Cozzi et al., 2022:55). South Africa has committed to decarbonising by 2050 by reducing its carbon emissions and adopted a coal phase-out strategy aligned with the international approach (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1). Magketla (2021:6) asserts that emissions of GHG in South Africa are the result of beneficiating coal into electricity and petrochemicals with Eskom accounting for 45% of carbon emissions and Sasol responsible for 15%. China pledged in September 2021 to halt any new construction of coal plants overseas which ideally deprived Africa of public funding for new coal plants (Cozzi et al., 2022:55). Globally, signatories to the Paris agreement have committed to a reduction in the demand for coal as coal will eventually become a commodity of the past (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:36). Semelane et al. (n.d.:62) argues that the phase-out of coal from energy production globally is crucial to mitigate the effects of climate change and comply with the Paris Agreement on CO2 reductions. Regardless, the rapid transition to a low carbon future will disadvantage communities economically and socially who have solely relied on the fossil-fuel industry for their livelihood (Neal, 2020:1). Large parts of the world have come onboard to gradually phase down coal utilisation as the transition has become politically desirable and with falling renewable prices being more feasible (Semelane et al., n.d.:62). The cessation of support for fossil-fuel projects by China bodes well for Africa’s transition to renewable energy which halted 25 new coal power projects in 14 African countries with a potential capacity of 15 GW, accounting for 70% of coal-fired projects in sub-Saharan Africa (Cozzi et al., 2022:94). Wang et al. (2020:5) has identified two challenges with the rapid phase-out of coal, firstly abandoned fossil-fuel power plants risk becoming stranded assets and secondly the energy deficit could result in rolling blackouts. The transition from coal through a water-focussed lens highlights the challenge of contaminated water and opportunities to address acid mine drainage (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). The Olifants River has been found to be one of the most polluted rivers in South Africa due to water flowing from the coal belt region and is a source of water for over 4 million people as well as some of the largest irrigations schemes (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:4). The Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:17) states that climate change has negatively impacted on water scarcity and aggravated water availability patterns. Jobs and livelihoods are at risk through coal mine closures, but employment opportunities will arise through restoration of coal mining areas (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). According to the Draft Report, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station utilises significant amounts of water for cooling, which is considered misleading, as the cooling water is sourced from the ocean and does not create competition for limited water availability (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:6). The areas of focus for rehabilitation include mine dumps, revival of natural habitat and the building of artificial wetlands with a primary objective of driving revegetation for the purpose of sustaining the quality of water due acid mine drainage (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). The Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa (2022:1) states that climate change has had a devastating impact on South Africa’s infrastructure, productivity, human resources and limited water availability is at risk. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and financial institutions may reconsider financing fossil-fuel power generation if HELE (High Efficiency, Low Emissions) technology is incorporated in the project (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:64). Africa’s response to climate change and the speed with which action is taken to mitigate it will present an opportunity to address Africa’s socio-economic development against the backdrop of an evolving energy mix, skewed heavily towards renewable energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:174). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:4) supports the transition but advises South Africa requires the enforcement of good governance principles, unwavering leadership and a transition from monopolistic power utilities to a decentralised energy system, driven by renewable energy. The region with the most available renewable energy is the Northern Cape but has exhausted the available grid capacity since Bid Window 5 (Swilling et al., 2023:17). Unfortunately, Africa is exposed to the greatest threat of climate change notwithstanding the fact that Africa contributed the least towards greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Cozzi et al., 2022:174). However, the CCDR encourages the transition from fossil fuel to a low carbon energy system which will produce a wide range of benefits including the elimination of load shedding, enhanced energy security, economic growth and global competitiveness, minimise water, air and soil pollution and reduced carbon emissions (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:1). South Africa’s transition has been gaining momentum as Eskom’s coal procurement has steadily declined from 132.7 million tonnes in 2007/8 to 115.5 million tonnes in 2017/18 (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:1). The South Africa Economic Outlook November report (2022:3) disputes that Eskom achieved this reduction through a concerted effort but was a culmination of high levels of load shedding and private generation. South Africa has an exceedingly high propensity for fossil fuel generation which will negatively impact the country’s global competitiveness as Europe introduces the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:4). Cozzi et al. (2022:174) supports the transition, citing evidence of climate change wreaking havoc with the weather patterns which has already gripped Africa and exposed the African economy to volatility and undermined its ability to attain lasting peace, stability and prosperity. Steps taken to phase-out coal mining will vastly improve food security and significantly minimise contamination of soil (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:21). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:2) asserts that the Global North has the financial capacity, human capital and resources to cushion the impact of the transition to low carbon footprint while the Global South will require significant financial support to shield developing nations from economic hardships. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:6) strongly advises against a deliberate bias towards renewable energy by drawing on predetermined findings and making incoherent recommendations. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) further questions if the carbon emissions for renewable energy was assessed “from cradle to grave”, by including emissions during mining, processing and manufacturing, intercontinental and local transportation, construction and maintenance of renewable energy plants, decommissioning of plants and disposal of waste. The minister of DMRE also warned of consequences of decommissioning power stations as the EPWP (Expanded Public Works Programme) could not replace lost jobs (Minister of DMRE, 2021:4). The Bloomberg study (2021:9) cautions against the political backlash if fossil-fuels are phased out and subsidies for fossil fuel are withdrawn. The minister advocates for the investment in clean coal technologies to maintain the status quo and maximise the exploitation of the natural abundance of coal (Minister of DMRE, 2021:5). The IRP (2023:10) contends that coal will remain the cornerstone of the energy mix due to the abundance of coal resources and the availability of cleaner and efficient technologies to mitigate against the emission of harmful by-products. Africa is not classified as an energy intensive economy except for South Africa, which may present challenges for the continent transitioning to a low carbon emitter (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:4). 2.4.6. Is Small-Scale Embedded Generation the silver bullet? The African continent is vastly enriched with an abundance of natural resources of energy and minerals (Cozzi et al., 2022:136). The transition to renewable energy presents new opportunities and a reduction in the price of electricity, circumventing the addition of carbon tax on goods exported from South Africa (Makgetla, 2021:5). Fossil-fuel exports has been a primary driver of economic growth and development for decades while critical minerals are abundantly available and are crucial for renewable energy technologies such as solar panels, batteries and wind turbines (Cozzi et al., 2022:136). Adding to the argument for renewable energies, renewable energy resources such as bioenergy, solar and wind are in abundance (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa is endowed with 60% of the best solar resources globally (Allen & Overy, 2023:35). Longe (2021:17) presents a convincing case for off-grid renewable energy, citing communities located in rural mountainous areas, are uneconomical to be connected to the grid. The expense of extending the grid would be astronomical, prompting an alternative solution such as off-grid renewable energy micro-grids (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). The implementation of the micro-grid solution can be achieved in a shorter timeframe and at a lower cost (Longe, 2021:17). Energy priorities in the Middle Eastern and Northern African region (MENA region) has propelled the expansion of solar power (Lefore et al., 2021:3). Solar energy in the region is driven by several factors such as high diesel costs, a reduction in fuel subsidies, oil price instability and the reduction of carbon emissions (Bloomberg, 2021:41). Baker and Phillips (2019:179) observed that in recent years, the expeditious adoption of solar energy in South Africa with commercial, high-income residential households and industry installing rooftop or ground-mounted solar PV. Low carbon emission energy generation is predicted to grow at twice the rate observed between 2018 and 2023 and significantly reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2024:11). The Draft Basic Assessment Report (2018:94) however argues that solar PV plants negatively intrudes on the natural landscape which results in visual impact. Lefore et al. (2021:6) advocates for the adoption of micro-grids solar PV which has proven to be affordable and reliable in the agricultural sector for irrigation. Solar-powered micro-irrigation has been directly credited for raising income in the agricultural sector between five to ten times, 300% increase in harvesting yields, 90% water reduction and generating 250kW of clean energy (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:3). However, the Draft Basic Assessment Report (2018:33) asserts that quarterly cleaning requires approximately 5 million to 8 million litres of water per year during operations, which could be more frequent depending on environmental conditions. According to the Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:19), off-grid solar has been touted as the most economical and workable solution to electrify 55% of households without access to electricity within five years. Due to limited grid capacity, the planned acceleration of renewable energy projects faces considerable restrictions and negatively impacts on the number of projects that can be connected to the grid (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The highest demand for energy is largely concentrated in the northeast of the country but superior wind and solar sources are located in the southwest of the country, indicating a mismatch between supply and demand (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:112; Swilling et al., 2023:17). An expeditious expansion of the grid will be critical to transmit energy to where the demand for energy is located, while creating additional grid capacity to accommodate an influx of projects which will maximise the generous wind and solar conditions (SONA, 2024:13). In light of the above challenges, municipalities can play a vital role in promoting the installation of microgrids and SSEGs, improving energy security and minimising the impact of load shedding (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:5). An analysis conducted by PwC revealed that commercial and industrial roof space in the Midrand area in Gauteng amounted to 638,000m2 and if installed with solar PV, could generate 2,000 kWh / m2 per year for 2,500 hours per year (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). The energy generated could potentially total 500 kWh of electricity for 2,500 sunlight hours per year and can be transmitted to the local distribution grid to alleviate the bouts of load shedding, without the constraint of the transmission network (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:5). Swilling et al. (2023:12) advocates for renewable energy fundamentally because renewable energy has been proven to be less costly than coal per kWh sold. Makgetla (2021:1) concurs that the costs associated with the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources is far cheaper than generating electricity from coal. However, renewable energy does not produce energy 24 hours a day as the output is determined by the varying weather conditions, including the sunlit hours in a day (Swilling et al., 2023:12). In order to match the energy produced by coal fired power stations, the renewable energy capacity must be ramped up to produce similar outputs but the cost per kWh of electricity still remains cheaper than energy generated from coal (IEA, 2021:4). The Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:19) supports that position that off-grid technologies are the most economical approach to achieve universal access and is based on geospatial least-cost modelling. A report titled Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:17) has revealed that solar PV has attained grid parity globally and is predicted by IRENA and many other institutions that the cost of solar PV will be further reduced. Advances in technology supported by energy storage, higher efficiencies and improved solar power forecasting, solar PV has become a strong contender and will feature prominently in the energy mix in most countries around the globe (GreenCape, 2021:10). Swilling et al. (2023:21) contends that rooftop solar PV limits transmission grid constraints and cites Vietnam as an example where rooftop solar PV with a capacity of more than 7 GW was installed in 2020. By comparison, South Africa has favourable solar resources, but the adoption of rooftop solar PV has been stagnant and optimistically predicted to reach 7.5 GW of installed capacity by 2035 (Swilling et al., 2023:21). The slow rate of rooftop solar PV adoption is disputed by the authors of a report titled The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis (2022:8) and asserts that municipalities have not taken cognisance of the rapid uptake of rooftop solar PV. However, this omission on the part of the municipalities may be attributed to residents failing to register their installation. The City of Cape town requires all residents to obtain permission prior to installing solar PV and register the installation, notwithstanding the type of installation (Rooftop Solar PV, 2022:7). The City further advises residents that the installer must be registered with The Department of Labour and Employment, and provide a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) after completing the requisite tests and inspections (Rooftop Solar PV, 2022:8). An analysis of customs data by Reuters revealed that South Africa imported R2.2bn worth of solar panels in the first five months of 2022, with the potential to generate 500 MW of energy (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:8; Bavier, Joe and Promit Mukherjee, 2022). The installation of rooftop solar PV will unfortunately have a negative impact on the city’s revenue as more affluent customers who contribute significantly to the city’s income adopt solar PV (Hausmann et al., 2023:75). Municipalities have a critical role to play in plugging the energy deficit by diversifying into energy generation in a sustainable manner to remain relevant and viable (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:2). According to the Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:7), solar installations costs reduced significantly and conversely, installed solar capacity rose substantially. This sentiment is also echoed by International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), reporting that solar PV modules prices have diminished dramatically over the last decade while installed capacity has risen from 40 GW to over 600 GW during the same timeframe, with similar trajectory expected in the future (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:7; Swilling et al., 2023:21). The GreenCape 2022 Market Intelligence report paints a similar picture whereby the rooftop solar PV is expected to balloon at a rate of between 250-400 MW installed per year which translates to a maximum capacity of 7,5 GW by 2035 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:23). The reasons cited for the growth in the South African market is related to cost reduction, maturity of technology and rolling blackouts, with the expectation that the trend will continue on an upward trajectory (IEA, 2021:4). The trend is encouraging as the transition to clean energy technology paves the way for a greener and environmentally friendly future (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:24). Due to the high upfront costs of solar PV, business models are being engineered to support the implementation of rooftop solar PV and are either financed by the installer or through a third-party financing partner, and the amount is settled over a pre-determined timeframe (Swilling et al., 2023:21). There is a tangible business case to pursue this investment when owners of these installations are permitted to export energy back to the grid through net energy metering for energy not being utilised, at a favourable rate to make this option equally attractive (Kuhudzai, 2021:23; IEA, 2022:10). The drawback for the grid operator is the generation and supply of energy to the grid during daylight hours (off peak time) while consuming energy from the grid during peak time (Swilling et al., 2023:21). This drawback can be offset by installing battery storage to negate the effects of the “duckcurve” problem and contribute positively towards the stability of the grid (IEA, 2021:87; Hausmann et al., 2023:58). Makgetla (2021:5) purports that mining companies will be forced to write off coal reserves and capital investment as well as mining jobs as the transition to renewable energy forges ahead. The four districts in Mpumalanga (eMalahleni (Witbank), Steve Tshwete (Middelburg), Govan Mbeki (Secunda) and Msukaligwa (Ermelo)) that rely heavily on coal and coal value chains for economic growth and sustainability, will be forced to seize the opportunity now and start diversifying into new economic activities (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16). A study by Kuhudzai (2021:8) found new settlements in Zimbabwe’s major cities are portrayed by poor planning and lack of enforcement of urban by-laws, which results in poor service delivery to the extent that these establishments may be located close to the grid but remain without access. These residents have opted to install small solar home systems to power up essential devices and lighting (IEA, 2024:20; Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). However, these solar home systems must be maintained from an operational and maintenance perspective which can be significant over the lifespan of the installation (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:20). Factors which affect the performance of the solar installation include local geography, climate conditions, the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation which is directly proportional to soiling of PV modules (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88; Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:20). A survey by Afrobarometer in 2023 found that electricity was ranked third on the list of critical problems that South Africans wanted government to intervene while 60% of respondents wanted Eskom to be privatised to allow other actors to enter the generation and distribution space to stabilise the electricity supply (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:6). The outcome of the last bid window for renewable energy generation, over 3 GW of projects were not approved due to lack of capacity on the transmission network which has further hamstrung future renewable energy projects (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The Renewable Energy Market Update (2023:61) also cited a lack of investment in grid infrastructure as a global challenge which has curtailed new solar PV and wind projects from being implemented. Solar radiation is a natural resource freely available to varying extents globally and the conversion of solar radiation into electricity is largely a function of solar PV plants (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:7). The renewable energy generated by solar PV provides an ideal opportunity for countries and communities to transform their power consumption to a low-carbon energy source and moderate climate change (SONA, 2024:13). China has invested USD 75 billion on average per year since 2010 on grid infrastructure to avoid curtailing variable renewable energy additions to the grid (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:61). In contrast to China’s grid infrastructure investment, South Africa has run out of grid capacity in the Northern Cape which has proved to be the strongest source for variable renewable energy (Swilling et al., 2023:17; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:27). Solar PV is uniquely positioned to be the most suitable yet flexible energy source to provide reliable, affordable and sustainable electricity to a growing number of people globally, to uplift poor households out of poverty while improving their economic development and raising their standard of living (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:11). The Zimbabwean government anticipates a huge spike in demand by 2038 and is promoting solar PV generation to accommodate the demand, as set out in the launched National Renewable Energy Policy 2019 (Kuhudzai, 2021:17). China’s manufacturing sector for renewable energy to supply both domestic and export markets continued to expand at a rapid rate with an increase of 40-50% for wafers, cells and modules and the demand doubled for polysilicon (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:38). Oil prices are subsidised to promote low-cost energy while renewable energy attracts high interest rates in developing countries which favours fossil fuel (Puig et al., 2021:5). Makgetla (2021:10) argues that producers will have to invest in alternative energy source while Sasol and metal refineries will have to source alternative feedstock, a challenge which may require extensive research and innovation. Subsidies may be deemed myopic in the broader context of long-term sustainable solutions as oil price volatility can have devastating effects on electricity tariffs (International Energy Agency, 2022:17). However, solar PV continues to weather the storm and has become the dominant source of renewable energy, capturing 65% of the market growth, with a combination of commercial and industrial applications (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:18). The pitfalls of renewable energy cannot be ignored as the reliability and stability of variable renewable energy (VRE) is of paramount concern (IEA, 2021:115). Variable renewable energy is weather-dependent and delivers an output which can be variable, erratic and can destabilise the grid due to unplanned fluctuations (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). A study titled Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:8) further elaborates on the disadvantages of solar PV and states that solar energy output is influenced by latitude, cloud cover, terrain elevation and shading, atmospheric aerosol concentration, and moisture content in the atmosphere. Nowak et al. (2021:2) posits that the African continent has immense potential and an abundance of energy resources due to the continents geographical location but are hindered from large scale implementation as a result of financial constraints. Michaelowa et al. (2020:3) advises that a distinction between off-grid and on-grid renewable energy projects must be acknowledged as off-grid projects attract higher initial investment costs and are not competitive with large scale projects. A further hinderance is the array of physical and regulatory land-use limitations and a practical solar PV potential assessment can determine the value added after incorporating all these inputs (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:8). The Russian invasion of Ukraine created a global energy crisis and triggered a spike in electricity prices as solar PV installations were positioned as economically viable and cost effective for both commercial and residential clients (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:18; International Energy Agency, 2022:17). The Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:20) states that the solar PV installation during year 0 performs at the manufactured peak with a degradation of 0.8% for the first year followed by 0.5% thereafter until the end of the anticipated lifecycle of 25 years. There has been growing appetite in South Africa for renewable energy with the government announcing a Solar Panel Tax incentive during the State of the Nation Address (SONA), allowing individuals to claim a 25% rebate on rooftop solar PV panels to a maximum value of R15 000 for individuals and 125% tax deduction for qualifying businesses (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:30; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). The International Energy Agency (2022:17) forecasts a growth of almost 2400GW of global renewable energy between 2022 and 2027, the equivalence of the entire installed capacity of China. The only renewable energy technology that is growing exponentially is solar PV and has been breaking annual capacity records (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:16). However, Puig et al. (2021:5) maintains that there is no silver bullet to achieve universal access as potential solutions must appeal to local conditions. 2.5. Regulations and Regulatory Framework The regulations governing the installation of SSEGs are both essential and mandatory to safeguard the homeowner as well as the distributor’s network, according to the Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998 (Embedded generation policy, 2023:1; Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:8). The Embedded generation policy (2023:7) requires municipalities to enforce regulations where SSEGs are approved by ensuring that the installations are installed, commissioned and signed off by suitably qualified personnel. The “requirements” document specifies the details essential for compliance and the commissioning report must be submitted on the prescribed document to the municipality. Although the rules may vary between different municipalities, the fundamental requirements of an application process and technical compliance has been standardised across the licensed distributors (Filipova and Morris, 2018:3). However, the net-consumer condition attached to the installation mandates the customer to consume more energy than what is exported to the grid on an annual basis to protect the municipal revenue (Filipova and Morris, 2018:3). Conway (2019:13) asserts that Section 74 subsection 2c and 2e of The Municipal Systems Act (2000) directs municipalities to subsidise poor households through cross-subsidisation. The tariffs for high-income, high-consumption customers are elevated to cross-subsidise low-income households which is guided by progressive economic policy to protect citizens living in poverty (Filipova and Morris, 2018:10). The threat of the upper-middle-income and high-income households defecting to SSEGs undermines the ability of the municipality to generate sufficient revenue from a dwindling customer base to cross-subsidise poor households (Low- and middle-income grid-connected solar PV approaches in South Africa: Discussion paper, n.d:1). The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) was prompted by Nelson Mandela Bay pilot project to generate Standard Conditions for Embedded Generation within Municipal Boundaries in September 2011 (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). According to the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006, all generators of electricity must be licensed by NERSA (Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities, 2014:6). Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006 defines the parameters of capacity that must be registered and which systems must be licensed by NERSA (Embedded generation policy, 2023:3). However, the regulations at the time allowed private electricity producers with a capacity of less than 100kW to operate without a generation license (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). Therefore, the municipalities were empowered to approve SSEG systems less than 100kW in the absence of NERSA approval (Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities, 2014:6). Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act 2006 (DoE 2020) was amended and gazetted on 26th March 2020 which modified SSEG license exemption and registration with NERSA (Status of small-scale embedded generation, 2020:3). The amended Act permitted generators up to 1MW from being exempted from obtaining a license from NERSA (Status of small-scale embedded generation, 2020:12). The Electricity Regulation Act under schedule 2 was further amended to exempt SSEG with a capacity of up to 100MW from licensing requirements (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:12). The Embedded generation policy (2023:1) asserts that the Association of Municipal Electricity Utilities (AMEU) and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) have formulated standardised procedures and supporting documentations to support municipalities to champion and smoothly navigate the process in conjunction with national policies and regulation. According to Section 156 (1) and Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution, municipalities have been empowered with the legislative and executive authority to manage and regulate electricity reticulation (Embedded generation policy, 2023:2; Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:8). The Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities (2014:5) defines Anti-islanding as “the ability of the inverter to isolate from the distribution network when the network power is off, thus ensuring the safety of technicians working on the network” and must be enforced by the municipality. The Embedded generation policy (2023:3) states that embedded generation must not impact safety, quality of power and grid operational specifications which can be achieved through the compliance and enforcement of technical specifications and standards. The standards and specifications can be sourced in the Grid Code, NRS097-2 series of specifications for SSEGs, the SANS 10142-1-2: The wiring of premises and Specific requirements for embedded generation installations connected to the low voltage distribution Network in South Africa (Embedded generation policy, 2023:3). 2.6. Case Studies 2.6.1. Case study 1: Why did the Boomplaas renewable energy project fail? SSEGs in South Africa were not subsidised through government policy or regulations but were driven by the national electricity crisis and waning public confidence, rapidly rising tariffs and declining solar PV costs which favoured wealthy consumers (Baker and Phillips, 2019:191). This contrasts with high-income countries such as the UK and Germany where adoption is encouraged by regulation and worthy subsidies. In South Africa, Boomplaas informal settlement located near Keimoes in the Northern Cape was an exception and was chosen as a pilot project for the installation of domestic rooftop solar PV in 2012 (Kumar et al., 2019: 170; McEwan, 2017:10). A total of sixteen houses were identified as beneficiaries of the solar PV project where two 240W solar panels combined with a 1000W inverter and six 2V batteries were installed at a total cost of R1 million (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). In addition to the solar PV installation, internal wiring was installed in each house as well as fittings for pull switch lights and plug sockets for appropriately rated household appliances. The project was implemented due to political pressure from a senior member of South African Communist Party (SACP) which is a part of the ruling alliance (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The project proved to be a dismal failure as a result of unrealistic promises made regarding the solar system’s capabilities by politicians with no technical expertise in this field (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The units performed below expectation of the end users and lacked support and a maintenance plan which caused several units to fail (McEwan et al., 2013:6; McEwan, 2017:10). The project incorporated two community members who received a week’s paid training and were expected to perform basic maintenance services. The trainees were constantly being bombarded by the community to provide maintenance, diagnose and repair the system without compensation (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). Furthermore, the trainees had limited technical knowledge devoid of any support from the installers and no spares. Although the installers committed to proving post-installation repairs, potential infringement on the warranty terms and conditions caused the warranty to be null and void, converting an asset into a liability. 2.6.2. Case study 2: Pilot project in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, South Africa The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) is a metropolitan municipality located in the Eastern Cape and incorporates Gqeberha (formerly known as Port Elizabeth), Kariega (previously known as Uitenhage) and Despatch (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, n.d). According to ICLEI Case Studies (2015:1), the NMBM initiated a pilot project of SSEG consisting of solar PV and wind energy for the sole purpose of generating energy and dispatching the power to the grid and measuring the production through a net energy meter (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:1). NERSA approved the application for the pilot project which consisted of 1kW wind and 1kW solar PV which was later raised to 5kW (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). The findings of the experiment of the pilot project were that SSEGs were not financially viable but sustainable from a technical perspective (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). The pilot project was initiated at a time when electricity tariffs were affordable and renewable energy was in its infancy stage and the costs of renewable energy was exorbitant (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). However, the project became feasible as the cost of electricity begun escalating while the cost of renewables begun declining aggressively. 2.6.3. Case study 3: iShack Project The iShack Project was the brainchild of the Sustainability Institute just outside Stellenbosch and the initiative was a social project to provide residents in informal settlements with off-grid solar electricity in 2012 (iShack Project, n.d). The project was executed in conjunction with Stellenbosch University’s TsamaHUB and funding was provided by the Gates Foundation (Hweshe, 2012). The “i” in iShack means an improved shack which was retrofitted with a solar panel and the first demo was built in Enkanini in 2012 (Glasser, 2017:34). The installation had limited capacity to supply three led lights, a cellular phone charger and a motion sensor security light (Hweshe, 2012). Although the solar system cannot power up a stove or fridge, the installation has improved the lives of the residents who did not previously have access to electricity. According to the Glasser (2017:34)., clients are presented with two options, the “Free Basic system” which powers three lights and a charger or the contract system with an upgraded capacity which can additionally power up a LED television set, radios, tablets and smartphones. The iShack project prides itself on building local capacity, developing renewable energy skills and creating “green jobs” within the communities that are being serviced (iShack project, n.d). The iShack agents are members of the community who receive weekly training from the Sustainability Institute to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to deliver a high-quality service to the community (Sustainability Institute, n.d). The pilot phase consisted of electrifying 100 shacks with solar PV over a period of 18 months in the Enkanini informal settlement and proved to be highly successful (Hweshe, 2012). The full-scale rollout of renewable energy electrification was initiated in 2019 to electrify 580 homes serving over 3000 residents in informal settlements of Malawi Camp and Freedom Farm (Hweshe, 2012). The communities were expected to pay a subsidised joining fee and a monthly service fee to drive the sustainability of the service delivery project. The project costs per shack ranged from R7 000 and R10 000 per installation (Hweshe, 2012). 2.7. The Energy-Poverty-Climate Nexus 2.7.1. Energy Poverty 2.7.1.1. Energy Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) estimate that 3 billion people globally are energy poor and resort to utilising combustibles such as wood to meet their cooking and heating needs. In sub-Saharan Africa, energy poverty affects predominantly females as women and girls are delegated the responsibility of acquiring and utilising traditional biomass energy sources for cooking and heating (Longe, 2021:1). Exceptionally high levels of poverty can be attributed as the key reason for unaffordability of modern energy services even though the energy may be subsidised (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:50) estimates that the demand for energy on the African continent will double the growth of the global average. Rising energy prices is also a contributing factor to energy poverty as high prices undermines the ability of people to pay for energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). Allen & Overy (2023:36) assert that the recent global developments including the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war had a ripple effect on the cost of food and fuel prices, which caused debt in most African countries to rise exponentially. An analysis of the average residential rates in several sub-Saharan African countries in 2020 found that electricity prices were higher than the average Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries before making allowance for the differences in purchasing power between the economies (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The energy transition landscape has endured fundamental changes worldwide with varying significance attached to elements of the “energy trilemma” representing energy affordability and accessibility, energy security and reliability, and clean and sustainable energy (Sasol Climate Change Report, 2023:19). Predictably, in some African countries with lifeline tariffs, the average exceeded the OECD even with purchasing power parity adjustments (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The ramification of higher energy prices amplified energy poverty in Africa and curtails utilisation of modern-day energy service, even if they have access (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:141). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:1) assert that energy poverty reduction and universal access to energy is a fundamental right which lays the foundation for a low carbon transition and creates an economy which is environmentally friendly. There are two key elements which are essential to address household poverty: access to adequate and affordable energy to meet the basic human needs of the household (General House Survey, 2021:42). The Survey further determined that the basic human needs encompass lighting, cooking, space heating and water heating which is a diverse set of criteria utilised to determine access and affordability. A reasonable standard of living would require electricity for cooking, refrigerator to store food, water heating, for communication purposes and entertainment (Ye and Koch, 2020:16). Applied social scientists have come to the realisation that households embrace flexibility to some degree and do not limit their energy source exclusively to a single source of energy (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). This realisation is prevalent in rural communities whereby households’ resort to utilising inefficient combustion of biomass for preparation of the main meal for the day (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). The General House Survey (2021:42) utilises this information to influence future electrification planning programmes to provide adequate capacity and determine what are the future energy needs from a generation capacity. The rapid transition from inefficient biomass cookstoves to low-carbon and sustainable technologies on the African continent cannot be delayed any longer (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). Rural areas in South Africa can be classified into two well-defined classifications, one being the traditional areas which falls under the responsibility of the tribal chief and the second area known as commercial farms (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:12). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) adds another layer to the grouping of informal areas by incorporating informal settlements and backyard dwellers who migrated to burgeoning urban informal settlements in the quest for better economic opportunities. According to the South African constitution, “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” which gave rise the RDP housing, built in economically disconnected areas (Hausmann et al., 2023:94). Rapid urbanisation from rural areas to informal urban settlements on the urban periphery has created another dimension to the universal access programme as the unplanned settlement created a burden for municipalities to provide services which were not initially planned and budgeted for (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). Unfortunately, informal dwellers residing on the urban periphery of cities, are not residing on proclaimed land for housing and are therefore not entitled to the provision of basic services (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:5). Lack of investment in rural areas by the private sector and utilities can be attributed to the exorbitant costs and risks linked to electrifying sparsely populated areas and low consumers of energy (Jeuland et al., 2021:3). Due to the slow pace of electrification of rural areas, a spike in urbanisation has been witnessed, as communities desperately seek a change in their economic future (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). The electrification programme is unable to provide grid connection in remote rural areas within the short or medium term and can only offer non-electrification grid connection such as solar PV (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). The perception of the provision of services and access to energy in urban areas is misleading as municipalities are often under-capacitated and do not have the financial means, amongst other challenges, to provide basic services (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) commends municipalities which have risen above their challenges and implemented innovative solutions through the “maypole method” in informal settlements whereby several households are supplied with electricity which is drawn from a pole using a single transformer. Ngarava et al. (2022:9) attributes historic racial and employment discrimination coupled with dysfunctional schooling system as the key drivers of impeding economic opportunity and obtaining credit as contributing factors to energy poverty, predominantly amongst Blacks and Coloureds in South Africa. A study by Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:3) found that energy poverty has the biggest impact on low-income household based on several factors but not restricted to income levels. Allen & Overy (2023:37) concur that developing countries face extreme challenges with alleviating energy poverty. However, energy poverty can be extended to include low literacy levels, power dynamics within the household, distance and lack of transport, as well as the lack of energy subsidies (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:3). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:14) argue that cooking has been singled out as the activity that utilises the most amount of energy in low-income household in South Africa. The level of poverty has impacted on their ability to pay for basic electricity services as people resort to unconventional means for cooking and heating (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). All staple foods must be cooked before consumption and whole grains are examples of foods which produces higher nutritional values but consumes more energy due to lengthy cooking times (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) supports this view and further states that, although low-income households have access to electricity, such households resort to utilising different sources of energy (energy stacking) due to several important factors. According to a study by Longe (2021:3), women in rural areas had to develop creative strategies to deal with energy poverty although not necessarily producing the desired results. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) acknowledges these challenges and added that ranking high up amongst the challenges is availability and affordability of energy, type of foods being prepared, and their dependence on unclean sources of energy such as wood and paraffin when the energy units in the electricity meter are exhausted. They have employed cooking techniques to reduce their cooking duration, time of consuming meals, change in diet, utilising lower fuel-intensive cooking processes, cooking with unhealthy sources of energy and lastly, eating cold foods and leftovers (Longe, 2021:3). After the depletion of electricity credits, the limited options available to poor households is cooking with polluting sources of energy (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). The Gender Snapshot (2023:17) states that clean cooking fuels and technology and access to electricity is beneficial for women as they will enjoy improved health and a reduction in poverty. Households without access to a refrigerator or own a refrigerator but have no energy credits, cannot purchase, and store raw foods or store leftover food to be consumed the next day (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). Jeuland et al. (2021:7) argues that low-income households may be influenced by energy technologies providing multiple advantages such as cooking on a traditional stove will provide secondary benefits of distributing heat in the home. Key drivers to a rapidly rising energy demand are the population growth and economic activity (Cozzi et al., 2022:59). A total of 9 percent of the global population lack access to electricity and more than a quarter utilise polluting fuels and technologies (The Gender Snapshot, 2023:17). The African continent is home to 1.3 billion people in 2020 and experienced a yearly growth rate of 2.5%, a figure that is twice the average global rate (Cozzi et al., 2022:59). Notwithstanding the alarming growth rate, Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:3) argue that energy poverty should not be contingent upon the individual’s or household’s wealth status but contend that the lack of access to energy exacerbates poverty and impedes human development and survival. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:16) advocates for addressing energy poverty through a two-pronged approach: Firstly, households should be in a position to access the minimum amount of energy required to raise their standard of living and embark on more productive and entrepreneurial activities which can boost their income. Secondly, the energy utilised by the households must be safe and clean, and sources of energy from paraffin and firewood should be totally avoided. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) supports this approach as the risk of using paraffin and candles have led to numerous shack fires which have destroyed entire informal settlements. Ledger (2021) states that the constrained energy system does not support the country’s transformation and socio-economic development goals by providing universal access and sufficient energy (Ledger, 2021; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:5). Ngarava et al. (2022:6) postulates that many households face energy vulnerability in South Africa with the highest exposure risk of being cut-off (disconnected) for non-payment of electricity. In the United States, Memmott et al. (2021:190) found that energy insecurity affected approximately 4.8 million low-income households who were unable to service at least one energy bill during the past year, with more than two in five families unable to service their account which resulted in their energy being disconnected. Ngarava et al. (2022:7) cited high tariffs have led to disconnections as the cost of energy rises beyond the means of poor South Africans. South Africa has made monumental progress in achieving universal access to electricity but faces an unprecedented 43% households that are energy poor (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:141) concedes that, although the electrification rate hovers around 84%, energy poverty has confined people to dirty fuel sources such as paraffin, dung, coal and wood. Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) states that economic forces directly impact on the source of energy and the transition to a more efficient fuel. Failure to address the widening gap caused by energy poverty will enforce the triad of poverty, inequality and unemployment, a problem that is rapidly spiralling out of control (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1: Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:1) advocates for a just energy transition that will drive energy equity while achieving a low carbon footprint. A higher living standard will generally accelerate the transition to a cleaner and more efficient energy source (Di Falco and Lynam, 2023:1). Allen & Overy (2023:34) assert that some segments on the African continent have launched claims of environmental colonialism based on two reasons, firstly citing that developing countries that have succeeded in reducing the levels of poverty have simultaneously intensified the rates of per capita carbon emissions and secondly, a third of the population on the African continent lives in abject poverty, rendering the call to minimise GHG emissions as unfair and unjust. The pursuit of a low carbon footprint would not necessarily inflate the cost or affordability of electricity (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). Solar photovoltaic and wind energy resources are delivering the cheapest electricity, largely due to their falling costs and technological advancements and as a fringe benefit, reducing the carbon footprint of the energy sector (IEA, 2021:4). The true cost of electricity, incorporating avoided environmental externalities, results in astronomical savings whilst pursuing an ambitious decarbonisation pathway (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). Nowak et al. (2021:23) argues that challenges arising from inefficient governmental institutions coupled with excessively high levels of corruption is derailing governments’ plans to achieve universal access to electricity. This results in disillusioned stakeholders who are apathetic and become impervious to critical matters of national importance. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) however cautions against withdrawal of subsidies which customers have historically benefited from, as tariffs may spike while evolving to a low carbon energy network. Nowak et al. (2021:23) supports the investment in electrification to improve GDP per capita and an improved Human Development Index (HDI index). Creecy (2022:4) advocates for exploiting the opportunities of cheap and reliable electricity which is abundantly supported by a surplus of natural resources (sun and wind) and support from the international community to decarbonise the energy sector. 2.7.1.2. Impact of Covid-19 on Energy Poverty The African continent economies performed exceptionally well between 2010 and 2019 and grew at an average rate of 3%, until the Covid-19 pandemic struck and derailed growth, plummeting the continent into its first recession since the 2009 global financial crisis (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). The coronavirus pandemic decimated economies globally and South Africa was not spared the hardship although the country was already undergoing economic challenges and was saddled with a high unemployment rate (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused a global crisis with pronounced impacts on the health of the populations and contraction of economies, largely due to restriction of movement and shutting down of borders (World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results, 2022:1). The pandemic had a negative impact on society and further led to embedded energy poverty which impeded people’s ability to pay for electricity for cooking, lighting and space heating (World Development Report, 2022:3). A study by Memmott et al. (2021:190) concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated energy insecurity which was attributed to the economic dislocation and the inability of households to meet their energy needs. (Cozzi et al. (2022:15) advocated for an accelerated transition to cheaper and cleaner sources of energy which was driven by the global energy crises. The Covid‐19 pandemic had already placed significant strain on the African economies (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10; IEA, 2021:90) and was further impacted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). The invasion sent shockwaves through the global economies, spiking food, energy and commodity prices (Hepburn et al., 2020:16). The pandemic exposed the magnitude of inequality and poverty in the country with the state introducing programmes to address poor people’s inability to pay for food, basic services and education (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). According to World Development Report, the pandemic exacerbated the ability of lenders to analyse the credit risk of borrowers while lenders were constrained when borrowers defaulted on their loans (Klapper et al.,2022:15). Fig. 2.1: COVID-19-related conditions and energy insecurity. Source: Sociodemographic disparities in energy insecurity among low-income households before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021. Figure 2.1. illustrates how the various categories were impacted by the public health crisis and more particularly, the three levels of energy insecurity experienced by households (Memmott et al., 2021:189). A significant portion of households were either served with a disconnection notice, could not pay their energy account or were ultimately disconnected, a rather harsh approach adopted by the service providers in the face of the crippling pandemic (Cozzi et al., 2022:15). Ledger & Rampedi, (2022:4) discovered that the economic shock, as a consequence of the national lockdown, exacerbated poverty and inequality to the extent that poor households lacked the ability to pay for a basic bouquet of essential services with electricity being the most prominent casualty. Middle-income households were not shielded from the economic turmoil with household incomes diminishing by a minimum margin of 5% and had a ripple effect on their ability to service their municipal accounts (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:99). The harsh reality conflicted with steps the government had undertaken to cushion the blow of the pandemic, especially for poor households (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). The effects of Covid-19 led to economic and social impacts which resulted in substantial job losses and devastating impact on the global economy (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:6) further stated that low-income households developed strategies to address energy poverty by pleading for assistance on social media or tagging celebrities with details of their meter number, with the hope of receiving assistance. Lu et al. (n.d:15) asserted that the lockdown had a devastating effect in the renewable energy field as labour shortages were acutely felt, supply chains were disrupted, leading to material shortages and new installation were delayed. The lockdowns implemented during the height of covid-19 diminished economic activity and resulted in low energy demand with non-conventional demand patterns (IEA, 2021:90; Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:15). Hepburn et al. (2020:4) avers that the citizens were pressuring governments to take decisive steps prior to the onset of the pandemic but experienced a momentous setback as the virus spread rapidly. The cascading impact of abandoned projects negatively undermined the progress to achieving universal access, with 4% more people descending into the lack of access grouping in 2021 than 2019 (Cozzi et al., 2022:15). However, the Covid-19 pandemic also provided an opportunity to transform the energy sector to a low carbon and climate resilient sector in a just, inclusive and sustainable manner (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:12). The health crisis further compounded the fragile economy and accelerated public debt which prompted governments to act with urgency to contain the economic, environmental and social risks facing the country (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:22). However, the lack of competent economic and social policies coupled with “state capture” exacerbated fiscal debt to a staggering 70.2 percent of GDP in 2020 (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:3). The Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action (2023:22) claims that significant progress has been achieved in recent years, however, the African continent faces a myriad of challenges. Although Africa was derailed from reaching significant milestones on the journey of SDG7 (access to electricity and clean cooking), the pandemic proved to be a hurdle of epic proportions as projects were hampered by delays and household incomes dwindled (Cozzi et al., 2022:35). The health crisis was found to have a disproportionate impact on lower-income and middle-income countries as the public health systems were stretched to breaking point and social packages displaced climate action to take precedence in the national budget (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). The Covid-19 pandemic created a health crisis that crippled economies around the world, with Africa facing the brunt of the impact (World Development Report, 2022:20). The challenges were further exacerbated by climate change and increasing public debt reaching unsustainable levels, with governments scrambling to address the economic, social and environmental risks plaguing the continent (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:22). Cozzi et al. (2022:35) concurs with the Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action report and further asserts that the pandemic negatively impacted on new grid and off-grid connection rates. The root cause was multi-faceted, from the logistical and financial hinderances to supply chain disruptions and social distancing (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). 2.7.1.3. Demystifying Energy Affordability People living in extreme poverty are burdened with energy costs ranging from 15% to 35% of their annual household income when resorting to off-grid solutions for the purpose of cooking and heating (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the cost of electricity has ballooned by 177% from the period of 2010 to 2020 in the municipal environment (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:68). However, government, labour, and civil society groups have raised pertinent issues regarding privatization of the energy sector under the auspices of a transition to renewables, thereby depriving the poor and marginalised communities’ access and affordability (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:22). According to Akrofia and Antwi (2020:3), the energy infrastructure is fragile and aggravated by rising levels of energy poverty which deprive the utilities of desperately needed income to modernise the network. According to Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, expenditure on electricity affordability for minimum requirements for cell phone charger, four light bulbs (4 hours per day), fan (3 hours per day) and a television (2 hours per day) accumulating to 500 kWh per year should not exceed 5% of household income (Ledger & Rampedi, 2022:24). Electricity subsidies and lifeline tariffs across African countries does not cater for the cooking and heating needs of low-income households (Cozzi et al., 2022:120). Eskom remains the dominant provider of electricity and the cost of energy has risen to unaffordable levels (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:12). Rural women in South Africa are responsible for sourcing biomass and had to devise strategies to deal with the varying levels of energy poverty they encountered (Longe, 2021:3). The strategies devised included minimising the cooking times, consuming cold foods, changes in diet, utilising lower fuel-intensive processes for cooking and procuring alternative cooking fuels (Longe, 2021:3). Affordable electricity is crucial to enable low-income households to reap the full social, economic and health benefits and improve their standard of living (Cozzi et al., 2022:120). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) assert that affordability remains a critical element of the energy conundrum and the theoretical approach to access does not adequately address the problem. The GreenCape (2021:9) avers that it is imperative to contain rising electricity costs and manage the grid to restore reliability of supply. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) acknowledge that connection to the grid is essential in achieving universal access but the cost recovery is often a long-drawn-out process. Hausmann et al. (2023:56) believes that the South African government should bolster the entire system financially but concede there will be trade-offs between access and affordability. Many countries, including South Africa, partially or fully subsidises the connection fees, with the expectation that the user pays for consumption (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:21). Cozzi et al. (2022:119) posits that policies, measures and programmes are crucial to switching to clean cooking technologies. The nexus of the energy source and poverty must be carefully evaluated as unaffordable electricity may drive households into consuming less nutritious food contingent upon cooking times (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:22). However, the cost of conversion can be exorbitant in the context of a low-income household with an improved charcoal cooking stove consuming approximately one-third of monthly income, 50% of monthly income for LPG, and 75% for electricity (Cozzi et al., 2022:119). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) maintain that affordability remains the greatest obstacle for low-income households and small enterprises, negating the benefits of having access to energy. Low-income households are financially challenged and can only afford low electricity consumption (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:22). The State of Energy in South African Cities report (2020:43) states that the consumption of electricity is declining due to fuel switching in response to spiralling electricity costs. Small-scale farmers and small businesses are faced with a similar challenge but cannot afford increased consumption to boost productivity or participate in any additional value-added activities to grow their businesses and increase employment (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:22). However, Cozzi et al. (2022:121) argues that cooking with electricity will improve electricity sales and profitability for utilities and will generate a higher investment in growth strategies and support lower energy tariffs. Innovative solutions were developed by businesses to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies and spreading the upfront costs over a period of time to address to issue of affordability (Cozzi et al., 2022:121). However, many cities are circumspect with the installation of solar PV in residential areas as the reduced electricity sales have negatively impacted municipal revenue (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:72). According to the Presidential Climate Commission report (2023:25), municipalities are responsible for the planning, maintenance and management of electricity distribution which is a major revenue stream but suffers from a variety of challenges and is reduced to a loss-making entity. The PayGo business model for solar home systems (SHS) is touted as a solution whereby the upfront costs are recovered through payments in instalments (Cozzi et al., 2022:121). 2.7.1.4. High-Emission Fuel Sources Chanchani and Oskarsson’s (2021:4) study of the Indian villages of Raipur and Korba identified several different household sources of energy in low-income areas namely coal chunks, coal cakes, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), firewood, cow dung, husk cakes and electricity. In rural households, utilising dirty biomass fuels in inefficient traditional cookstoves to cook the main meal for the family is a common practice (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). Solid biomass fuel consists of fuelwood, waste and charcoal which is used as an energy source in a three stone fire coupled with a basic inefficient stove (Cozzi et al., 2022:65). Lakdi (firewood) can be sourced from urban peripheries or purchased in a processed form of wood chips from the furniture manufacturing industry and Lakdi can be used solely as a fuel or alternatively as a starter for different coal fuels or as a combination of fuel with cheena (dung cakes) (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Longe (2021:4) posits that in South Africa, unclean sources of energy for cooking include firewood (7.7%), coal (0.4%), and paraffin (3.6%), while clean sources of energy for cooking are gas (3.6%), electricity (76.8%), and solar energy (0.1%). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:73) contends that households which are connected to the grid additionally utilise energy sources such as coal and firewood for cooking. The traditional utilisation of biomass fuel in sub-Saharan Africa is the dominant source of energy in residential areas, with more than 80% of the population depending on this inefficient energy source (Cozzi et al., 2022:65). The energy source utilised depends largely on the availability and affordability as more than one energy source or a combination of energy sources are used for cooking (Longe, 2021:4). The utilisation of dirty fuel sources can provide secondary services when considering open flame for cooking which can also heat the home and provide warmth and will influence the household decision in respect of the choice of fuels (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). The efficiency of three stone fires that burn biomass fuel is exceptionally low with efficiencies from as little as 10% rising to a maximum of 25% and due to their low efficiencies, solid biomass in three stone fires consume more than 95% of the total residential energy use in sub-Saharan Africa stoves (Cozzi et al., 2022:66). Longe (2021:4) asserts that solar cook stoves are not popular and account for only 0.1% of the energy mix for cooking in South Africa. According to le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:24), residents in informal urban areas do not have the luxury of time and access to forests to collect wood and traditional biomass fuels. The fuels required to achieve the desired result means a longer duration consumed for cooking and much more fuel must be gathered, translating to significantly more time to collect firewood (Longe, 2021:4). Residents are therefore compelled to move up the energy ladder, shifting to electricity, gas or paraffin (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:24). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:141) asserts that while access to the grid has soared to 84%, the reality is that many households cannot afford the cost of electricity and are compelled to resort to utilising wood, coal, paraffin, candles and dung. Figure 2.2: Percentage distribution of main sources of energy used for cooking by year, 2002–2021 Source: General House Survey, 2021 The General House Survey (2021:44) revealed the main sources of energy utilised for the period of 2002 to 2021 for cooking are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The trend in cooking utilising electricity rose from 57,5% in 2002 to 77,7% in 2021. There was a noticeable decline in the utilisation of unclean fuels such as coal, paraffin and firewood. The decline in the use of paraffin for cooking dropped considerably from 16,1% in 2002 to 3,5% in 2021, while firewood followed the same trajectory, declining from 20,0% in 2002 to 7,7% in 2021. On a positive front, the utilisation of gas for cooking rose marginally from 2,2% in 2002 to 4,8% in 2021. The utilisation of dirty fuels can have dire consequences on low-income households from the adverse impacts of indoor air pollution, poisonings, burns, shack fires and deaths, with women and children falling victims to these hazards (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:141). These impacts can have devastating consequences on the availability of human capital to empower countries to flourish economically and become competitive in future (Fisher et al., 2021:686). 2.7.1.5. Sourcing of Harmful Energy Sources In the Indian village of Korba, low-income households scavenge for coal chunks at local coal mines and along transport routes (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) do not have access to electricity and find it incumbent to source firewood to meet their energy requirements but face grave risks and hostilities from host communities who witness the devastation of their environment and deforestation (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:31). In sub-Saharan Africa, as much as 81% of the population energy needs hinges on traditional biomass to meet their heating and cooking requirements (Nowak et al., 2021:3). In South Africa, scavenging for solid biomass is also culturally gendered as women and girls are responsible for collecting firewood to meet the energy requirements of the household (Longe, 2021:5). Longe’s (2021:10) research further discovered that the collecting of firewood was dependent on the proximity of the source, the quantity required and the nature of the energy demand. Nowak et al. (2021:4) shares a similar view and further adds that time was a factor in sourcing and maintaining biomass, a fundamental task assigned to women and children, causes indoor air pollution, leads to deforestation and soil degradation. Appropriating coal for household use is gendered in India and women rise early in the morning to accomplish this task as competition for free and limited energy source is high (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Deforestation in nearby bushes and mountains has led to the depletion of good wood for cooking, resulting in longer periods of time dedicated to this task as good firewood is located further away (Longe, 2021:5). Ngarava et al. (2022:1) agrees that women are burdened with the responsibility of collecting energy fuel due to power relations, social dynamics and lack of access and control. Lakdi (firewood) can be collected on the outskirts of urban areas or through social contacts from private properties (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Collecting firewood was found to be extremely risky, as women and girls face the risk of rape and kidnapping, wild animals and snakes and injuries (Longe, 2021:17). Mulugetta et al. (2019:3) shares this view and elucidates fuel sourcing by women and children elevates the risk of injury and personal security and deprives them of leisure time or income generating activities. A significant portion of the day (2 to 9 hours) is consumed by women in developing countries collecting fuel and fodder and are further compelled to prepare meals for the household (Ngarava et al., 2022:1). The unfortunate situation is that the opportunity cost whereby income-generating activities could be executed are lost to menial household tasks (Ngarava et al., 2022:5). The time could be better utilised by engaging in productive activities that has the potential of generating an income and raising their standard of living (Longe, 2021:10). The report on the State of energy in South African municipalities (2020:103) maintains that households generally preserve the traditional gender roles whereby women carry the burden of gathering energy fuel amongst other duties. There is undoubtedly a need for the collection of energy fuel to be spread evenly across household members and gender equity must be embraced (Longe, 2021:10). The lack of access to electricity places a significant burden on women in low-income households in rural areas to secure fuel for the household’s energy needs (State of energy in South African municipalities, 2020:103). The presence of men and boys in the collection of firewood would safeguard the women and girls against attacks from predators patrolling the forests, preying on helpless victims (Longe, 2021:10). The division of chores would balance out the time spent by both women and men while achieving gender equity and lead to more girls remaining in school and completing their studies. 2.7.1.6. Unauthorized Power Connections: A Threat to Utility Stability Eskom defines non-technical losses as “energy losses due to electricity theft through illegal connections, tampering and bypassing of electricity meters as well as the purchase of electricity tokens from unregistered or illegal vendors. It includes meter reading and billing errors” (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:137). Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:4) assert that electricity is solely used to power up small appliances and lighting due to rising costs and limited budget. Therefore, alternative means are devised for the purpose of daily cooking in the Indian village of Dhuvan Basti where illegal connections to the overhead electrical conductors provided free electricity. In comparison, the US power grid has encountered 4 493 attacks between 2020 to 2022, with half of the attacks targeting substations (IEA, 2024:86). In sub-Saharan Africa, a significant investment is required to address the technical and non-technical losses resulting from cable and energy theft, vandalism and destruction of networks caused by armed conflict (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:76) posit that illegal connections are not necessarily free as syndicates operating in these areas have to source material and construct the network to effect a connection to the shack. The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges (2022:3) states that organised criminal groups are liable for the rise in losses from theft of cable, illegal connections, vandalism of substations as well as other means to circumvent payment for electricity. Cozzi et al. (2022:125) have discovered that over half of sub-Saharan African utilities fail to recover their operating costs arising from high network losses, poor revenue collection strategies and under-pricing. The City of Johannesburg calculated nontechnical losses and illegal connections, costing the utility a staggering R2bn per annum which could have been utilised in upgrading the electricity infrastructure (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:3). The City of Tshwane nontechnical losses amounts to an astronomical amount of R470 million per year, predominantly emanating from illegal connections (Ledger & Rampedi, 2022:104). Eskom, the state-owned power utility in South Africa, publicly condemned the escalating incidents of theft and vandalism on the distribution infrastructure (Eskom Media Statement, 2022:1). Perpetrators stand accused of vandalising and stealing transformers, substations, control room security fence, copper cables and bypassing energy meters which undermines the security of supply. Illegal connections were identified as the fundamental reason for network overloading and high levels of infrastructure failure, triggering lengthy power outages which disadvantage businesses and disrupt household activities. Eskom is portrayed as fighting a losing battle as illegal connections which are removed by the field technicians are immediately replaced after the technicians leave site. In another media statement (Eskom Media Statement, 2022:1), Eskom appealed to the community to report acts of sabotage and criminality as the replacement costs of infrastructure runs into billions of rands and negatively impacts on the economy. Eskom further warns the public that it is a criminal offence to steal electricity, vandalise infrastructure and sabotage critical network infrastructure. Eskom employees were also cautioned to desist from tampering with their own energy meter and pay for energy that they are consuming. Lack of investment in electricity infrastructure is rooted in the utilities perilous financial state due to a myriad of challenges (Cozzi et al., 2022:130). Utilities are suffering from extremely high energy losses, averaging 15% across the African continent in 2020, almost double of the global average of just 8%. However, municipalities are expected to take decisive action to reduce leakage and non-technical losses by enforcing stringent security measures and crystallize the relationship with the community to help combat the scourge of vandalism and theft (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:6). Operating losses are estimated to exceed USD 150 billion in 2020 amongst African utilities and can be attributed to theft, costs increase including cost of capital, poor payment collection rates, operational challenges and supply chain restrictions which are responsible for raising debt and diminishing cash flows (Cozzi et al., 2022:134). According to Eskom, in 2015 electricity theft posed an elevated threat to South Africa as a result of illegal connections, energy meter bypassing and tampering which resulted in loses to the value of between 3730 GWh to 5968 GWh, the equivalent of between 1.57% and 2.52% of total energy generated (Ye and Koch, 2020:18). According to Eskom Integrated Report (2022:89), the technical energy losses reduced from 25 078GWh in 2021 to 24 802GWh in 2022, which included electricity theft and errors in transmission and distribution. Figure 2.3: Network performance Source: Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:101 The network performance report depicted in figure 2.3. illustrates how networks have performed against predetermined targets with distribution energy losses causing significant concern (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:102). Although energy losses have been reduced from 10.11% in 2021 to 9.62% in 2022, the target of 9.45% was not achieved. Continued interventions by the power utility have made inroads in arresting the non-technical energy losses from 20.2TWh in 2021 to 19.8TWh in 2022, which amounted to a staggering R2 291 million for 2022. Eskom lamented the rising levels of energy losses emanating from illegal connections and theft has added to the woes of the power utility, struggling to meet the energy demand (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:24). The report further stated that consumers who don’t pay for electricity are prone to wasting electricity instead of consuming the energy frugally. Accompanying the energy losses, network assets are vandalised, theft of equipment and overloading of networks have all contributed to an increase in breakdowns, maintenance costs and ascending safety risks to the general public and employees. In a Media Statement released by Eskom on Monday 18 September 2023 (Eskom Media Statement, 2023), four suspects were arrested in Kagisanong View, Ga-Rankuwa after discovering illegal connections to Eskom transformers. The suspects were detained at the Ga-Rankuwa police station. Eskom has expressed concern that during the joint operation with South African Police Service (SAPS), Public Order Police (POP) and a private security company to remove the self-built electricity network, the community mobilised and the technicians were forced to flee the area. Even more disturbing was the fact that the community followed the Eskom technicians back to their Ga-Rankuwa offices, whereby the entire building had to be evacuated with urgency. The power utility condemned these acts of intimidation and harassment and stated that the safety of the employees is the utility’s primary concern. The power utility has taken several steps to combat the rampant energy theft by conducting meter audits on all categories of customers and driving the implementation of smart meters as well as replacing the online vending system (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:102). Eskom has further identified areas contributing to high energy losses, conducts investigations and remove illegal energy consumptions which leads to reduced energy losses and an increase in collection of revenue. 2.7.1.7. The Impact of Polluting Fuels on Public Health Research conducted by Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:8) highlight the plight of participants who were negatively impacted by the deleterious effects of fly ash, emissions from coal-fired power plants and industry, dust and waning green vegetation and smoke from solid fuels utilised for household energy consumption. Di Falco and Lynam’s study (2023:1) focussed on the effects of indoor air pollution on the health of occupants who inhale fine particles which are emitted during combustion. There is growing public awareness and solicitude in South Africa pertaining to the quality of air and carbon emissions (Government Gazette No. 44606, 2021:7). The risk of developing respiratory and cardiovascular diseases is significantly intensified on account of air pollution and acutely raises the level of complications and deaths (Myllyvirta and Kelly, 2023:24). This in turn has a ripple effect on the quality of life and negatively impacts the economic productivity of people suffering from air pollution illnesses, ultimately raising healthcare costs and burdening a collapsing healthcare system (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:3). Breathing in polluted air has culminated in shortness of breath, skin allergies, burning sensation in the eyes, respiratory tract infections and fatigue (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:8). Although the community is acutely aware of the negative impact on their health, they are limited in terms of choice of energy fuel which largely depends on their finances. Cooking with unclean solid fuels is a major source of indoor air pollution in sub-Saharan Africa and exposure to indoor air pollution has generated portentous economic costs (Cozzi et al., 2022:122). In 2019, air pollution was attributed to the cause of 1.1 million deaths across Africa (Fisher et al., 2021:681). Air quality emissions emanating from Eskom’s coal-fired power station are forecasted to be responsible for 79 500 air pollution-related deaths from the period of 2025 to end of lifecycle (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). Health implications beyond 2030 will include 140 000 asthma emergency room visits, new asthma cases increasing in children by 5 900, 57 000 premature births, a projected 35 million days of absence from work and 50 000 years of living with disability (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). Household air pollution was the leading cause of premature air pollution deaths, accounting for 697 000 deaths caused by non-communicable diseases. Ambient air pollution related deaths are on an upward trajectory, rising from 361 000 in 2015 to 383 000 in 2019 (Fisher et al., 2021:681). In rural households in South Africa, burning of biomass fuel has heightened the effects of indoor air pollution (IAP) which has negatively impacted on human health and the environment (Longe, 2021:4). In many low-income households, burning of solid fuels indoors generates greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) which consists of carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), particle matter (PM2.5), black carbon and carbon monoxide (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:12). The inflammation of lungs and airways causes a reduction in capacity of blood to carry oxygen and compromises the immune system (Longe, 2021:4). Approximately 500 000 premature deaths on the African continent can be associated with the exposure to indoor air pollution (household) and a further 300 000 deaths can be attributed to outdoor air pollution (ambient) in 2020, which has been classified as the fundamental cause of premature deaths (Fisher et al., 2021; Cozzi et al., 2022:122). Dirty polluting fuels as an energy source for cooking has been classified as the leading cause of indoor air pollution on the African continent and has contributed negatively to economic costs (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:3). A study by Fisher et al. (2021:681) revealed that the economic loss due to air pollution in 2019 was $3·02 billion in Ethiopia (1·16% of GDP), $1·63 billion in Ghana (0·95% of GDP), and $349 million in Rwanda (1·19% of GDP). The study further elaborated on lost IQ points in African children in 2019 to be M2·5 1·96 billion caused by air pollution. In another study by Jeuland et al. (2021:16) found that air pollution could be linked to the negative impacts map relating to air quality and personal health, climate, quality of forest and ecosystem and gender empowerment. Longe (2021:4) established through her study that green-house gas (GHG) emissions as well as small particulate matter stemming from indoor air pollution (IAP), leads to inflammation in human lungs and airways, restricting the blood capacity to transport sufficient quantity of oxygen and negatively impacts the individual’s immune system. Exposure to air pollution during pregnancy and early development after birth has found to have a critical impact on cognitive function (Fisher et al., 2021:686). The total loss of cognitive function was estimated at 1·96 billion PIQ points due to air pollution on the African continent in 2019 (Fisher et al., 2021:686). PIQ refers to the fluid cognitive abilities which is the ability to solve novel problems. Lu et al. (n.d:17) asserts that fossil fuels caused environmental pollution which in turn caused some people to become more vulnerable to COVID-19. The minimum emissions standard (MES) should be mandatory for Eskom without exception as the argument of financial constraints for expensive clean coal technology are in contravention of the atmospheric emission licences (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:11). Fisher et al. (2021:681) asserts that ambient air pollution across Africa is rising and the consequence will lead to a rise in mortality and morbidity rates, reduce economic productivity, minimise development and harm human capital formation. The transition to renewable energy to attain net-zero carbon emissions will protect the environment as well as human life and transition the economy into a sustainable and competitive powerhouse, repurposed for accelerated growth and development (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Cleaner generating energy sources will minimise air pollution and are environmentally friendly, supporting a healthier environment. 2.7.2. Universal Access 2.7.2.1. Is Universal access possible? According to Cozzi et al. (2022:106), more than three‐quarters of the global population are deprived of access to electricity and more than a third resort to utilising solid biomass as a source of energy in Africa. Approximately 600 million or 40% of inhabitants on the African continent did not have access to electricity, predominantly located in sub-Saharan Africa as of 2023 (IEA, 2024:20). Baker and Phillips (2019:178) argue that significant progress has been made since the dawn of democracy as grid connection rates accelerated from a third of the population pre-1994 to 87 percent post 1994. There is strong coherence between policies and strategic plans to infer that the South African government has intimate knowledge of the nexus of universal access to electricity and empowering the citizens through job creation, economic development, reduction in poverty and raising their standard of living (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:56). The electrification programme since the dawn of democracy in South Africa has been tremendously successful with the growth of access to electricity rising from 36% in 1994 to close to 87% in 2021, falling short of the initial target of 100% access by 2014 (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). Cozzi et al. (2022:21) posits that the African continents’ growing need for electricity has outpaced the ability of governments to meet the demand for access to safe, secure and affordable modern energy needs. Nowak et al. (2021:1) asserts that access to electricity in Latin America or Middle East and North Africa countries ranges between 80 to 90%, while Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Seychelles have attained universal access although still being classified as developing countries in Africa. Figure 2.4. Percentage distribution of households connected to the mains electricity supply by province for selected years between 2002 and 2022. (Source: Stats SA, 2022:43) The lack of investment in electricity in informal settlements by policy makers fundamentally serves to foster economic inefficiencies and social inequality, as depicted in Figure 2.4. (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). Cozzi et al. (2022:21) asserts that South Africa is the most advanced and industrialised economy on the African continent and accounts for 16% of the continent’s consumption. The reasons submitted for the ongoing delays in achieving universal access to energy can be attributed to the completion date being moved further into the future although programmes and policies are in place to realise this target (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). The challenge of universal access is not limited to rural areas but includes urban areas, and where access is possible, affordability remains a major hurdle to everyday consumption (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). The World Bank report (2022:34) supports this finding and further states that the lack of access to electricity has a negative impact on investment, undermines people’s economic opportunities and inculcates inequality. A study by Longe (2021:1) also found that South Africa accounts for approximately 2.5 million households, which are predominantly located in urban informal settlements and rural areas, do not have access to electricity. Ngarava et al. (2022:1) supports this finding and states that 87% of the 842.47 million people without access to electricity living on the African continent are mostly located in rural areas and are predominantly households headed by females. The problem is further exacerbated when energy is required, the girl child is burdened over the boy child to fetch fuel from the forest, resulting in the girl child being withdrawn from school and contributes to the high illiteracy rates (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:13). The situation on the African continent is horrendous as 64% of inhabitants on the continent resort to utilising solid biomass fuel such as wood, and agricultural and animal wastes for cooking (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). The proportion of electricity calculated in final consumption has reached a paltry 20% in 2023, although a positive increment from 18% in 2015 (IEA, 2024:8). In order to change the current trajectory to enhance prosperity and social change, policy makers must realign their strategies with access to energy at the centre of service delivery policies (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). The Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:17) optimistically predicts, based on the current electrification rate, that it will take a minimum of 17 years to achieve universal access to clean and modern sources of energy. Loadshedding clearly illustrates that South Africa lacks capacity to provide universal access to electricity to all citizens as the rolling blackouts continues unabated (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:60). Loadshedding is defined as the “scheduled and controlled power cuts that rotate available capacity between all customers when demand is greater than supply in order to avoid blackouts” (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:136). During the Department of Energy IEP Planning Report Workshop: Overview of Universal Energy Access Strategy, over 5.7 million households were electrified between 1994 and 2013/2014 (DoE, n.d:4). However, the rollout of electrification in rural areas through the Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP) programme shuttered in recent years primarily due to the absence of capacity in substations and overhead high and medium voltage lines (Implementations guidelines for INEP, 2020:7). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:140) argued that the INEP programme was funded by the DMRE to electrify rural and peri-urban areas by means of grid or off-grid solutions to achieve universal access. According to Nowak et al. (2021:4), electricity provides the impetus to drive economic and social growth globally. However, Clark (2021:6) argues that the cost of electrification to achieve universal access surpasses the benefits but contends that electrification has potential to drive economic development through household productivity, specifically in rural and agricultural areas. Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) asserts that energy is acutely required to propel economic transformation and social wellbeing. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:9) provide a compelling argument for attaining SDG 7 to root out poverty, enhancing food security, embracing clean energy and supporting improved health. The per capita consumption of electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is on a downward trajectory which has been attributed to low access to energy as well as the demographic boom (Nowak et al., 2021:4). Approximately 80% of people who do not have access to electricity reside in informal areas or informal urban settlements which is plague by the lack of infrastructure and services (Mulugetta et al., 2019:3). These settlements are prone to the cataclysmic impacts of global warming and have resulted in droughts, extreme weather events and destruction of agricultural crops (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Nowak et al. (2021:4) maintains that the electrification process utilising fossil-fuel makes a negligible contribution towards carbon dioxide emissions and global warming. Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) disputes this notion and charges that humanity must change the trajectory to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and develop a sustainable model. 2.7.2.2. Benefits of Small-Scale Embedded Generation Due to the rising cost of electricity, crises at the national power utility and declining prices of solar PV technology, the adoption of SSEG by industry, high-income households and commerce have been rapidly growing (Baker and Phillips, 2019:179; Hausmann et al., 2023:51; Off-grid solar market trends report, 2020:39). The energy crises at the power utility have repeatedly plunged the country into darkness through load shedding, a strategy to protect the grid from total collapse (Swelling et al., 2023:9). Ritchie et al. (2023:1) argues that some households install inverters and batteries, excluding solar panels and rely on the grid to charge the batteries. In this scenario, the demand after load shedding rises exponentially due to drained batteries requiring charging. Proponents such as Lefore et al. (2021:3) anticipate renewable energy replacing fossil-fuels and reduce oil-based carbon emissions, reduced energy costs and boost food production. Makgetla (2021:10) asserts that renewable energy is cost-effective, clean, modern and safe source of energy will drive economic growth and improve the quality of life for producers and households. In a bid to achieve universal access to electricity by 2030 as countries committed to the United Nations SDG 7, 90 million people primarily located in sub-Saharan Africa will have to be connected to the grid yearly from 2022 (Cozzi et al., 2022:108). A total of 80% of these people reside in rural areas where access to the grid would be a costly exercise and impede progress (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). The installation of mini-grid systems with the benefits of rapid access to electricity and approximately two‐thirds of new connections can be achieved through this technology (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140; Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14; Kuhudzai, 2021:21). Lefore et al. (2021:6) argues that solar irrigation reduces operational costs and off-grid solar technologies can be further extended to enhance production process, extend the shelf-life of produce and process raw goods. An off-shoot of these process is the growth in the employment rate and the potential to create income-generating opportunities (Hartley et al., 2021:13). Renewable energy will mitigate the risks of climate change and produces no pollution when converting energy from the sun to electricity (Makgetla, 2021:10). Solar energy is not only enticing due to the low cost for domestic and production functions but holds immense benefit for the environment and provides a solution for the water-energy-food security triad (Lefore et al., 2021:4). Jeuland et al. (2021:16) posits that off-grid solar PV will not generate sufficient energy to transform traditional cooking practices and therefore will have negligible impact on arresting the harmful effects of household indoor air pollution. Access to electricity is a driving force to achieving inclusive and equitable education through elevated access to information (radio and ICT), longer hours of studying during the night due to access to lighting, and the benefits boosting the Human Development Index (HDI) (Mulugetta et al., 2019:3). Solar PV technology, which converts solar radiation from the sun, is a resource which is freely available globally and presents an ideal opportunity for countries to transform their energy infrastructure to a low-carbon solution while achieving universal access (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:1). Economic benefits include cheaper and a reliable electricity grid while having uninterrupted access to export markets without incurring carbon tax penalties (Makgetla, 2021:10). Access to energy is a fundamental requirement to achieve economic growth and solar PV is expected to be at the forefront of renewable energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). The debate of growth in the solar PV market is determined by electricity demand, supportive policies enhancing growth, initial costs and payback time, risks due to climate change, stability of the grid, forecasting of solar PV output and interconnectivity (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:1). However, Clark (2021:15) argues that electrification provides benefits beyond the traditional access for basic requirements such as transforming gendered social norms whereby access to information through watching television has the potential to change intrahousehold bargaining power. Restrictions and regulations may cause a constrained effect on the rollout of utility-scale solar PV plants where regulations may be geared towards agricultural land conservation with the primary function of ensuring food security (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:13). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:27) envisions a significant amount of new renewable energy capacity connected to the grid to balance out the current deficit in generation capacity. Utility scale solar PV will consume large swathes of land and may potentially impact agricultural production (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). However, agrivoltaic systems have produced positive outcomes when combining solar PV generation and agricultural production (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:13). The costs of electricity generation from utility-scale solar PV plants are predicted to follow a downward trajectory by 2024 but not substantially enough to below pre-Covid-19 values (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:57). Solar PV has already been declared the cheapest source of power throughout the African continent and is expected to outpace all sources of energy by 2030 (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) disputes that renewable energy can decarbonise electricity generation in totality and alludes to the fact that no country has achieved full decarbonisation on renewables. The benefit of solar PV extends beyond scalability, versatility and having the shortest construction time to include socio-economic development (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:37). These factors primarily promote the acceleration of growth of the solar PV market to benefit developing countries (Hepburn et al., 2020:8). Assertions surrounding the deployment of nuclear power stations by the PCC Draft Report in relation to long construction times, cannot be substantiated as France, China and Sweden constructed nuclear power station within short time frames (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:9). China on the other hand has ceased to support new-build coal-fired power stations abroad (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). Utility scale solar PV projects have the shortest average build times of between 18 to 24 months (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). There is substance to the claim that countries should achieve synergies with renewable and non-renewable energy in the energy mix to the extent of achieving grid stability and reliability of supply (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:36). A case in point is hydro connected PV power plants, whereby hydro compliments solar during raining seasons when there is sufficient water and vice versa (IEA, 2024:55; Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). Although solar PV technology has transformed the energy sector, no technology currently exists that can provide the full theoretical potential of solar resource (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:22). The limitations stem from the conversation rate of PV modules, shading, soiling of modules and configuration of the system. Clark (2021:17) states that the health benefits from electrification far outweigh the disadvantages and solar-powered cookstoves provide substantial health benefits and is one of the cleanest options. Zimbabwe was considered to be one of the first African countries to introduce net metering which allowed for vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-home electricity generation, with excess energy generated exported to the grid with a ceiling of 100 kW (Kuhudzaik, 2021:23). Smart meters, which are bi-directional, are being rolled out in South Africa to facilitate load-limiting and allow customers to export excess energy to the grid (Smart Meters, 2023:5). The net metering scheme in Brazil contributed significantly to the surge in the distributed PV market due to the attractive energy export rates to the grid (IEA, 2022:10). The installation of small-scale embedded generation (SSEG) in rural areas in South Africa has the potential to address the challenge of energy poverty and universal access to electricity (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5; State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:69). The benefits of SSEGs can lead to the establishment of SMMEs in the manufacturing, installation, and service sectors (GreenCape, 2021:8). The energy generated from SSEGs will contribute significantly to the energy deficit and minimise the bouts of load shedding (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5; South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). Prosumers would be encouraged to become legal energy customers and benefit financially from exporting energy to the grid (Ritchie et al., 2023:1). The financial attractiveness of this system will discourage illegal connections to the grid and customers will be compelled to pay special attention to demand side management to reap the benefits of the system. Customers who were not connected to the grid will now have access to electricity and raise their standard of living and improve their health (GreenCape, 2021:3; Nowak et al, 2021:23). The installation of small-scale embedded generation in rural areas in South Africa should be subsidised due to prohibitive initial costs of acquisition and installation. Government should subsidise 60% of the initial costs while the recipient should contribute 40% of the costs which would encourage recipients to demonstrate ownership and accountability. Personal investment would solicit a greater involvement in the project and support for the initiative while discouraging resistive behaviour. Financial institutions could offer favourable loan options to cover the 40% contribution from recipients at minimal cost as aligned to their vision for a low carbon footprint. The implementation of small-scale embedded generation would enable customers not having access to the national grid, to have access to electricity (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). Therefore, the entities responsible for electrifying these specific areas can redirect the budget for maintenance and upgrades to the existing grid. Decentralised and off-grid solutions serve to enhance the electrification of rural customers at a fraction of the cost (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). Customers connected to the national grid will be compelled to manage the demand for energy and alleviate pressure on the national grid (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). Excess energy can be exported back onto the grid transforming customers into prosumers (Bichof-Niemz, 2019:2). An enticing rate of energy exported through net energy metering would encourage behavioural change towards compliance and legitimacy. Figure 2.5: Solar PV installation on RDP house Source: Author's own design based on Bichof-Niemz, 2019 Figure 2.5. illustrates a typical RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) house bearing dimensions of 7.1 m by 7.3 m with a gently sloping corrugated roof, providing a roof surface area of approximately 50 m2 (Bichof-Niemz, 2019:2). The load bearing capacity of the roof can support the installation of ten 400W solar PV panels, generating a capacity of 4kW which translates to 20kWh per day or a yearly production of 7 300kWh. If the customer consumes an average of 2 400kWh per annum, the excess of 4 900kWh can be exported back to the grid and earn a lucrative amount of R14 700 per annum (based on the assumption government will reimburse the customer at R3 per kWh). 2.7.2.3. Navigating Socio-Economic Challenges with Solar PV Adoption Due to a variety of factors, grid-tied SSEG has become an attractive option for businesses and wealthy residential households (Baker and Phillips, 2019:181; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). A mass deflection of these customers will deprive the utilities of much-needed revenue (Cozzi et al., 2022:43), notably to cross-subsidise the low-income households by protecting these customers from escalating tariffs and driving them into energy poverty (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:68; Makgetla et al., 2019:16). The South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA) collaborated with GEOTERRAIMAGE (GTI) to maps out solar installations throughout South Africa and found in excess of 5.5GW of installed solar PV capacity, as illustrated in Figure 2.6. (SAPVIA, 2024). Residential installations (0-30kWp) accounted for 11% of the installed capacity while CoT leads the way with the highest number of installations (22 956) while CoJ has the highest installed capacity at 586MW. Figure 2.6: Cumulative Installed Capacity Source: https://sapvia.co.za/dataportal/dataportal-public The resultant decline in utilities revenue stream will heap pressure on the utility’s ability to generate sufficient revenue to service the operational and fixed costs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:181). The Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) suffered a major setback when the Pretoria High Court ordered ELM’s large power users (LPUs) to pay their electricity bills directly to Eskom in July 2023, as the municipality failed to adhere to previous payment arrangements with Eskom (Eskom Media Statement, 2023:1). In another Media Statement (October 2023), City of Tshwane (CoT) and Ekurhuleni (CoE) Municipality owed Eskom a total of R4.7 billion, with CoT responsible for R3.2 billion and CoE’s electricity debt totalling R1.5 billion. According to Cozzi et al. (2022:131), the power grids in Africa experience high technical and non-technical losses and exceptionally poor reliability, primarily due to underinvestment and aging infrastructure. Deflecting customers adopting solar PV and other renewable sources of energy will place the utility under financial pressure as low-income customers and non-paying consumers will dominate the customer base, undermining the financial sustainability of the utility (Baker and Phillips, 2019:190). Hausmann et al. (2023:75) argues that the rolling blackouts have placed an immense burden on the system as customers have become disillusioned and are reluctant to service their accounts. The expenses incurred due to network maintenance and refurbishment and support for basic services to the citizens will warrant alternative income to cover these costs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:190). Municipalities receive income from two broad catgories:1) Income is generated through rendering of services and receive revenue from property taxes, service charges, traffic fines and 2) Income from government grant and subsidies or from public donations and contributions (Statistics SA, 2021:1). The above figure 2.7. illustrates that the highest income generated through services rendered is the sale of electricity which accounted for 27% of the total revenue generated, lagging the government grants and subsidies by a mere 1.8% (Statistics SA, 2021:4). Out of a total of 257 municipalities, 71% of the total income was self-generated while the balance of 29% was provided by government through subsidies and grants (Statistics SA, 2021:1). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:51) concur that the delivery of services including property rates and taxes, should be the main source of revenue followed by a small funding top-up from the national fiscus to plug the deficit. Non-technical losses of electricity caused by cable and energy theft, vandalism and destruction caused by armed conflict, has played a motivating role for end-users to self-generate electricity to avoid unplanned outages (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). Unfortunately, the utility bears the brunt of the migration of commercial and industrial customers, reducing revenue while raising the cost-of-service delivery, higher non-technical losses, underinvestment in infrastructure and deteriorating reliability (Hausmann et al., 2023:75; IRP, 2023:3; State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:106). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:48) challenges municipalities mandated to implement the FBE policy, as the onus of registration rests solely at the discretion of the municipality. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) raises concerns regarding the trade-offs absent in the report but plays a crucial role in decarbonising the environment. Fly-ash is a by-product of burning coal, extensively utilised in the generation of electricity and is a crucial ingredient in the cement industry (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:8). Kuhudzai (2021:26) counters these claims and states that renewable energy will prompt the workforce to be skilled and developed which will enhance industrialisation while reducing unemployment. However, the Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) finds this approach myopic and disputes the non-inclusion of nuclear plants as emissions would be significantly lower for nuclear. The transmission and distribution networks lack investment, especially since the start of the pandemic which prevents the extension or addition of additional capacity (Swilling et al., 2023:5). Countries such as Ghana and Kenya with an oversupply of energy are disadvantaged and have no alternative to exporting this energy or transmitting the energy to domestic demand epicentres (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). South Africa is endowed with an abundance of fossil fuel and nuclear energy resources and should consider the ramifications of wholly committing to renewable energy in the wake of the country’s current energy situation (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:3). 2.7.2.4. The Eskom Conundrum 2.7.2.4.1. Eskom's Stability: A Pillar of National Energy Security Eskom was established in 1922 to deliver electricity supply to the country and was primarily expected to support the mining industry (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). Eskom is a state-owned vertically integrated power utility consisting of generation, transmission and distribution divisions, delivering power to predominantly black townships and some traditional rural homelands (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). The Financial Times Global Energy Awards held in New York awarded Eskom the renowned title of “Global Power Company for the year” in 2001, primarily for the organisations technical, executive, maintenance and operations (Wasara, 2021:378). Eskom generates approximately 86% of electricity in South Africa, extensively from coal-fired power stations and has been declared one of the highest carbon emitters in the energy sector globally (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The power utility distributes 40% of electricity in South Africa while municipalities distribute the remaining 60% (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). As the largest electricity supplier on the African continent, Eskom manages approximately 48 000 km of distribution lines, 296 000 km of reticulation power lines and 7 500 km of underground cables (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The power utility is crucial to the South African economy and operates on an annual procurement budget exceeding R25 billion (Wasara, 2021:378). While Eskom holds the monopoly in the generation and transmission environment, government has embarked on the process to separate the organisation into three separate entities according to their functions (generation, transmission, and distribution) (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The National Transmission Company South Africa (NTCSA) is legally separated from Eskom, incorporating the System Operator and Transmission (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). Government declared during the budget speech in 2022 to ultimately absorb the R254 billion of Eskom’s debt to allow Eskom to invest in infrastructure and conduct deep maintenance to strengthen the EAF trajectory (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:31). Hausmann et al. (2023:64) believes that political patronage through the cadre deployment policy of the ruling party were fundamental in reducing SOEs to surviving on government bailouts. The VGBE report (2023:30) declared through its assessment that low morale, lack of motivation, extended working hours with the burden of unbearable workload in a high-pressure environment as well as the hiatus in the training and development programmes as aggravating factors for the utility’s poor performance. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:98) alluded to the fact that Eskom was at the centre of state capture as the power utility was looted in a feeding frenzy, DMRE reluctance to support Eskom’s venture into the renewable energy generation and Eskom’s balance sheet saddle with enormous debt. The position of Eskom’s balance sheet was shared by Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:12) and further stated that investment required to transition to a low carbon footprint was improbable. Eskom’s substandard operational performance was also attributed to deterioration of unplanned outages, record number of plant breakdowns and extended periods of load shedding which crippled the economy (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:62). Eskom’s fleet of coal-fired power stations were poorly maintained and were driven to the point of collapse in a bid to avoid load shedding (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:4). 2.7.2.4.2. Rolling Blackouts Electricity outages are experienced by people in many sub-Saharan countries which have become more frequent and unpredictable and negatively impacted their lives (Nowak et al., 2021:5). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) assert that reliability and quality of supply are primary requirements to drive economic growth and small business enterprises. South Africa is not immune to the energy deficit which has stalled economic growth and has had a cascading effect on job creation at a time where economic recovery from the pandemic is crucial (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:2). The agricultural sector harvesting fruits and vegetables, are wholly dependent on a stable and constant supply of electricity for post-harvest storage (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). The agricultural sector provides employment to approximately 60% of the Africa’s population and has the potential to build intrinsic resilience and deflate poverty between two to four times faster than any other sector (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:27). The agricultural sector is the anchor of the continent’s economy and the vast majority of the population is dependent on this sector for their livelihood (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:23). An erratic supply of electricity can have a devastating impact on the harvest and result in devastating losses (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:11) posits that the economy cannot diversify and grow without a stable and reliable electricity supply. An economy in the contraction phase will reinforce poverty, unemployment and inequality (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1; Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:10). (Nowak et al. (2021:5) concurs and further adds that a substandard supply of electricity has a massive impact on small businesses as a result of foregone sales and services and failure of equipment, low productivity and suboptimal economic growth. South Africa faces energy insecurity and citizens endure over six hours of rolling blackouts per day (Swilling et al., 2023:4; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). Although the country can be accredited with making giant strides towards achieving universal access to electricity since 1994, the electricity crises known locally as load shedding struck in 2008 and has become a regular feature (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). Eskom implements load shedding as the last resort to protect the grid from total collapse by removing demand, thereby preventing demand from exceeding the supply (Ritchie et al., 2023:1). If Eskom does not proactively implement load shedding, the grid will collapse resulting in a total blackout which could take two weeks to fully restore supply (Hausmann et al., 2023:50). Swilling et al. (2023:4) claims that load shedding has cost the economy and shaved off 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). PwC echoes similar sentiments stating that real GDP was reduced by five percentage points in 2022 due to load shedding (South African Economic Outlook, 2023:2; Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:8). Allen & Overy (2023:43) asserts that the rolling blackouts cost the economy R899m a day in 2023 according to the SARB. Makgetla (2021:7) posits that South Africa’s exceptionally high GHG emissions negatively impacted on economic growth, as the effects of climate change in 2010 became more pronounced. While South Africa is lagging in the transition to renewable energy, there is an accelerated global drive to lower the carbon footprint by transforming the energy sector (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:35). Allen & Overy (2023:34) attributes these challenges to the elevated demand for energy and infrastructure development while necessitating the implementation of mitigation against climate change. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:100) argues that the Northern hemisphere emitted the highest volume of GHG and should therefore be the first to implement realistic strategies to reduce their carbon footprint. The current load shedding crises is a result of a deficit of between 4 to 6 GW of generation capacity, largely due to the loss of ~3.5 GW of capacity linked to diminishing plant performance and decommissioning of ageing coal-fired plants (Swilling et al., 2023:5; Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:11; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:119; Swelling et al., 2023:5). Rotational load shedding was implemented on 208 days, alternatively four days every week in 2022 which equated to 11,797 Gigawatt hours (GWh) of unavailable power (South African Economic Outlook, 2023:3). Figure 2.8: Annual hours and total GWh of load shedding 2018 to 2023 year-to-date Source: Creamer Media Engineering News, 2023 Figure 2.8. clearly illustrates the horrendous picture with 2022 besieged by 4000 hours of load shedding while 2023 fared much worse with approximately 7 000 hours and the year has not ended yet. Load shedding in 2021 represented a meager 2 000 GWh compared to 2022, which spiralled to 8 000 GWh, a staggering four times the energy shed in 2021. However, the worst load shedding undoubtedly dominated 2023 with an astounding 16 000 GWh, a figure of eight times the load shed in 2021 and illustrated the severity of the crises. Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:12) stated that 1.3TWh of energy was shed in 2019 and the first half of 2020 which indicated at the time that load shedding was significantly intensifying. According to the Statistics of utility-scale power generation in South Africa (2023:110), 2022 experienced the most intensive load shedding surpassing 2021 by more than fourfold. The President acknowledge that load shedding was on a upward trajectory and South Africa experienced the most severe load shedding since the dawn of rolling blackouts in 2007 (Swilling et al., 2023:9). The IEA (2024:82) asserted that load shedding in 2023 at the end of September exceeded the total volume of energy shed in the previous eight years combined. According to Hausmann et al. (2023:47), the load shed in the first three months of 2023 surpassed the total energy shed from 2018 to 2021 as load shedding was implemented daily for three consecutive months. The deterioration of power cuts reached startling milestones as load shedding registered an average on 626 GWh per month from January to September 2022, thrice the average energy shed in monthly in 2021 (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:3). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:1) painted a similar picture, concluding that 1 950 hours were shed in the first nine months of 2022, translating to an unimaginable three months of power cuts. The loss of an estimated 12 GW of coal-fired generation capacity from 2013 exacerbated the level of energy insecurity and was replenished with a flawed ~1.5 GW generational capacity (Swilling et al., 2023:10). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:26) attributes the energy deficit to a combination of insufficient and lagging maintenance, constantly changing leadership, state capture, lack of financial resources, delayed and deferred decisions and protracted delays in implementing and executing the new build programme. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) dispense mutual factors such as lack of or poorly maintained infrastructure and failure to build additional capacity to match end-user demand cycles, as the leading causes of load shedding. Swilling et al. (2023:4) proposed a feasible course to end load shedding requiring significant investment in the transmission infrastructure to create additional capacity to accommodate oversizing renewable energy to meet demand. This can be considered a sensible option given that renewables are the quickest form of new generation that can be added to the grid (Supporting Just Transition, 2020:14). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:11) disputes that an industrialised country like South Africa should transition to intermittent weather-dependent technologies that are not suited to sustain baseload capacity and drive energy security. However, the report fails to incorporate battery storage which can support renewable energy such as solar from sunset to sunrise (IEA, 2021:87; Kuhudzai, 2021:20). Load shedding is implemented in stages with each stage equating to 1 000MW and a predetermined timeframe: Stage 1 = 1 000 MW, Stage 2 = 2 000 MW, Stage 3 = 3 000 MW, Stage 4 = 4 000 MW, Stage 5 = 5 000 MW, Stage 6 = 6 000 MW (Statistics of utility-scale power generation in South Africa, 2023:110). The energy intensive industries in South Africa dictated a generally flat demand profile as these industries operated 24 hours per day and seven days a week in the past (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:23). The Kenyan electricity market has the opposite challenge with a constant oversupply of energy 24 hours a day and resorted to offering favourable Time of Use tariff to encourage energy intensive industrial users to shift the profile into the evenings and during the night to prevent venting their geothermal power plants (Kuhudzai, 2021:19). However, over time, the South African demand profile was transformed considerably to peaks in the mornings and evenings as the government embarked on the journey to attain universal access (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:23). Load shedding has had an adverse effect on business survival and revenue and the chronic electricity crisis has resulted in sunken costs, damaged equipment, low productivity, low economic growth and lower than expected GDP (Nowak et al, 2021:5). The constant power cuts have had a negative impact on foreign direct investment which has had a ripple effect on the quality of life and wellbeing of the citizens (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:8). The South Africa Economic Outlook November report (2022:8) has conceded that load shedding is the primary driver of weak economic growth and high unemployment rate which has aggravated the level of poverty and inequality. 2.7.2.4.3. Generation Capacity and Performance Analysis A report released by VGBE (2023:44) stated that Eskom Generation Division’s (Gx) management system including the processes, structure and governance, as dysfunctional and convoluted (VGBE, 2023:44). Faced with mounting pressure to retrofit ageing and polluting power plants at a cost of R300 billion to comply with the MES, Eskom opted to apply for exemption and decommission the worst performing plants ahead of schedule as the investment would outweigh the benefits (Makgetla, 2021:14). The Nationally determined Contribution (NDC) self-imposed target of 280 Mt CO2 emissions will compel Eskom to decommission the coal fleet and replace the lost generation capacity with a minimum 40GW of renewable energy (Marquard et al., 2021:26). Allen & Overy (2023:43) postulates that South Africa’s energy landscape is dominated by an ageing fleet of coal fired power stations and generates approximately 70% of power. A total of 10 GW of coal fired generation capacity is anticipated to be decommissioned over the next decade with the energy deficit expected to be plugged with renewable energy (Swilling et al., 2023:20). Consultants addressing the community at Komati highlighted the age of the station and frequent unplanned outages which resulted in load shedding (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:25). According to a survey conducted by Afrobaraometer (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:9), the findings indicate that government’s performance received a bleak rating with citizens signalling for a halt of governments monopoly on electricity production. (Mamorobela (2021:10) concurs and recommends that Eskom should be privatised as the parastatal is failing to deliver on its mandate. The largest emitter of GHG in South Africa (Figure 2.9.) is undoubtedly Eskom and the power producer failed to retrofit the fleet of power stations with emission controls to comply with the MES (Minimum Emissions Standards) (Myllyvirta and Kelly, 2023:24; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:25). However, the immediate crises, which could paralyse Eskom, is that nine out of a total of fourteen power stations are non-compliant with MES while Eskom has opted to appeal the ruling (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28; Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:29; Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:17). The stations risk being shut down as these stations are in violation of the ruling and could wipe out 16 GW – 30 GW of installed generation capacity between 2025 to 2030 (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). The quagmire policymakers face is deciding on a balancing act between energy security and economic growth versus the detrimental impact on health and degradation of the environment as well as global warming (Swilling et al., 2023:5; Hausmann et al., 2023:50). Taken on review, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment’s (DFFE) decided to grant Eskom a postponement of the MES and the National Air Quality Officer granted Eskom a license for Atmospheric Emission (Eskom Media Statement, 2023). The postponement granted to Eskom also included Kusile’s operation of three units without a Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) plant while undergoing repairs to the flue gas ducts to 31 March 2025. One of Eskom’s Air quality improvement initiatives is the retrofitting of stations in line with Eskom's Emission Reduction Plan (Eskom Air Quality Implementation Plan, 2023). Eskom is compelled to comply with MES standard as mandated by the atmospheric emission licences and technology is readily available to retrofit existing stations (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:11). Eskom’s plan involves the implementation of particulate matter (PM) reduction projects, specifically targeting Kendal, Matimba, Lethabo, Tutuka, Duvha, Matla, and Kriel (Eskom Air Quality Implementation Plan, 2023). The second stage incooperates the introduction of oxide of nitrogen (NOx) burner retrofits at Majuba, Lethabo, and Tutuka. The third stage will include the addition of sulphur dioxide (SO2) reduction at Medupi. Figure 2.9: EAF trajectories and actuals (%) Source: Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8 The System Operator (SO) anticipates a negative trend in plant performance, with an Energy Availability Factor (EAF) of 57,8% for the week ending 16 October 2022 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). The higher EAF with an average of 67% depicted in Figure 2.9. is linked to the generation plan to add more capacity and further assumes the Reliability Maintenance Recovery Programme maintenance will improve plant performance (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8). The management of Eskom fleet of generators being over-run and undermaintained, has led to an EAF of 52% for week 9 of 2023, underperforming and drastically short of the 75% target (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). The Eskom Weekly System Status Report (Week 28)– (2023:1) paints a dismal picture with the EAF of 58% for 2022 and a decline to 54.08 for 2023 to date, out of a total generation capacity of including imports and emergency generation resources of 49 191 MW. Swilling et al. (2023:10) charge that a healthy fleet of coal-fired power stations should operate at an EAF of 80% but the reality at Eskom, due to an aging coal plant with an average age of 41 years, lack of maintenance, substandard repairs and sabotage of plants, managed to achieve 59% for the period April – October 2022 (Swilling et al., 2023:10). The Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook (2022:9) further expects a depletion of 5 288 MW of generation fleet capacity as plants reach their turbine dead-stop dates (DSD) between 2023 and 2027. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:18) contends that Eskom has supplemented its power generation with 8GW of coal-fired power, 7GW of renewable energy, 2GW of diesel open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs), and 1.3GW of pumped storage since 2010, yet the power utility can only muster up enough generation capacity equivalent to the 1980s. VGBE was commissioned to investigate the poor coal fleet performance whereby the EAF hovered around 50.83% as of April 2023 and advance plausible solutions to elevate the EAF (VGBE, 2023:26). Although no new nuclear power generation is planned for South Africa, the Koeberg nuclear power station is scheduled for an extension to its 40-year lifespan which would have been realised in 2024 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:9). Delays to the project to extend the plants lifespan will jeopardise the 1 860 MW capacity and add to Eskom’s woes in meeting demand, particularly from the fleet’s most reliable base station (World Nuclear Performance Report, 2023:47). The evidence is crystal clear that Eskom’s EAF is descending on a downward trajectory and rapid intervention is desperately required to arrest this situation and reverse this trend to achieve a tangible performance (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:25). The transition from fossil-fuel polluting generation to renewable energy with a low carbon footprint will ensure sustainability and ensure that Eskom remains competitive in the global markets (Makgetla, 2021:14). 2.7.2.4.4. Consequences of Mismanagement and Corruption Eskom is tethering on the verge of collapse due to maladministration and corruption over the last decade and has plunged the country into rolling blackouts (Mamorobela, 2021:4). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:68) concur that Eskom is beset with mismanagement and corruption, calling it a “horror show” and has led to steep increases in tariffs. The power utility which has constantly experienced perennial losses has amassed over R400 billion in debt and only remains operational due to government bailout to the value of R128 billion (Wasara, 2021:378). The construction of Medupi and Kusile power stations became the epicentre of rampant corruption which invariably delayed the completion of these projects and the costs overruns ballooned to twice the initial estimate (Hausmann et al., 2023:52). The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (2022:558) found that Eskom’s precarious situation emanated from corrupt executives and managers in the procurement domain who fleeced Eskom for billions of rands. The Fundudzi report (2018:168) found that Eskom management was biased towards Tegeta and prejudiced Glencore by refusing to sign the Coal Supply Agreement (CSA) which amounted to an abuse of power, violation of trust and a violation of the Prevention and Combating of Criminal Activities Act. Wasara (2021:379) asserts that Eskom hired Bowmans’ attorneys to investigate rampant corruption at Medupi and Kusile in 2018, only to bring the investigation to a grinding halt a year later after credible evidence of high-level corruption was uncovered. Another forensic investigation into corrupt activities at Eskom revealed that corruption infiltrated the entire organisation, from the new build programmes to transmission projects, coal supply contracts, transportation of coal and service providers including consultancies such as McKinsey, Trillian and Regiments Capital, the contracting of IT companies and private manufacturing companies (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). In his response to the State of Capture Report, President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that a group of people infiltrated crucial departments, state-owned entities, law enforcement, security services and private companies with the sole purpose of looting public funds on a grand scale and ultimately undermine and bankrupt state-owned institutions (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:1). There is merit to President Cyril Ramaphosa’s response as Eskom was the epicentre of state capture in South Africa whereby private and public actors conspired to extract undue benefits which ultimately paralysed the power utility’s operations and finances (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). Testimony from the late Mr Jabu Mabuza at the state capture judicial commission, who served as the chairman of the Eskom board in 2018, confirmed the existence of a pervasive culture of corrupt practices, mismanagement and malfeasance which had been prevalent and infiltrated the organisation. (State of Capture Report: Part 4, 2022:1039). These corrupt practices were facilitated by the Eskom board and Executive Management, further diffusing throughout the organisation (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The recovery programme to dismantle these networks and irradicate corrupt practices had to focus on procurement processes and people complicit in endorsing state capture (State of Capture Report: Part 4, 2022:1039). Further investigations revealed that internal controls had to be strengthened, accountability and consequence management had to be reignited, strengthen corporate governance practices, and review of vague policies which lent themselves to abuse. The state capture which enabled the looting of Eskom directly resulted in the enormous debt, undermined the power utility’s ability to sustainably deliver on its mandate and grow the economy (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The President appointed Special Investigating Unit (SIU) Special Tribunal to retrieve funds looted from state institutions and had recovered over R8.6 billion (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:1). In his response, the President claimed that law enforcement agencies have been successful in securing preservation orders to the value of R12.9 billion (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Eskom took decisive steps to recovery funds from entities improperly awarded work and retrieved R1 billion from McKinsey and R600m from Trillian and served Deloitte Consulting with court papers, demanding the return of R207 million (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The total value recovered from entities participating in state capture amounted to R2.9 billion and a further R4.8 billion has been recouped from entities owing SARS, through the work of the commission (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Attempts to terminate the contract between Econ Oil and Energy (Pty) Limited and Eskom was met with elevated resistance from then Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) Mr. S Tshitangano, who resorted to levelling a series of allegations against then Group Chief Executive (GCE) Mr. A de Ruyter (Inquiry into allegations by the Chief Procurement Officer of Eskom Holdings SOC Limited, 2021:6). The inquiry, chaired by Advocate Semenya SC, found allegations favoured by Mr. S Tshitangano to be wrong, egregious, false, baseless, and lacking any substantiation and could make no recommendations to that effect (Inquiry into allegations by the Chief Procurement Officer of Eskom Holdings SOC Limited, 2021:29). Although substantial efforts are being undertaken to arrest the situation, fraud and corruption which is deeply entrenched at Eskom continues unabated. On Thursday, 31 March 2022, the Palm Ridge Commercial Crimes Court sentenced a former employee and a supplier to 20 years’ imprisonment (Eskom Media Statement, 2022). The convicted thieves were found guilty on 53 counts of fraud and theft, totalling R35 million. In another case registered with the Edenvale Police Station with case number: CAS 278/08/2023, after an alleged attempt was made on the life of a former fixed-term contract employee (Eskom Media Statement, 2023). The power utility stated that it was deeply troubled by the threat to the former employee and offers protection to its employees who fight against corruption through the Eskom Whistle Blowing Policy. The Investigating Directorate (ID) which operates within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has made significant progress in enrolling 26 cases in court, declared a total of 89 investigations and has secured the appearance of 165 accused in court for alleged state capture offences (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Eskom has stated in its Annual Report that forensic report into 1 980 Eskom officials have been concluded and were found not to have declared their business interests (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). Further investigations have revealed that 131 of these culprits have transacted with Eskom to the value of R 5.7 billion, while several matters have been referred for criminal investigation and prosecution. Hausmann et al, (2023:55) cited Eskom’s preferential procurement requirements which raised the cost of operations as substandard and expensive coal had to be procured which was located far from the power stations. Poor coal quality which consists of impurities including rocks have caused extensive damage to the mills and resulted in a rising number of unplanned outages which depleted the available capacity and led to load shedding (VGBE, 2023:76). The acts of sabotage featured regularly in the media which did not deter truckers from selling high grade coal destined for Eskom power stations and replacing it with inferior grade of coal with the addition of rocks (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:181). In a Media Statement (2023) released by Eskom on Friday, 22 September 2023, Eskom detailed the arrest of a coal truck driver and two weighbridge clerks for committing acts of fraud and theft of coal. The truck laden with 34.9T of coal was diverted to an illegal coal yard where the coal was offloaded and the truck driver was able to produce a valid weighbridge ticket for Majuba power station, although not having reached the power station. In another Media Statement (September 2023), SAPS arrested nine people at Kusile Power Station for theft and fraud, eight weighbridge operators (ERI) and a coal truck driver. The coal haulers were found to bypass Kusile Power Station without offloading the coal ordered and the weighbridge operators would process the coal deliveries, even though the coal truck never entered the power station. SALGA contends that it would be a “fool's errand” to defend Eskom as corruption free as the state capture commission report detailed the deeply rooted corruption and maladministration which bedevilled Eskom for years (Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:51). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:68) classified the corruption and mismanagement at Eskom as a “horror show” which has been clearly established and documented in detail. Supporting Just Transition in South Africa report (2020:25) revealed the real reason for the resistance to the rollout of renewable energy, as powerful figures who have devised strategies to extract profit and rents from coal-fired power stations at Eskom. This is a shocking revelation when the South African president acknowledged the existence of state capture and the adverse impact that it had on the performance on the power stations and the spiralling costs of the new-build projects (SONA, 2024:4). 2.7.3. Generation of Employment 2.7.3.1. The Evolving Employment Market: Opportunities and Challenges Africa is under tremendous pressure to create monumental employment opportunities for a rapidly growing population facing a bleak future with an ever-escalating unemployment rate (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). According to the South Africa Economic Outlook report (2023:3), skilled workers accounted for a meagre 25% of all employment in South Africa with 4.1 million skilled workers in the economy, followed by 7.5 million semi-skilled workers and an unskilled labour force of 4.6 million workers. The second quarter of 2023 benefited from an economic expansion of 1.6% (y-o-y) and a contraction of the unemployment rate (narrowly defined) to 32.6%, mainly attributed to a reduction in load shedding (PwC, 2023:5). The African continent is home to the youngest population globally and accounts for 15 million people seeking employment yearly with the hope and ambition of becoming productive and meaningfully contributing to the growth of the African continent (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). The African continent ambitious target of least 300GW of renewable energy by 2030 faces a myriad of challenges including technical skills deficit, institutional capacity and finance to aspire to the 2050 net zero carbon emissions (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). The South Africa Economic Outlook November edition (2022:8) found that economic exclusion attributed to unemployment and fickle institutions with poor governance can be credited for the slow demise of South Africa’s social cohesion. The Auto Green Paper on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa (2021:3) indicates that the South African automotive sector faces similar challenges and has reached the inflection point, recognising the acute need for reinvestment to reskill and upskill the automotive workforce to embrace New Energy Vehicles (NEV). The transition to renewable energy will inflict inherent risks to the South African economy, predominantly impacting on the coal value chain (Makgetla, 2021:10). The coal mining value chain is the source of approximately 400 000 jobs, with the coal mines directly employing 80 000 workers and between 200 000 to 300 000 indirect and induced jobs (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:35) expects job losses predominantly in the petroleum and coal sector and is anticipated to employ minimal workers by 2050. Notwithstanding the current levels of employment in the coal sector, the future trajectory indicates dwindling employment levels on account of a depressed economy, technological and environmental factors (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:13). A conservative estimation links a mine worker to an average five dependants, but the figure can be as high as ten dependents, translating to the sector supporting between two to four million households (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The sudden transition could have dire consequences for the families and their livelihoods without support and alternative employment for these workers (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16). Mulugetta et al. (2019:4) however argues that although the transitions carry extensive risks, carbon taxes will unwittingly result in higher prices being imposed on carbon intensive goods. The costs will undoubtedly be passed onto the consumer and have an inordinate impact on poor households, further relegating them into extreme poverty (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The majority of Africans (80%) work in the informal sector earning a meagre salary and are constantly facing job instability (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:10) is confident that the renewable sector will generate approximately 30% of newly created jobs in the manufacturing sector. The establishment of the renewable energy value chain from extracting the raw material to manufacturing of components and end products will have a positive impact on the economy and reverse the unemployment trends (GreenCape, 2021:8). However, the employment opportunities created should be derived from decent work and well-paid jobs to catapult the population out of poverty and be instrumental in accelerating the economy (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Forty-five percent of the workforce in the agricultural sector work in harsh conditions and earn on average one dollar per day (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). Air quality, energy security and global warming have become a focal point for the public, not only globally but in South Africa as well, primarily due to the ongoing bouts of load shedding. The international commitment to reducing carbon emissions has prompted the South African automotive industry to accelerate the transition as export markets intend banning the imports of internal combustion engines (Auto Green Paper on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa, 2021:7). The increase in revenue from VAT on imports can be attributed to the spike in imports of solar panels and alternative power supplies to counter the ongoing stages of load shedding (PwC, 2023:7). However, the spike in imports signals the exporting of jobs against the backdrop of rising unemployment (PwC, 2023:7). The Urban-Econ Development Economists report (2022:156) advocates for various partnerships to be established to promote reskilling and development such as South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA) and the South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA). Eskom has already entered into a partnership with the South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre (SARETEC) based at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) (The Presidential Climate Commission Report, 2023:6). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:10) supports this initiative and asserts that the introduction of programmes to upskill the workforce and unemployed youth will align them to job opportunities presenting themselves in the renewable sector. The Minister of DMRE (2021:4) advocates for employment protection and diversification of the economy and compensation for employees impacted by the socio-economic changes. 2.7.3.2. Harnessing Africa's Natural Resource Potential The African continent is endowed with enormous amounts of mineral resources which are critical for component manufacturing of a variety of clean energy technologies (Cozzi et al., 2022:146). South Africa is a major player in the global market supplying platinum‐group metals (PGMs) and is also a dominant producer of manganese and chromium (Makgetla et al., 2019:32; Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). Lu et al. (n.d:13) posits that renewable energy technology requires significantly more raw mineral resources than fossil fuel technology. An example amplifying this point is the mineral resources required for onshore wind generation is eight times more than mineral resources required for gas power plants when equal capacities are compared (Lu et al., n.d:13). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is endowed with 70% of the global cobalt reserves while Zimbabwe is enriched with an unrivalled deposit of lithium on the African continent (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12; Kuhudzai, 2021:37). The African continent has a surplus of raw minerals such as lithium, cobalt, manganese and graphite which is critical in manufacturing batteries for renewable energy storage (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). Raw minerals required for manufacturing of renewable energy components is intensely concentrated in South Africa, accounting for more than 40% of world’s chromite and 35% of Manganese being mined in the country (IEA, 2024:59). Significant deposits of untapped resources such as lithium and nickel hold massive potential of growing the economy and creating employment (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). The benefits derived from exploiting these minerals include local economic and social development, improved infrastructure and job creation (Cozzi et al., 2022:147). South Africa accounts for more than 90% PGM global reserves and benefits from quasi-monopolistic position (Makgetla et al., 2019:32; Hausmann et al., 2023:134). The country also mines a significant amount of chrome and manganese and forms an elite group of oligopolist countries (Makgetla et al., 2019:32). Unfortunately, the manganese mined in South Africa is refined into intermediary products and exported to China (Bloomberg, 2021:50). The market for minerals including lithium, cobalt, platinum, vanadium and copper is set to grow exponentially as the demand for batteries in the transition to cleaner energies gains momentum (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:12). Kuhudzai (2021:37) contends that the Electric Vehicle (EV) market is on an upward trajectory globally and lithium will be one of the raw materials in high demand, driving employment absorption, growth in foreign exchange due to exports, skills development and transfer of technology and a boost for tax revenues. Lu et al. (n.d:13) concurs and adds that the demand for raw material for EVs, wind turbines and solar panels will spike as well as the prices for these mineral resources. However, a much greater benefit can be extracted from the process if the mineral beneficiation and value addition were firmly entrenched on the African continent, creating an opportunity for battery cell production to be initiated (Kuhudzai, 2021:37). The mining operations are a key driver of infrastructure projects such as railways, roads and capacity of the national grid as the mining sector hinges on supporting infrastructure to move the raw material and assumes the role of the anchor investor to develop and upgrade infrastructure which would be beneficial to local communities and value chains. (Cozzi et al., 2022:147). The Renewable Energy Market Update report (2023:68) states that new manufacturing facilities (85%) principally focus on integrated, module and thin-film manufacturing while waning manufacturing capacity exists for manufacturing for new cells (less than 1%), ingots and wafers (9%) and polysilicon production (6%). The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:12) cautioned against mining critical minerals in an unsustainable manner and encourages the departure from limiting the country to an extractive economy and exporting raw minerals without beneficiation. Africa is endowed with key raw minerals for the renewable energy market and accounts for 40% of the global reserves of manganese, platinum and cobalt which are utilised in the manufacturing of batteries and hydrogen technologies (Cozzi et al., 2022:18). South Africa, in particular, has rich deposits of manganese, cobalt, iron ore, nickel, titanium and exhibits a quasi-monopolistic position for manganese (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). The South African manufacturing industry has outstanding experience and expertise in beneficiation of minerals but exercise little beneficiation of minerals mined to the level of battery grade (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). Cozzi et al. (2022:18) argues that, although Africa holds significant undiscovered mineral reserves, the investment in mineral exploration is following a downward trend due to a host of factors. The African continent largely resembles an extractive economy as an exceeding high quantity of minerals mined in Africa are exported and beneficiated outside the continent (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:5). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:61) assert that South Africa’s wind and solar energy is rated amongst the best globally and has an excellent endowment of green minerals which will facilitate a smoother transition to low-carbon energy generation. South Africa can reposition itself to be a global leader to supply renewable energy components manufactured from green minerals and dominate the low carbon energy value chains (Hausmann et al., 2023:133). The GreenCape (2021:36) echoes similar sentiments and reinforces the beneficiation of raw materials and reignite industrialisation. 2.7.3.3. The Future of Employment: Trends and Predictions Semelane et al. (n.d:19) asserts that renewable energy employment has expanded since 2012 and the solar photovoltaic (PV) experienced the strongest employment growth in 2017. Job creation linked to the installation of infrastructure and supply chains in providing households with access to modern energy services in rural areas is expected to grow significantly which will fundamentally require local workers to support the construction and installation, as well as operations and maintenance (Cozzi et al., 2022:197). Renewable energy industrialisation will facilitate energy security now and in future and will generate sustainable employment, specifically targeting workers in the electricity and coal value chains who are most at risk (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:10). The transition to renewable energy holds the potential to generate employment through ownership, project planning and design, procurement, construction/installation, operation and maintenance of small- and large-scale construction projects (GreenCape, 2021:7). By comparison, the solar PV sector generated 3.6 million jobs in 2018 while the wind energy sector created 1.1 million jobs (Semelane et al., n.d:19). Cozzi et al. (2022:197) projects a total of 2.8 million jobs will be created in the renewal energy sector in Africa between now and 2030 with the aim of providing universal access to energy and operations and maintenance is expected to secure 55% of those jobs. However, the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:14) acknowledges that the transition of the electricity sector carries inherent transitional risks to the economy as well as job security across the electricity and coal value chain. Semelane et al. (n.d:19) argues that the renewable energy sector is the source of socio-economic benefits in a vast number of countries with employment benefits narrowly converged in countries such as China, Brazil, the United States, India, Germany and Japan. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:94) disputes that more jobs will be available in the transition and cites the loss of 80 000 coal miner jobs as well as jobs linked to the coal value chain such as coal truckers and power station workers, 100 000 in manufacturing of internal combustion engines (ICE) vehicles, 200 000 mechanics and 150 000 petrol attendants, 500 000 jobs in the tourism sector and 110 000 small enterprises. Cozzi et al. (2022:197) anticipates the creation of 1.8 million jobs in Africa as the continent picks up the tempo to achieve universal access by 2030. Cozzi et al. (2022:197) distinguishes the jobs created and classifies them as 700 000 to support fast tracking grid connections, construction and infrastructure development, 700 000 linked to mini-grid assembly and connections and the balance of the 400 000 jobs generated in the manufacturing and installation of solar PV installations. For the three 115MW solar PV projects, an estimated 40 and 50 skilled and 200 and 250 unskilled labour will be required during the construction phase and between 20 skilled and 40 unskilled labour for maintenance and operations over the lifespan of the plant (Draft Basic Assessment Report, 2018:32). The GreenCape (2021:14) states that the direct, indirect and induced job-years created will rise to 252 616 for the construction of Solar PV as predicted by the IRP 2019 while the wind sector will generate 594 098 during the construction phase. The World Bank (2022) predicts the generation of 500 000 net-direct jobs if South Africa embarks on an ambitious journey to become carbon neutral by 2050 (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:65). Calculations by Hallowes and Munnik (2022:56) indicate that solar PV could create 600 000 jobs while wind energy could generate 250 000 in construction, maintenance and operations if the IRP2019 was fully implemented. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:10) supports the approach for local manufacturing of new energy and technological systems and must be protected by regulations to allow the sector to develop from infancy to a mature industry. However, this approach will require government intervention and support, strong governance to allow this sector to flourish in the face of strong global competition (GreenCape, 2021:34). Local renewable energy industries can thrive and create employment opportunities while reducing imports and build expertise to compete globally (Cozzi et al., 2022:18). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) cautions against a hasty surrender to renewables as this approach will result in economic suicide and obliterate 2.3 million jobs in South Africa. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:65) agrees that the transitions to renewable energy will require a range of government interventions to generate more employment opportunities as these jobs will not be created automatically. The interventions required include reskilling, upskilling and renewable energy programmes to cater for at risk workers and the future workforce and industrial policies which will attract foreign direct investment (GreenCape, 2021:49). Decision-making should not only reside in government’s domain or with the private sector but must include vulnerable members who will be impacted the most (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). 2.7.3.4. Navigating the Solar PV Ecosystem The raw material production focuses on the material utilised in the manufacturing of equipment to support the solar panel construction and installation (Semelane et al., n.d.:22). A fully-fledged manufacturing sector will be the engine driving sustainable growth through the low carbon sector as demands reached unprecedented levels in preparation for net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 (GreenCape, 2021:3; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:8). Bernstein (2021:1) argues that South Africa has the tendency or “over propensity” to export raw material and import finished goods which deprives local industries of growing economically and establishing local value chains. The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:18) claims that load shedding due to demand outstripping supply was the rationale for mothballing multiple beneficiation facilities. Components for solar module manufacturing are imported into South Africa and assembled locally (Semelane et al., n.d.:23). The destiny of the South African manufacturing sector is in a precarious situation as a consequence of many factors but not limited to policy uncertainty, cheap imports flooding the market, rising import costs, narrow skills base and the shrinking domestic market (GreenCape, 2021:34). Currently, the manufacturing industry in the renewable energy sector exhibits an excessive dependence on China, with Europe and the United States as well as other countries importing significant volumes of batteries and solar PV modules from China (Lu et al., n.d:15). The solar PV construction sector generates bulk of the employment opportunities and incorporates design, selection, procurement and construction of the plant (Semelane et al., n.d.:23). However, more than 50% of the global demand for solar PV equipment is imported from China while China and Europe combined supply approximately 60% of the global demand for wind energy equipment (Lu et al., n.d:15). CDE Insight (2022:2) advocates for initiating changes in small business policies and replicating success stories from other countries whereby associations representing township and informal businesses exert pressure on government to amend policies in their favour. The renewable energy industry continues to exhibit financial tenacity in the wake of energy security challenges, volatility in commodity prices, supply chain limitations and trade policies (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). South Africa has the largest deposits of vanadium globally but vanadium is an aggressive toxic metal and plants in eMalahleni (Vanchem) and Brits (Vamteco) processing vanadium release heavy pollutants (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:113). Bernstein (2021:4) reflection on localisation acknowledges the country’s future growth predominantly counts on elevated exports, but contends that localisation will lead to increased delays, inferior quality and rising costs. The Renewable Energy Market Update (2023:53) does not share this view and encourages government to strengthen policy to support the industry as demand is growing and commodity prices are cooling off, creating room for higher revenue margins. The CDE Insight (2022:8) also promotes localisation and encourages government to protect small businesses by introducing exemptions from certain regulatory requirements such as complying with the national minimum wages or with being compelled to implement centralised bargaining council outcomes. Government has passed legislation which encourages local beneficiation before permitting raw material to be exported (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:23). The removal of onerous restrictions and mandatory compliance will level the playing field and empower small business to compete against well-resourced major players in the market (CDE Insight, 2022:8). The increased demand for solar PV and throttled polysilicon supplies have resulted in a spike in price of over 400%, reaching the highest price since 2010 (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:61) assert that electric vehicles require thrice the amount of copper and twenty times the volume of nickel than the equivalent fossil-fuel engine. South Africa has opted to establishing a lithium-ion battery value chain to primarily supply the energy storage sector as well as NEVs (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). The Development and Innovation Programme was established in 2011 based on the broader Energy Storage Research initiative to develop the lithium-ion battery value chain (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:2). The solar PV manufacturing sector anticipates an elevated growth trend in 2023/2024, largely driven by government’s announcement of subsidies and ambitious plans to increase the capacity in each bid window for renewable energy auctions (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:55). The localisation of supply chains translates into sourcing, producing, and distributing goods and services domestically in a strategic manner to build resilience, stability and sustainability (South Africa Economic Outlook January, 2024:6). Local manufacturers are faced with the additional burden of dealing with the country’s crumbling infrastructure which raises the cost of doing business and throttles economic growth (Bernstein, 2021:2). The International Energy Agency (2022:135) posits that China and ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia) have dominated the market, bearing the lowest costs for all elements of the solar PV supply value chain. However, China has benefited from economies of scale, an integrated supply chain, reduced energy costs and low labour costs has earned China the title of being the most competitive global solar module manufacturer (International Energy Agency, 2022:135). Reconfiguration of local supply chains will essentially cause production to be closely linked domestically with the end market and avoid volatility of international markets (South Africa Economic Outlook January, 2024:6). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:8) differs with the country’s localisation and import substitution policies, intimating the myopic stance of protecting jobs in the short run while exposing South Africa and the rest of the continent to the negative impact. There have been considerable investments in the renewable energy sector in countries such as India, United States and Europe and governments are expected to protect these new businesses from global competition and nurture them to maturity through trade policy instruments (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:55). The International Energy Agency (2022:135) asserts that higher investment costs are the key reason for India’s lack of competitiveness with China, while the United States struggles with higher overhead and labour costs. Europe, on the other hand, is facing escalating energy prices due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which is undermining the country’s ability to compete with China (International Energy Agency, 2022:135). Bernstein (2021:2) argues that South African businesses do not have the capabilities of manufacturing all the components in the renewable energy value chain. The GreenCape (2021:3) believes that industrialisation is the foundation for quality and higher paying jobs, relatively stable sector and the manufacturing sector can significantly improve economic productivity. The minister was appalled, after engaging with stakeholders in the renewable energy sector, that the overwhelming conclusion was that manufacturing was not blossoming and demanded change (Minister of DMRE, 2021:5). South Africa could emerge as a leader in the renewable energy sector due to the availability of rich green minerals, the country’s contiguity to African countries with an abundance of green minerals and the industrial capacity and expertise to become the continents beneficiation hub (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:19). 2.7.4. Climate change 2.7.4.1. The Implications of Delaying the Move to Renewable Energy South Africa is undoubtedly the highest emitter of GHG emissions per capita on the African continent and emits 7.2 tCO2e/capita, fractionally lower than China (8.0) and France (8.7) but far exceeding the sub-Saharan African average (World Inequality Report, 2022:218). Makgetla (2021:5) supports this view and states that South Africa is guilty of emitting excessively high levels of GHG from coal relative to global standards. The impact of climate change has the most pronounced effect on the marginalised and poor communities encompassing informal labourers, indigenous people, forest dwellers, peasant farmers, people residing in informal settlements and women of all ages (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156). Dasgupta et al. (2023:12) shares a similar view and states that climate change has had an asymmetric impact on the elderly, low-income earners, children, women and socially marginalised groups. In addition, global warming has been found to expose workers to hotter temperatures, resulting in a negative impact on labour health and productivity (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:1). Michaelowa et al. (2020:2) states that vast sums of climate finance must emanate from the private sector to accentuate the country’s ambitious target of limiting global warming to exceedingly below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, according to the Paris Agreement (PA). Global carbon dioxide emissions were on an upward trajectory from the first industrial revolution, with one billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents being emitted in 1850 (World Inequality Report, 2022:117). The report further states that the emissions rose to 4.2 billion tonnes by 1900, and by 1950 emissions reached 11 billion tonnes, by 2000 35 billion tonnes and a staggering 50 billion tonnes by 2022. South Africa’s GHG emissions are expected to peak in 2025, ranging from 398-510 Mt CO2 -eq while 2030 will witness a distinct reduction ranging from 350-420 Mt CO 2-eq (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:66). Cozzi et al. (2022:179) posits that the risks associated with a 2 °C rise in temperature will have a varying effect in different regions on the African continent. The grouping of people facing the highest impact of climate change are also underrepresented in decision-making and have minimal impact on shaping the future in mitigating the effects of climate change (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Dasgupta et al. (2023:12) asserts that climate change accelerates inequality and inequality further entrenches climate change impacts on marginalised members of society, as they become more exposed and vulnerable. Low-income employees working in high exposure sectors such as construction and agriculture will be most vulnerable to global warming and will be negatively impacted economically (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:1). The temperature fluctuations and frequency of warm extremes is anticipated to rise astronomically to over tenfold in the Sahara and Sahel while comparatively by approximately 600% in Southern Africa (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). Water remains a critical resource in a water scarce country and the production of energy requires vast amounts of water which is negatively impacted throughout the process (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). Evapotranspiration rates are projected to increase as temperatures rise which will cause the volume of water available for cooling to diminish (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Fossil-fuel fired power stations and nuclear power plants require substantial volumes of water and coal mining negatively impacts on the quality of water (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). Additional impacts of climate change include the mounting risks of drought, which affects food and water scarcity, forced human migration and rising political instability (Cozzi et al., 2022:46). Decisions regarding energy investment will be critical and is expected to provide impetus to the adoption of renewable energy to protect the planet (Supporting Just Transition, 2020:9). Beukman and Reeler (2021:11) argue that renewable energy requires a fraction of the amount of water utilised by fossil-fuel power stations and should be a dominant factor when planning the future energy mix in a water scarce country. However, the Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) compares the CO₂ emissions per MWh of France and Sweden (nuclear power) versus Germany and found that France’s CO₂ emissions (57g of CO₂ per kwh) is six times lower than Germany (366g of CO₂ per kWh). The risks linked to energy production from renewable energy due to climate change should not be ignored as wind patterns change, cloud cover and rainfall will negatively impact on renewable energy production (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). However, the production of energy through hydropower is at the highest risk as climate change influences a drier future with reduced amounts of precipitation (IEA, 2024:55). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:62) cautions against the adoption of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies as short-term relief to mitigate the pressure of compliance, as this route will cause the cost of electricity rise beyond the reach of poor households. Extreme precipitation on the African continent is expected to intensify while more frequent and intense coastal flooding in low-lying areas will become the norm (Allen & Overy, 2023:34; Creecy, 2022:2). However, North Africa is expected to experience an average of 10-25% decline in precipitation while East Africa is projected to be exposed to a 50% increase in frequent rainfall events (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). Sub-Saharan Africa experienced one of the most impactful years of climate change in 2022 which included the floods in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces and was ranked as the third most costly climate-related disasters globally (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:5; Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:5). Figure 2.10: Physical hazards and consequential impacts associated with a global 2 ⁰C temperature rise in African regions around 2050. Source: Africa Energy Outlook, 2022 Figure 2.10. paints a bleak picture for the African continent if humanity cannot rein in global warming and exceed the 2 ⁰C temperature rise. Quite alarming is the number of extreme events that in all probability are expected to impact the continent negatively, notably +930% frequency of warm extremes in the Sahara and Sahel regions, followed by 600% in the Southern African region (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). A total of 85 million people is expected to be displaced due to extreme weather events and an additional 120 million people living below the poverty line (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). The African continent is facing an existential threat due to global warming and will be most impacted although Africa contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions (Cozzi et al., 2022:174; Michaelowa et al., 2020:2; Allen & Overy, 2023:38). Nowak et al. (2021:3) asserts that Africa is most at risk to climate change and the impact on farming will be the most devastating. Farming is the basic sector in most African countries but loss in subsistence farming will witness many people descending into extreme poverty and hunger (World Bank, 2022:103). Extreme weather events in West Africa resulted in heavy rainfalls and floods while South and East Africa experienced Tropical Storm Ana and Tropical Cyclone Batsirai, dumping excessive amounts of rain when making landfall (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:5). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:13) advocates for the mitigation and adaptation to climate change by addressing socio-economic risks and reducing GHG emissions with elevated attention to the carbon-polluting energy sector. Cozzi et al. (2022:174) concurs and calls for the evolution of the hard-to-abate energy sector. The agricultural sector will be burdened with the adaptation to climate-resilient interventions such as drought-resilient crops and mitigations against flooding (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:13). These interventions are expected to shield the at-risk groups in society such as the poor, women and children and create jobs and facilitate economic growth (SONA, 2024:13). Nowak et al. (2021:3) alludes to the fact that developing countries face a trilemma of choosing between growing the economy, social development, and environmental sustainability. The private sector has a vital role to play in partnership with financial institutions whereby businesses develop new technologies to mitigate climate change and banks finance these projects (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:8). Global warming is anticipated to generate significant incidence of specific diseases coupled with deteriorating working conditions (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:3; State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:5). Studies regarding declining health of agricultural and construction workers will help shape policies to protect workers and determine the burden on the healthcare system (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Proponents such as Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:2) advance the just energy transition with a two-fold purpose of protecting and rehabilitating the environment and transforming the economy to function in an environmentally sustainable manner. 2.7.4.2. The Ongoing Debate on Climate Change: Key Insights and Arguments The burning of fossil fuels, agricultural production, deforestation, waste management and certain industrial processes emit carbon dioxide (World Inequality Report, 2022:117). Semelane et al. (n.d.:62) states that coal is a dominant fuel source globally and accounts for a quarter of all energy utilised, further elevating up to 38% for the production of electricity. Commercial interests have been promoting “clean coal” technology to extend the existence of fossil-fuel energy generation globally, but the reality of the matter is there is no “clean coal” (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:1). Proponents such as Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:2) argue that the transition away from fossil-fuel is critical to mitigate the effects of climate change and improve public health. Households should not be excluded from the transition away from solid fuels as the negative impact on health affects the quality of life and the ability to be productive. The Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:17) supports this assertion and further states that global warming will accelerate extreme heat events, flooding as well transforming disease patterns which will amplify the risks to human health. According to Brown and Spiegel (2019:163), humanity is faced with an ecological crisis of epic proportions fuelled by political instability, coal remains a source of controversy and polarisation. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:5) cautions the South African government from succumbing to pressure from foreign governments driven by commercial gains. Extreme weather events and global warming have triggered academics, entrepreneurs, financiers, civil society and innovative groupings to formulate new policies and generate new ideas to deal with the impacts of climate change (Bloomberg, 2021:2). The impacts range from damage to infrastructure, low productivity, declining human capital and vulnerable water resources which have prompted the South African government to identify climate risks and mitigate against the effects (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:1). However, many states and corporations repudiate cautionary warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other formidable bodies and plan on expanding the sector (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:163). Low-cost fossil fuels such as coal were readily available to drive industrialisation and political leaders found coal to be tantalizing and unyielding to accelerate the economy and compete globally (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:154). According to the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 2004 (Act No. 39 of 2004), Eskom was mandated to comply with the minimum emissions standard (MES) which translated to 15,9 GW to be immediately shut down while 29,9 GW to be terminated after April 2025 but appealed the decision (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:21). Advocates for the coal sector have promoted “clean coal” after shifting their stance from an outright denial of climate change, and further justifying their position by promising increased efficiency, carbon offsets and trading, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) to extend the lifespan of the coal sector (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:62). During former US president Donald Trump’s term in office, he threatened to withdraw from the Paris climate accord with the intention of supporting the coal industry to generate more jobs (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156). The transition to solar PV technologies holds a wealth of benefits but the most critical advantage is the water efficiency in a water scarce country, requiring less than 95% water in comparison to nuclear and coal (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). Climate change has negatively impacted on weather patterns causing areas to face more frequent and prolonged droughts, low rainfall trends and earlier snowmelt which resulted in a 2% drop in hydropower generation in 2023 in comparison to 2022, a huge deficit in renewable energy production (IEA, 2024:55). The Colorado river in the US has been classified as one of the highest overworked rivers globally and is rapidly being depleted along the path to the Bay of California with significant reduction water volumes and cannot be utilised to drive hydropower generation (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:5). Locally, the Western Cape was subjected to the worst drought on record between 2015 to 2018, as the province approached “Day Zero” in 2018 (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:22). Scholes and Engelbrecht (2021:6) posit that Southern Africa is water scarce but in addition, suffers from poor quality water which triggers increased biological oxygen demand, algal blooms, and the accumulation of pathogenic microbes. The horn of Africa has not received rains for the last four years and this has been the longest drought experienced over the last few decades, forcing residents to seek relief at displacement camps which are in deplorable conditions (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:7). Beukman and Reeler (2021:11) raised concerns over dedicated crops grown to supply biofuels necessitate adequate amounts of water and large-scale arable land but risks diverting these scarce resources from food production. Further consideration should be given to the negative impact (socially and economically) on the transition and the plausible scenario of South Africa possessing different conditions and being at a different phase of economic development (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:5). However, a window of opportunity exists if the green hydrogen sector being piloted in South Africa, to mature and become a global leader to dominate the market by producing over 100 Mt per annum (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). There is consensus from a scientific perspective that Southern Africa temperature is notably becoming warmer due to higher levels of GHG and rising sea levels surrounding the continent (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:3) has concluded that South Africa desperately needs to implement mitigation and adaptation measures against climate change or face subdued economic growth and unprecedented poverty and inequality. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:13) shares a similar sentiment and encourages the reduction of GHG emissions across all sectors with greater focus on the energy sector. Human activities are directly responsible for and the highest contributor to the release of GHG in the atmosphere and climate change and requires urgent intervention to slow down the warming of the planet (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). 2.7.4.3. The Dynamics of Energy Sector Finance The bulk of the energy finance nests in private institutions which are ungoverned and remain resistive to fulfilling the populations social needs (Newell et al., 2022:2). Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) is one of the four key programmes that are rolled out by the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) (Michaelowa et al., 2020:2). Policies must be drafted to privilege leveraging and de-risking private investment, resembling the establishment of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (Newell et al., 2022:2). As of May 2023, twenty-two countries in sub-Saharan Africa were in financial distress while the total public debt for the African continent was the equivalent of $1.1tn (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:3). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:6) asserts that the majority of the $250bn will be required as investment in new energy infrastructure and the private sector should play a leading role in financing. Public finance should be directed to accelerate the initial scope of the work, specifically for transmission to reassure potential investors of government’s commitment to the transition (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:11). However, pledges in future from developed countries should not accelerate the debt on the African continent and create unsustainable debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio (Cozzi et al., 2022:53). Philanthropic and donor capital should be directed at ensuring justice for the transition by supporting workers and coal-dependent communities who stand to lose the most as coal mines wind down its operations and permanently shut down (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). However, Newell et al. (2022:2) disputes efforts of a top-down approach as the ability to address energy injustice and inequality will be compromised. According to the Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:21), developed countries are supporting developing countries with significant financial investments to transition to renewable energy, including sharing of technology and building capacity to achieve a carbon neutral footprint by 2050. Lefore et al. (2021:5) argues for greater participation and involvement of the community in shouldering the financial responsibility of SSEGs. Financial innovation such as the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) solar irrigation is a success story which can be replicated with solar home systems (Off-grid solar market trends report, 2020:39). The African Development Bank (AfDB) had endorsed a total of 23 projects worth USD 0.8 billion on the African continent in 2018, funded by the World Bank Climate Investment Fund (CIF) with an additional USD 2 billion designated for the continent (Michaelowa et al., 2020:2). Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) can receive climate finance from donor countries and become the implementing agent to accelerate the just transition to renewable energy while ensuring climate justice (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6; Swilling et al., 2023:43). Donor countries (France, Germany, European Union, United Kingdom and United States) have pledged $8.5bn to accelerate South Africa’s just energy transition programme in November 2021 at COP26 (Swilling et al., 2023:4; Cozzi et al., 2022:53; Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:15). The president announced that financial pledges to support the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan in the last year grew from R170 billion to approximately R240 billion (SONA, 2024:14). Although the pledge is a fraction of the $250bn required to transition to a low carbon economy, it’s a step in the right direction to harness the capital and fruitfully utilise the funds and demonstrate to the world South Africa is capable of applying good governance principles (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). The aim of such institutions is to create a vehicle to mitigate the effects of climate change and address the end goal of whose energy needs will be met and how (Newell et al., 2022:2). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:11) believes that the South African government should kickstart the energy transition programme and illustrate governments commitment. South Africa is home to mature public financial institutions and highly regulated markets recognised globally (Bloomberg, 2021:49). These public financial institutions have vast experience from investing in the coal and energy sector and have evolved to invest in renewable energy (Supporting just Transition in South Africa, 2020:15). Unfortunately, South Africa remains constrained due to the exceedingly high credit-to-GDP ratio standing at 138% and may hamper the country’s ability to secure additional concessionary loans to fund the low carbon transition (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:9). Nowak et al. (2021:23) recommends donor countries and institutions to design focussed projects and programmes to promote electrification on the African continent (Nowak et al, 2021:23). Credible institutions including the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), Public Investment Corporation (PIC), Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) have significant reserves and should be at the forefront in financing South Africa’s energy transition (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:11). South Africa requires approximately $100bn over a five-year timeframe to achieve a just energy transition and will require funding from all available sources (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:15). 2.7.4.4. The Impact of Environmental Degradation The natural environment has been the bedrock of human prosperity spanning human existence on earth (O’Callaghan and Murdock, 2021:32). Countries on the African continent are guilty of placing significant reliance on natural resources which is the backbone of the African economy, but depletion of natural resources has placed weaker economies at risk and reversed the gains of poverty reduction and social development (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:56). Nowak et al. (2021:3) posits that 81% of sub-Saharan population utilise traditional biomass energy for cooking and heating with ramifications of deforestation, and soil degradation. Governments globally have comprehended the need and urgency to protect the environment from degradation as the environment supports economic growth and recovery but must be executed in a responsible and sustainable manner (O’Callaghan and Murdock, 2021:32). The demand for wood as a source of energy is placing significant pressure on forests and is not sustainable (Di Falco and Lynam, 2023:1). TMX’s pipe-building activities for a gas pipeline in Canada led to the cutting down of 1308 trees in 2021 which destroyed the nests of species of hummingbirds which are legally protected (Spiegel, 2021:11). The response from TMX was disingenuous citing an inspection was conducted prior to the felling of trees in the working areas and no nests were visible or identified, even though Community Nest Finding Network (CNFN) provided proof contradicting TMX’s statement. TMX’s activities further threatened the salmon on which local Indigenous people depend on as well as the entire ecosystem. The company responded to these complaints by building artificial “fish farms” to accommodate the salmon and continued with their activities. Energy poor communities and communities without access to electricity utilise biomass on a traditional stove to cook meals and discharge on average 1 kilogramme of carbon dioxide equivalent (kg CO2‐eq) (Cozzi et al., 2022:123). The African continent is languishing at the bottom rungs of the energy ladder as universal access appears to be a distant goal and communities have no other option but to harvest wood for fuel, often unsustainably (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). Cooking a meal with a clean source of energy such as electricity utilising an induction stove, can vary drastically in terms of CO2 emissions depending on the source of electricity production as a comparison can be drawn between Ethiopia, where electricity generation is dominated by hydroelectricity and Chad which depend on fossil-fuels for electricity production (Cozzi et al., 2022:123). According to Longe (2021:16), communities understand the impact of their actions on the environment but unfortunately do not have a choice and are forced to resort to burning biomass for their heating and cooking needs. Cozzi et al. (2022:21) states that a colossal 64% of Africans are dependent on wood, agricultural and animal wastes as a source of energy for cooking. The participants’ response to the survey conducted by Longe when asked about the impacts of utilising firewood included deforestation, soil erosion, air pollution, global warming, threat to the existence of animal life and environmental pollution (Longe, 2021:16). The production of charcoal through inefficient and unsustainable methods may accelerate deforestation which highlights the urgency of providing access to clean energy for cooking (Cozzi et al., 2022:178). The benefits of transitioning to modern cookstoves by 2050 will realise benefits beyond the environment and holds the potential of reducing 6.5 million annual deaths due to indoor air pollution (The Gender Snapshot, 2023:17). The Supporting Just Transition in South Africa report (2020:10) introduces a debate between protecting the planet or protecting the livelihoods of workers and the economy but further reiterates “There are no jobs on a dead planet.” The Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country report (2022:15) contends that the location of solar PV plants in forests will be counterintuitive because deforestation to accommodate the plant will undermine the positive contribution of renewable energy. However, the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:63) challenges this train of thought as water consumption for renewable energy generation is negligible compared to thermal energy generation. Solar PV does not utilise water for energy generation but requires water for cleaning of the panels to secure maximum energy conversion and output from the plant (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:3; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). Commitments by governments globally must be translated into action as delays in mitigation will further prolong achieving the end goal, making targets difficult if not impossible to attain as the intensity of climate change regresses (King, 2021:1). One of the goals of the Paris Agreement is the conservation, protection and restoration of nature and ecosystems, incorporating the arresting and reversing of deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 (Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023:6). 2.8. Available Literature 2.8.1. Gaps in literature A study by Omowunmi Mary Longe (2021) focused on energy poverty in rural areas in SA and the impact of utilizing unclean fuels on the health of women and girls. Another study titled “Sustainable solar energy for rural development in South Africa” identified 5 projects with the Boomplaas project being most relevant in which 16 houses were electrified with renewable energy (Solar PV). The project was a dismal failure, and the lifespan of the installations were compromised (McEwan et al., 2013). In South Africa, the Boomplaas informal settlement located near Keimoes in the Northern Cape was chosen as a pilot project for the installation of household rooftop solar PV in 2012 (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). A total of sixteen houses were identified as beneficiaries of the solar PV project where two 240W solar panels combined with a 1000W inverter and six 2V batteries were installed at a total cost of R1 million (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). In addition to the solar PV installation, internal wiring was installed in each house as well as fittings for pull switch lights and plug sockets for appropriately rated household appliances. The project was implemented due to political pressure from a senior member of South African Communist Party (SACP) which is a part of the ruling alliance (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The project proved to bleak failure as a result of unrealistic promises made regarding the solar system’s capabilities by politicians with no technical expertise in this field (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The units performed below expectation of the users and lacked support and a maintenance plan which caused several units to fail. The project incorporated two community members who received a week’s paid training and were expected to perform basic maintenance services. The trainees were constantly being bombarded by the community to provide maintenance, diagnose and repair the system without compensation. Furthermore, the trainees had limited technical knowledge devoid of any support from the installers and no spares. Although the installers committed to providing post-installation repairs, potential infringement on the warranty terms and conditions caused the warranty to be null and void, converting an asset into a liability. A study by Baker and Phillips (2019) found that SSEGs in South Africa were not subsidised through government policy or regulations but were driven through the national electricity crisis and waning public confidence, rapidly rising tariffs and declining solar PV costs which favoured the wealthy consumers. This contrasts with high income countries such as the UK and Germany where adoption is encouraged by regulation and worthy subsidies. Ngarava et al. (2021) conducted a study based on energy poverty experienced by female headed households and focused on race and ethnicity in South Africa. Although a limited number of the studies mentioned above provided a framework, most studies merely provided recommendations and did not provide a model to specifically address universal access to energy. Furthermore, the projects installed through the INEP and the pilot project in Boomplaas did not adequately decode the energy requirements of the community, leading to the installation being wholly inadequate (480W to 500W) which did not meet the basic needs of the recipients. The studies did not incorporate job creation through the implementation of renewable energy and localisation. 2.8.2. Demarcation of scholarship (criteria) The criteria utilised for demarcation of scholarship excluded literature older than five years but included seminal work conducted by McEwan et al. (2013). Key constructs which were used in the search function included universal access to energy, energy poverty, renewable energy and climate change. The type of renewable energy was limited to solar PV and deliberately excluded other forms of renewable energy as these forms of energy have not reached technological maturity or feasibility, nor was the type of energy suitable for the South African landscape. The research incorporated literature such as journals, reports, studies, books, publications from subject matter experts, Eskom, policy briefs and government websites. 2.9. Conclusion According to the Normative Ethical theory, every citizen should have access to energy as a basic human right. Renewable energy has the potential to overcome the hurdles experienced by grid access, to achieve universal access to energy, solar PV has proven to be a mature technology suitable for local conditions in South Africa. Installing solar PV will significantly reduce energy poverty, drive innovation, and foster local entrepreneurship to stimulate micro-enterprises. The rollout of solar PV can re-ignite the local manufacturing sector and create sustainable employment opportunities with decent pay for people living in rural areas. Sourcing energy from renewable energy will reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, promote environmental sustainability, and minimise the impact of global warming. A once-in-a-lifetime opportunity has arisen to address past injustices and improve rural communities' living standards while mitigating climate change. Chapter 3 will follow with the presentation of the research philosophy and methodology as well as justification for the respective selections.

What are the key findings?

further detail on all of these points

CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 2.1. Introduction This chapter undertakes a review of literature to address the critical challenges of energy poverty, universal access and climate change. Globally, the generation of electricity is the highest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2024:3). The energy sector in South Africa is responsible for emitting 420 Mt CO2 through the generation of electricity utilising its fleet of coal-fired power stations, equating to more than 50% of the country’s CO2 emissions (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:56). The Framework Convention on Climate Change (2023:3) has acknowledged that human activities are primarily responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases which have directly led to global warming, causing the temperature to rise by 1.1 °C. The majority of the countries globally are signatories to the 2015 Paris Climate Accord with the fundamental goal of restricting global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels with a preference of 1.5°C (Allen & Overy, 2023:36; Vandyck et al., 2023:1; IEA, 2021:10; Creecy, 2022:2; Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023:5; Bloomberg, 2021:5). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:2) contends that, even if all the countries adhere to their self-imposed carbon reduction through their respective nationally determined contributions (NDCs), global temperatures are anticipated to rise by between 2.4°C and 3°C. The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:55) supports this notion and further concludes that the world is far off target to achieving these ambitious goals. However, power generation is leading the sector in transitioning to cleaner energy sources and reducing its carbon footprint globally (IEA, 2024:3). Baker and Phillips (2019:182) assert that access to electricity in South Africa is comparable with the high levels of poverty and socio-economic inequality. Lack of access to electricity has forced communities to resort to using unclean, unsafe and unhealthy energy sources which have compounded the challenge of deforestation and global warming (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). The Gender Snapshot (2023:17) advocates for an accelerated transition to low carbon cookstoves which could reduce deaths from indoor air pollution by 6.5 million and can primarily benefit woman who are poorer, categorised by low levels of literacy and are older, with the presumption they are more inclined to utilise biomass fuels and are exposed to the detrimental effects on their health. Universal access to electricity will minimise household reliance on solid fuels and positively contribute to combating climate change and improve public health while reducing the pressure on the public health system (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:2). Cameron et al. (2020:16) echoes similar sentiments and further adds that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is crucial to address the existential threat of climate change and environmental degradation. 2.2. Key Definitions 2.2.1. Definitions: Energy Poverty Longe (2021: 2) defines energy poverty as the “lack of access to sustainable and affordable clean energy services.” In South Africa, the prevalent polluting energy sources utilised for lighting are paraffin and candles, and for cooking are firewood, paraffin, coal, and animal dung (Longe, 2021: 2). Energy poverty is also defined as “the inadequate access to affordable, modern and/or sustainable energy services” (Ngarava et al., 2022:1; Casta˜no-rosa et al., 2019b; Crentsil et al., 2019). Ye and Koch (2021:5) describe energy poverty as “the situation wherein household basic energy needs cannot be met.” Baker and Phillips (2018:182) posit that access to electricity must not be viewed in isolation but viewed against the backdrop of affordability as grid connection does not automatically translate to affordability and utilisation. Mohlakoana (2021:3) summarises energy poverty “as the inability to meet one’s energy needs, especially the needs directly impacting the household.” The term utilised in developed countries is fuel poverty and is defined as “insufficient monetary resources to pay for energy needs, measured through affordability” (Ngarava et al., 2022:1). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:16) define energy poverty as “the gap between the amount of energy that facilitates higher levels of development, and the amount that can be accessed, is called energy poverty.” The World Economic Forum describes energy poverty as ‘a lack of access to sustainable modern energy sources and products’ (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:16). Although South Africa has a superior electrification rate in Africa, energy poverty is estimated to hover around 43% and energy poverty can be translated to not “meeting their basic energy needs and are therefore being denied a fundamental human right” (Mohlakoana, 2021:1). Energy is considered to be a basic human right although not explicitly contained in the South African Constitution or related literature but is implied in the constitution and is globally accepted. Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) posit that energy-poor means “they rely upon harmful fuel sources like biomass-generated fire for their cooking and heating.” The United Nations in Policy Brief 08 on accelerating SDG 7 achievement defines “energy poverty as lack of access to electricity and clean cooking fuels or technologies (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:3). Energy poverty is “the state of being deprived of certain energy services or not being able to use them in a healthy, convenient, and efficient manner, resulting in a level of energy consumption that is insufficient to support social and economic development” (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:2). Bouzarovski et al. (2021:2) adopts “a broad definition of energy poverty: a condition in which a household is unable to secure a socially and materially needed level of energy services in the home.” 2.2.2. Definitions: Universal Access Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) is a commitment by signatories of the United Nations and Paris Agreement to ensure access to reliable, affordable and modern forms of energy for all their citizens by 2030 (Radka, n.d:1). Romero-Ramos et al. (2023:1) posits that access to energy plays a critical role in promoting economic growth, social engagement and development of communities. Energy access is defined by the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change as “access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses” (Kumar et al., 2019:1). According to the Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, “access to electricity is defined as the ability of the end user to consume electricity for desired services” (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) define universal access “to mean that the household is now connected to the infrastructure that carries electricity – such as a formal connection to the electricity distribution grid or a home-based solar system.” Ledger (2021:1) states that universal access is “the ability of all South African households to access sufficient quantities of affordable, clean (non-polluting) and safe energy is directly related to both an improvement in households’ standard of living, and the country’s ability to achieve its decarbonisation target.” The United Nations report (2021:1) states that “achieving universal access to sustainable, reliable, affordable, and modern energy must also be an integral part of the just energy transition and be embedded in countries' climate commitments and their strategies and actions for net-zero-energy systems.” However, Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) argue that the focus on electrification rates in many countries is justifiable due to the retarded rate of electrification but access to energy forms one component and does not guarantee utilisation. Access to electricity “refers to the percentage of the population with access to electricity” (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2020:22). The study further proposes that to promote access to electricity where terrain is a hindrance and infrastructure is underdeveloped, solar PV provides an alternative, cost-effective option to achieve universal access. 2.3. System Theories The United Nations and World Bank opted for a multi-tier energy access tracking framework to address definitional and implementation challenges (Kumar et al., 2019:167). The multidimensional context of energy access holistically incorporates dimensions such as capacity, reliability, affordability, duration, safety, efficiency, availability and quality. The expanded definition further incorporates criteria for clean cooking such as safety, health, convenience, quality, affordability and availability. 2.3.1. The Real Option theory The Real Option theory applies to investment projects and the financial assessment can minimise risks to which the project may be exposed to. If alternatives are identified early in the implementation phase, such projects will increase in expected value and lead to a successful project (Trigeorgis and Reuer, 2017). In contrast, the Theory Based Policy Analysis theory applies to policy design cycle concerning renewable energy support schemes and determines the effectiveness and consistency from a national perspective. The application enables policymakers to generate policy based on a convoluted set of factors affecting implementation (Liptow and Remler, 2012). 2.3.2. The Concept of Assemblage Theory Kumar et al. (2019:167) explain “the concept of assemblage is increasingly advanced across the social sciences as a means through which the complex and interwoven relations of and between the social and material can be interrogated.” The conceptual approach is intuitively valid as demonstrated by Walker and Day’s analysis of household energy vulnerability as assemblage. Kumar et al. (2019:167) further enhance this position by encouraging assemblage thinking as being viewed in the context of energy access. Sustainability is consistently associated with three formidable pillars, economic, environmental and social, although the environmental/ecological pillar remains the dominant sustainable pillar (University of Alberta, 2013; Gómez de Segura, 2013:31; Jaramillo et al., 2018:2). The built environment physical characteristics could form a springboard for the integration of renewable energies such as solar cities (Huang and Cast´an Broto, 2018; Akrofi and Okitasari, 2023:21). The spatial distribution and landscape of the built environment has a significant bearing on sustainable energy transition theories and the theoretical underpinnings of sustainable transitions which can enhance their analytical strength (Akrofi and Okitasari, 2023:21). 2.3.3. Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DOI ) In seminal work published by Rodgers (1962), the diffusion of innovation framework clearly stipulates that a consumer must pass through different stages before accepting or rejecting new technology (Rodgers, 1962). Akrofi and Okitasari (2023:21) argue that Rodger’s theory (2003) identified the social system as the driving force for adopting innovations. The theory further expands to state that diffusion of innovation is confined within a social system, the social structure will shape its adoption as well as the individual’s behaviour. Menzli et al. (2022:2) postulate that DOI is extensively utilised in numerous disciplines and the actors have a crucial role in influencing the innovation system to obtain a positive outcome. According to Outcault et al. (2022:2), numerous studies have built on Rodger’s theory (either explicitly or implicitly) and has been cited more than 140,000 times in the academic literature. The DOI theory has been widely utilised to examine the effect of adoption of technology in diverse fields including information technology, agriculture, energy and medicine. Palm (2022:1) posits that the diffusion of innovation process whereby innovative technology is embraced by a rising number of stakeholders in society serves as a vital link to economic, social and ecological sustainable development. The rapid diffusion of renewable energy technology is a necessity to mitigate against climate change. The diffusion trends are shaped by different factors which will influence policy making and how business leaders facilitate diffusion. Akrofi and Okitasari (2023:21) state that several studies (Schulte et al., 2022; Simpson Clifton, 2017; Thomas et al., 2021) utilised the diffusion of innovation theory and applied the theory to residential solar PV systems with the key determinant of social factors featuring prominently. Outcault et al. (2022:1) supports the diffusion of innovation theory to promote growth in the solar PV market coupled with other interventions. An in-depth understanding of DOI will support a superior understanding of how the technology characteristics impact customer endorsement and acceptance will lead to improved designs, policies and programmes. Menzli et al. (2022:2) advocates for the utilisation of DOI to determine which factors impact on barriers to innovative technology and which factors can be leveraged to support enablers of this technology. 2.3.4. Normative Ethical Theory Löfquist (2020:711) raises the question of whether universal access to electricity should be a universal human right. Access to electricity is a fundamental requirement for raising the standard of living, bridging the inequality gap and ascending out of poverty. There is a clear distinction between access to energy and access to electricity, with the latter providing essential energy to power up light bulbs, computers and promote clean energy for cooking. Frigo et al. (2021:1) advocates for the sufficient supply of electricity, which is uninterrupted and stable, affordable to the masses and of a superior quality. A large number of countries around the globe experience energy poverty while other countries are consuming beyond what could be declared as sufficient, an imbalance giving rise to injustices. The reality of universal access to energy is that it is not a human right although there are fundamental contractual rights embedded in societies, an argument underpinned by Normative Ethical theory (Löfquist, 2020:1). Frigo et al. (2021:1) acknowledges the current inequalities and supports that possibility of establishing an additional human right to access to energy through the theoretical foundation of the Capabilities Approach (CA). Although not explicitly stated as a human right, the United Nations through the Paris Agreement in 2015, with all signatories committing to achieve universal access to energy by 2030 (Nowak et al., 2022:2). Roussos (2022:1) concurs that modelling can be utilised in formal ethics to determine the consistency of findings or the compatibility of predetermined conditions. The challenge of researching without a model is grounded in determining precisely what ethical principles suggest. Löfquist (2020:712) emphasizes that normative ethical theories provide a different perspective in analysing the probability of categorizing access to electricity as a human right. Löfquist further asserts that renown theorists such as Henry Shue, Martha Nussbaum, Jack Donnelly and John Rawls developed normative ethical frameworks and have delved deeply into defining human rights as well as the content thereof. Frigo et al. (2021:3) promotes ethics as the cornerstone to address energy transition to combat climate change while simultaneously, responding to energy injustices by interrogating energy usage, by whom and why (for what purpose). Normative ethics theory forms the basis for synthesizing energy poverty, access to rights theory and energy consumption. Urquidez (2023:160) explains normative ethical theory as principals of moral conduct which govern human behaviour by steering moral decision-making in the setting of personal and interpersonal relations. Burgess-Jackson (2021:231) shares a similar view and states that normative ethical theory provides an explanation or account, describing why certain acts hold the characteristics that they do. These characteristics refer to fairness, rightness, justice, goodness and praiseworthiness. Ethics otherwise known as moral philosophy falls under the ambit of philosophy with the primary function of defining justifiable moral norms, simply stated how things should be (Urquidez, 2023:160). Löfquist (2020:712) concurs with Urquidez elaborating on the purpose of normative ethics to improve a society through moral, cultural and material changes. Normative ethical theory provides a foundation for right-making characteristics whilst substantiating reasons for such actions (Burgess-Jackson, 2021:231). The reasoning behind such actions supports an individual who is inclined to do the right thing but may not know what is the right thing and therefore the knowledge of what is right will influence the individual to act accordingly. Although the South African constitution does not overtly state the right to have access to electricity, other rights guaranteed in the Constitution cannot be provided for satisfactorily without access to electricity such as right to decent healthcare, right to education etcetera (Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:5). In the findings of the court, the judge stated that the deficiency in providing electricity was nothing short of a breach of the Constitution and the Minister of Electricity was issued with specific instructions to remedy the situation. The South African Constitution as well as the Bill of Rights outlines the rights and duties of citizens and delineates government structure at all levels (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:19). The South African constitution mandates government and by extension the municipalities to provide basic services to all citizens which includes electricity (Implementation Guidelines for INEP 2020:10; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:8). There are many diverging views with respect to the right to energy but access to energy has been accepted as a basic human right which must be affordable, clean, reliable and sustainable (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). The Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023 (2023:35) found that load shedding in South Africa was a clear breach of rights as protected in the Bill of Rights. 2.3.5. The Researcher’s View The pronouncement therefore stands that access to electricity should be declared a right, to improve an individual’s standard of living in a modern society whereby the lack of access will stunt socio-economic growth, development and inclusivity. Arguments which compare access to electricity as a basic human right will not be a just and fair comparison, as a person can live without electricity but will not enjoy the same quality of life. The right in the context of electricity should be viewed as a contractual right and that every citizen should have access to electricity. Sustainable energy solutions, which do not infringe on other human rights, will serve as a springboard to achieve the target of achieving universal access to electricity by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2050. Sustainable energy solutions include mature technologies such as SSEGs where costs have fallen considerable over the last decade. Households with SSEGs could also divert excess energy back to the grid, where grid connection is possible and receive renumeration for exporting energy. The energy exported back to the grid could plug the energy deficit experienced by the State-owned entity Eskom and curtail the rolling blackouts locally known as load shedding. From a policy perspective, government will be mandated to introduce policies to support universal access to energy as a right and make a concerted effort in achieving this target. 2.3.6. Theoretical Model for the Implementation of SSEGs Source: Author’s own design • A comprehensive policy framework should be developed to align renewable energy implementation and industrialisation to ignite the local manufacturing industry to produce solar PV (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). The policies and programmes should be designed in such a manner which optimise local conditions and country specific (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • Economic diversification should be driven at a national, regional and local level with all three arms of government endorsing this policy and aligning their long-term strategy to achieve a low carbon economy (Cameron et al., 2020:32). • The implementation of the employment, industrial and climate policies must be assessed and monitored to determine if milestones are being met and progress is being maintained (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). • Skilling and developing members of the community to actively participate in the manufacturing and installation of renewable energy is of paramount importance (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). Clear guidelines and a skill development plan must encompass funding, a clear programme with deliverables and job placement. • Training centres, TVET Colleges and Universities must play a crucial role in education and training as well as innovation, research and development (Semelane et al., n.d.:50). New design concepts and functionality can deliver increased efficiency and longer duration output leading to continued long-term growth and economic prosperity. • The role of local politics and a broad spectrum of stakeholders must be incorporated in comprehensive and proactive planning phase to minimise resistance to the transition to SSEG (A MISTRA Policy Brief, 2022:2). Social dialogue and social consensus must be an integral part of policy decisions and implementation throughout every step of the transition process to SSEGs (Cameron et al., 2020:32). To accomplish these objective calls for strong political leadership with a clear vision, solid business and political leadership and political will (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • A communication strategy which is comprehensive must be established to reach all stakeholders (Cameron et al., 2020:32). Information campaigns will eliminate uncertainty and misinterpretation and raise social awareness, promoting the cause for renewable energy to save the planet from global warming (Falcone, 2018: 654). Information campaigns must utilise the channels of social media, seminars, workshops, websites and reporting. • Government must become the financial anchor for the implementation of SSEG and will have to fund a sizable share of the cost of solar PV (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). Government subsidies to support the implementation coupled with concessional loans and funding from wealthy countries will ease the burden on the community and fast-track the project. • Although policies and programmes should focus on gender equality and social justice, marginalised and vulnerable groups such as low-income household living in poverty should not be excluded (Semelane et al., n.d.:58). • Scientific collaboration and technological advancements through research and development will enhance the implementation and promote unique solutions on a scale which incorporates all stakeholders (Falcone, 2018: 654). The process will enhance integration and synchronisation across supply chains and manage the challenges of complexity as well as supply and demand of raw materials. 2.3.7. Hypotheses Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between environmental awareness and energy cost management, indicating that individuals who are more aware of environmental issues are better at managing their energy costs and consumption patterns. Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between energy cost management and support for renewable energy employment and policies, indicating that individuals who manage their energy costs effectively are more likely to support renewable energy initiatives and related policies. Hypothesis (H0): There is a positive relationship between environmental awareness and support for renewable energy employment and policies, suggesting that individuals with higher environmental awareness are more likely to support initiatives related to renewable energy and associated policies. 2.4. Energy Policies 2.4.1. Government’s Intervention in Alleviating Energy Poverty (FBE and FBAE) Baker and Phillips (2019:182) posits that access to electricity must not be viewed in isolation but viewed against the backdrop of affordability as grid connection does not automatically translate to affordability and utilisation. The free basic electricity (FBE), free basic alternative energy (FBAE) and inclining block tariffs (IBT) programmes were designed by government to address energy poverty (Longe, 2021:6; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:2) added the Integrated National Electrification Plan (INEP) to the bouquet of programmes implemented by government. The South African government introduced the free basic electricity (FBE) in 2004 to address the challenge of affordability by providing low-income households with 50 kWh of free electricity per month (Baker and Phillips, 2019:182; Ye and Koch, 2020:11). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:25) argue that government’s assumption of households merely consume 50kWh should be the barometer for affordability is erroneous and misguided and does not envisage households require substantially more electricity to elevate themselves out of poverty. le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:4) also dispute the amount allocated to indigent households and cite the programme administered by the City of Cape Town in the Western Cape. For customers consuming less than 250 kWh per month, the customer is provided with 60kWh free electricity per month and for customers consuming between 250–450 kWh per month, customers receive 25kWh free electricity (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:8) state that particularly metros offer higher FBE such as eThekwini municipality which allocates 65kWh to indigent households, and the Polokwane and Tshwane municipalities both provide 100kWh. According to Eskom Integrated Report (2022:136), free basic electricity is the “amount of electricity deemed sufficient to provide basic electricity services to a poor household (50kWh per month).” The provision of the FBE was designed to assist customers meet their basic energy requirements monthly with the option of purchasing additional electricity to supplement their energy needs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:182). Ye and Koch (2020:11) adds that FBE and FBAE also serves to influence their energy choices and the amount spent of energy. However, the FBE proved to be wholly inadequate to meet their basic needs and is depleted before the end of the month (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). Longe (2021:6) argues that despite government’s interventions to alleviate energy poverty, the rollout of the programme was inadequate and did not benefit all intended recipients. The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:14) concurs and municipalities must ensure effective implementation of the programme and enhancement of households who should be benefiting from the programme. However, municipal income has been depressed in the aftermath of the migration of paying customers descending into poverty and qualifying for free basic services (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:3). The FBAE programme was designed to provide a source of energy to low-income households that had no connection to the electricity grid (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:109). The FBAE alternatives to electricity programme include LPG, fire gel, paraffin, coal and solar home system (Ye and Koch, 2020:11). The results of a survey conducted by Longe (2021:6) found that only 6% of respondents benefited from the FBAE programme for the purchase of paraffin. The utilisation of paraffin is a harmful and dangerous energy fuel and the source of many shack fires, hence should have been discouraged and withdrawn from the bouquet of FBAE options (Longe, 2021:10). However, 22 municipalities in 2018 supplied free solar electricity systems to approximately 113 200 households as part of their FBE programme (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). Cozzi et al. (2022:113) advocates for increasing the affordability of electricity to promote economic, social and health benefits and supporting households climbing the energy ladder. The initiatives implemented by government (FBE) has had a positive impact in reducing the level of energy poverty (Ye and Koch, 2020:31). Ye and Koch (2020:31) further contend that households should receive 150 kWh per month which would translate to a reduction in energy poverty severity index from 58% to 29%. Longe (2021:18) advocates for FBE to be raised from 50 kWh to 100 kWh due to the electricity tariffs rising by double digits since inception until now. In respect to the FBAE programme, Longe proposes that the amount of R56.29 should be justifiably increased to an amount that is less than 10% of their income, as per equation below: “Proposed FBAE = Monthly energy expenditure - 10% of household monthly income” The FBAE income should be utilised to purchase clean sources of energy and recipients should be discouraged from purchasing paraffin, candles and firewood (Ye and Koch, 2020:11). Eskom has proposed that levers at governments disposal should protect low-income households against the rising cost of electricity, demonstrated by reviewing the FBE model which may contribute significantly to the reduction of energy theft and illegal connections (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:32). According to “The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis” (2022:3), electricity tariffs increased by 753% between 2007 to 2021 while inflation rose by 134%, translating to a five-fold increase in the cost of electricity in real terms. Municipalities are faced with a tough balancing act of recouping the cost from the customers while protecting poor households and maintaining affordability (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:110). The municipality’s electricity revenue stream accounts for 30% of the total operating revenue but Ledger (2021:25) disputes this figure, claiming not all billed accounts are serviced by customers. Ledger (2021:26) avers that local government debt has drastically risen from less than R130 billion at the end of the 2016/17 financial year to over R230 billion at the end of December 2020, a cumulative increase of R50 billion from March 2020. The depletion in revenue generated by municipalities has also been triggered by a rapid decline in paying customers who fell into the vicious cycle of poverty and balancing the surge in poor households registering for indigent benefits (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:3). The burden of ever-increasing number of indigent households further strains the limited municipal revenue with 3,6 million registered as indigent and receive free basic services, as reported in 2019 (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:3). Cozzi et al. (2022:113) attributes the high levels of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa to the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, the Covid-19 global pandemic and the rising levels of inflation globally, which impacts on the ability of households to service payments for electricity consumption. Guan et al. (2023:304) concurs with Cozzi et al. and further argued that the cost of goods and services were indirectly impacted by the crisis. As a result of the multitude of crises, the debt owed to municipalities ballooned from R20 billion in March 2020 to R27 billion, with household debt accounting for 72% (Ledger, 2021:26). More than three-quarters of the sub-Saharan population who were connected to the grid could not afford the extended bundle of electricity usage while 150 million couldn’t afford the essential bundle (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:25) has reported that some key municipal stakeholders surmised the electricity supply function as a loss-making revenue component. The 2021-22 assessment of municipalities found that 39% of municipalities are guilty of investing 1% or less of the value of their infrastructure on maintenance and repair, a fraction of what should be spent (Hausmann et al., 2023:66). Furthermore, the state of the municipalities has been condemned to being dysfunctional as a consequence of a skills deficit and lack of managerial capacity, high debt levels and theft of infrastructure (The Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:25). Electricity tariffs in some African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan are designed to be affordable to people living in extreme poverty who are in a position to pay for an essential bundle of electricity services (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). Electricity in Zimbabwe is subsidised and costs between $0.04–0.06/kWh (Kuhudzai, 2021:26). Ledger, 2021:26) posits that the Auditor-General of South Africa’s analysis indicates that 60% of household debt can be recovered by municipalities. Municipalities are expected to invest precipitously in developing world class cities in an endeavour to attract investors but face mandatory policy compliance and pressure to deliver services to indigent communities (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). The national government has also adopted the stance that municipalities must have effective revenue collection mechanisms in place and customers must be compelled to service their municipal debt to enable municipalities to claw themselves out of distress (Cozzi et al., 2022:113). However, Ledger (2021:25) argues that although tariffs have been rising steeply, the level of service delivery has been steadily declining. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:25) states that municipalities are expected to play a crucial role in energy efficiency and demand-side management programmes but also incorporate the role of regulating and incentivising SSEGs and storage. Ledger (2021:28) argues that due to lack of oversight of nationally funded programmes, the municipality may actually fund fewer households with free basic services compared to the funds received from the national budget. Although funds were allocated for free basic services, Treasury requires municipalities to verify if recipients are authenticated as the process can be subjected to abuse by political parties (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). Ledger (2021:28) also believes that the balance of the funding can be redirected to the general revenue budget and utilised as per the municipality’s own directives. Ye and Koch (2020:12) disputes this theory and states that Eskom and the municipalities should continue to encourage indigent households who qualify for FBE to claim their monthly energy allocation. A study by Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:8) revealed that in 2018, 49 municipalities out of a total of 213 in the country were providing FBAE, where grid connections were not feasible. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) advocates for the intervention of government to subsidise the transition by protecting low-income households from rising electricity prices by retaining the free basic electricity (FBE). 2.4.2. Why is Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) most critical? Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) is a commitment by signatories of the United Nations and Paris Agreement to ensure access to reliable, affordable and modern forms of energy for all the citizens (Radka, n.d:1; Longe, 2021:1). Achieving universal access through SDG 7 paves the way for the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy and opens a window of opportunity for billions of people globally (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). Cozzi et al. (2022:106) argues that Africa did not create a solid foundation to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 7) for universal access to modern energy by 2030. The impact of Covid-19 further derailed Africa’s plans of progressing towards the ultimate goal of SDG 7 (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:99). Government policies will have to be realigned and additional policies established to achieve universal access by 2030 (Cozzi et al., 2022:106). If the status quo does not change significantly according to the International Energy Agency, an astronomical 860 million vulnerable people residing in rural areas will not have access to clean and renewable energy (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:30). Baker and Phillips (2019:178) argue that the introduction of the independent power programme (IPP) to accelerate the transition from fossil-fuels to renewables, have not disrupted energy production in a substantial way nor did the introduction support the achievement of SDG 7 in a meaningful way. Radka (n.d:1) is however optimistic and believes the SDG 7 has laid a solid foundation to achieve the eradication of poverty, mitigate the effects of climate change and attain these goals in a sustainable manner. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:4) assert that the lack of access to clean, modern and safe forms of energy is closely linked to poverty and is well documented through the SDG 7. The goal of SDG 7 is to achieve universal access to clean and safe energy by 2030 and underpins the attainment of many of the other SDGs including but not limited to eliminating poverty and eradication of hunger (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2; Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:9). Access to electricity has the potential to provide a broad spectrum of both economic and non-economic benefits to the citizens (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). The benefits extend to people’s well-being, including economic welfare, ameliorating their quality of life, better educational opportunities, improved health, and better utilisation of time management (United Nations, 2021:1). The demographic trajectory indicates that the population in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow at an alarming rate, while the state faces the burden of providing decent schooling and healthcare (World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results: 2022:1). The attainment of these objectives will have significant influence on the quality of education and lead to a rising number of well-paid employment opportunities (Kuhudzai, 2021:21). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was core to transiting South Africa to a democratic state and fundamentally laboured to rebuild the economy while delivering services to benefit all the citizens (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). The focus of the programme was also to provide equal access to energy services to citizens who were previously denied access, thereby signifying the first crucial step in bridging the gap between the rich and poor (Hausmann et al., 2023:94). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:9) assert that SDG 7 has a bearing on achieving many of the other SDGs such as food security, eradication of poverty, improving the health and minimising the impact on the environment and mitigating the effects of climate change. The dominant consensus amongst scholars suggests that an increase in energy consumption is a strong indicator of an improvement in the quality of life and raising the standard of living (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:9). Sub-Saharan Africa has been classified as having the lowest electricity connections rates globally and politicians should enforce adherence to existing policies to ensure elevated investments in achieving universal access (Jeuland et al., 2021:6). Although developing countries face rising cases of energy poverty, UNCTAD has established that 13% of population in developing countries worldwide are without access to electricity (Allen & Overy, 2023:37). Puig et al. (2021:1) advocates for SDG7 and SDG13 to be achieved simultaneously as both goals are inextricably linked, as fossil fuels to some extent, will be utilised in achieving universal access in developing countries. Developing countries are experiencing a dilemma of exploring untapped fossil fuel reserves and drive economic development or transition to cleaner fuels and renewable energy and face financial headwinds (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:38). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) advocates for technology-level renewable energy sources that should take precedence over fossil fuel technology as solar PV and wind have a distinct advantage. This renewable energy technology can be deployed in the absence of the grid and at any scale, as evidenced by micro-grids (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5). The Afrobarometer survey found that government performance rating was predictably dismal when measured against providing reliable electricity, with half of those participating in the survey willing to pay higher tariffs for improved services (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:1). Clark (2021:2) states that the advantages of attaining SDG7 will lead to alleviating time poverty, economic empowerment, change social norms and will be a key driver of safety of women and elevated maternal health. The 17 SDGs are so intertwined to drive economic, social and sustainable development but SDG7 has been widely recognised as the single, most critical SDG that underpins the rest of the SDGs (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). Opponents believe that vast majority of citizens are unable to service their electricity requirements due to excessively priced electricity tariffs and advocate for low-cost energy production driven by a political agenda (Michaelowa et al., 2020:8). Clark (2021:2) counters this stance by stating that sustainable energy sources costs have been on a downward trajectory to such an extent that the cost-benefit analyses of electrification may favour renewable energy. Global public debt has spiralled to 92.6% of world GDP and has impeded investment in developing countries with SDGs being the sacrificial element in the national budget (South Africa Economic Outlook, 2024:5). Achieving access to energy plays a significant role in shaping the approach to incorporate sustainable development and climate change (Michaelowa et al., 2020:12). Reflecting on this approach, Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) states that access to energy cannot be divorced from social, economic and ecological goals and should rolled out in a sustainable manner. Universal access to electricity must endure a transition that is just, inclusive, sustainable and comply with the Paris Climate Agreement and in turn will sustain the economy (United Nations, 2021:1). 2.4.3. Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) is the South African roadmap for the energy sector was updated in 2019 and specifies the energy mix leading to the net-zero energy transition by 2050 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57; IRP, 2019:8). The IRP 2019 was approved by cabinet and was crucial in providing direction to add a mix of energy to the generation fleet to meet the anticipated demand in future (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:32). The plan incorporated the ideology of a sustainable future through the acquisition of least-cost, secure and reliable supply of energy, lowering GHG emissions, environmental sustainability and water use (Semelane et al., n.d.:57). The IRP as contemplated under the Electricity Regulation Act is a legal document providing direction of South Africa’s energy generation and designed with the ambition of meeting the country’s growing energy demand while sustaining industry standard reserve margin (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:22). The IRP (2023:28) purported that the review is the basis of establishing three distinguishable objectives comprising of the reduction in carbon emissions, security of supply and providing affordable energy. The minister stated that the IRP2019 is South Africa’s guiding policy framework for energy generation and the theoretical energy mix is designed to overcome the challenges of a low-carbon transition (Minister of DMRE, 2021:3). At the time of publishing the IRP2019, the GreenCape (2021:10) found the commitment of the DMRE comforting as the projection for adding wind energy was 14,400 MW, solar PV consisted of 6,400 MW, 4000MW of embedded generation and 2000MW of battery storage. Opponents argue that South Africa had a credible Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2010) and the country should have stuck to the plan and not be influenced by activist ideologies and other thought experiments (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). The South African national power utility is acutely impacted by the transition and must decommission 10 500W of coal-fired power stations by 2030 and a further 35 000 MW by 2050 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57; Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:12). Delays in implementing the original plan has fuelled the national energy disaster while South Africa is searching for impactful short-term solutions to arrest the energy crisis (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:14). The draft 2016 IRP drew responses from major industry players who reflected on the descending costs of renewables and concluded that renewables will be the least cost future of energy generation and objected to the addition of nuclear or coal (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:149). Supporting Just Transition (2020:14) supported the realisation that cost of coal fired energy has been surging while renewable energy costs have decreased significantly, to the point whereby levelized energy cost of in-service and new build coal-fired projects were more expensive than renewables. The GreenCape (2021:16) found the implementation of IRP2019 would boost the economy and create significant job opportunities as more than 14 million solar panels and 3,600 wind turbines would be required amongst other items. The Zimbabwe Renewable Energy Policy 2019 has provided a clear path to attaining energy security in a sustainable manner by including substantial amount of renewable energy (1,100 MW by 2025 or 16.5% of renewables from the total generation) to the generation landscape (Kuhudzai, 2021:23). The South African transition has prompted investors and the private sector to disinvested in “dirty fuel” sources and reinvest in renewable energy. The renewable energy mix is anticipated to consist of hydro, photovoltaic (PV), wind and concentrated solar power (CSP) will constitute 31 230 MW of the total installed capacity by 2030 (Semelane et al., n.d.:57). 2.4.4. Energy Justice The principles of a just transition must encapsulate procedural, distributive, and restorative justice in the planning and decision-making processes (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:31). The transition will fundamentally have to address the triad of inequality, poverty and unemployment without exacerbating the current situation (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:6). Energy justice comprises of three critical elements, namely distributive justice, procedural justice and restorative justice (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8). Hall et al. (2018:773) further elaborates on distributional justice which is concerned with the distribution of environmental benefits and drawbacks as well as responsibilities. Procedural justice relates to decision-making procedures that produces just and fair outcomes, and fair representation ensuring individuals are protected from physical threats and have equitable political rights (Hall et al., 2018:773; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:74; The Presidential Climate Commission Report, 2023:19). Restorative justice addresses historical harm suffered by individuals, communities and the environment and the steps taken to remedy the injustice against deprived and marginalised communities (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:91). Procedural justice is a dimension which highlights the need to address the process and aim of maintaining a process which is fair and inclusive (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8, Patel, 2021:9). The process is implemented in a manner which recognises marginalised and vulnerable groups who are included in the decision-making processes at various stages (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:18). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:74) posits that procedural justice embodies workers, communities and small businesses being entrusted to have a voice and exemplify how they shape their future and maintain their livelihood. Newell et al. (2022:3) supports an inclusive process and argues that the top-down approach undermines their ability to resolve existing energy equalities. Citizens and consumers have an integral role in the decision-making processes and should actively participate in processes such as the location of transmission power lines or nuclear waste disposal sites (Milchram et al., 2018:1247). The Presidential Climate Commission Report (2023:17) lamented over the consultations conducted before the closure of Komati plant which did not meet the threshold of being inclusive and participatory to demonstrate compliance with procedural justice. The second aspect of energy justice is distributive justice which focuses on a fair allocation of resources in a society (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8; Patel, 2021:9). The aim of distributive justice is to address the direct impact arising from the transition process and direct attention to the issue of “double inequality” rooted around the responsibilities of who bears the cost followed by the impact in relation to who should benefit and how should they benefit (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:18; Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8). Milchram et al. (2018:1252) asserts that transparency plays a vital role in addressing both procedural and distributive justice. Montmasson-Clair (2021:8) postulates that distributive justice should encapsulate steps to mitigate losses emerging from the process to creating benefits to improve the lives of the stakeholders in a manner that leaves them better off. Newell et al. (2022:2) warns that in the absence of meaningful commitment from government and businesses, recommendations generated from the process will merely provide a veneer of procedural legitimacy without achieving distributional justice. While distributive justice primarily focuses on the distribution of costs between consumers and suppliers, this relationship is also relevant between different groups of customers (Milchram et al., 2018:1253). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:12) concurs that decisions relating to distribution of costs and benefits should be fair and just. The third aspect is restorative justice which addresses past, present and future harm to communities, individuals and the environment and to generate a framework to ameliorate the position of disenfranchised communities and damage to the environment (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8, Patel, 2021:9). The offending parties and the offended discuss the impact of the harm or damages in a neutral setting and negotiate a just and fair settlement to remedy the situation (Montmasson-Clair, 2021:8; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:74). Tension between a just and rapid implementation compounds the process as trade-offs cannot ingrain and entrench injustices, although participatory process will inherently slow down the process but ultimately favour a just and equitable transition (Newell et al., 2022:3). Restorative justice has also been applied to climate change in the context of harm attributed to energy generation through the combustion of fossil-fuel and the emissions of harmful GHG (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:23). Planning a just transition to renewable energy provides an opportunity to address social and governance risks while developing infrastructure that is stable, reliable, affordable and sustainable (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12). Developing countries face a dilemma of abandoning vast quantities of richly available fossil fuel which could propel their economies to competitive heights and pursue renewable energy by maintaining a low carbon footprint (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:38). The Just Transition Principles incorporating procedural, distributive, and restorative justice in the energy sector will mitigate poverty, inequality, and unemployment to ensure a just transition (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:12). Creecy (2022:3) advocates for workers and communities to be at the heart of the transition as a prerequisite to enable them to benefit from the establishment of new industries and technology while ensuring that no one is excluded. 2.4.5. Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels Governments and lenders globally came under immense pressure to cease initiating and funding certain fossil-fuel projects with coal-fired power plants distinctly identified as the key sector due to be phased out (Cozzi et al., 2022:55). South Africa has committed to decarbonising by 2050 by reducing its carbon emissions and adopted a coal phase-out strategy aligned with the international approach (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1). Magketla (2021:6) asserts that emissions of GHG in South Africa are the result of beneficiating coal into electricity and petrochemicals with Eskom accounting for 45% of carbon emissions and Sasol responsible for 15%. China pledged in September 2021 to halt any new construction of coal plants overseas which ideally deprived Africa of public funding for new coal plants (Cozzi et al., 2022:55). Globally, signatories to the Paris agreement have committed to a reduction in the demand for coal as coal will eventually become a commodity of the past (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:36). Semelane et al. (n.d.:62) argues that the phase-out of coal from energy production globally is crucial to mitigate the effects of climate change and comply with the Paris Agreement on CO2 reductions. Regardless, the rapid transition to a low carbon future will disadvantage communities economically and socially who have solely relied on the fossil-fuel industry for their livelihood (Neal, 2020:1). Large parts of the world have come onboard to gradually phase down coal utilisation as the transition has become politically desirable and with falling renewable prices being more feasible (Semelane et al., n.d.:62). The cessation of support for fossil-fuel projects by China bodes well for Africa’s transition to renewable energy which halted 25 new coal power projects in 14 African countries with a potential capacity of 15 GW, accounting for 70% of coal-fired projects in sub-Saharan Africa (Cozzi et al., 2022:94). Wang et al. (2020:5) has identified two challenges with the rapid phase-out of coal, firstly abandoned fossil-fuel power plants risk becoming stranded assets and secondly the energy deficit could result in rolling blackouts. The transition from coal through a water-focussed lens highlights the challenge of contaminated water and opportunities to address acid mine drainage (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). The Olifants River has been found to be one of the most polluted rivers in South Africa due to water flowing from the coal belt region and is a source of water for over 4 million people as well as some of the largest irrigations schemes (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:4). The Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:17) states that climate change has negatively impacted on water scarcity and aggravated water availability patterns. Jobs and livelihoods are at risk through coal mine closures, but employment opportunities will arise through restoration of coal mining areas (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). According to the Draft Report, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station utilises significant amounts of water for cooling, which is considered misleading, as the cooling water is sourced from the ocean and does not create competition for limited water availability (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:6). The areas of focus for rehabilitation include mine dumps, revival of natural habitat and the building of artificial wetlands with a primary objective of driving revegetation for the purpose of sustaining the quality of water due acid mine drainage (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). The Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa (2022:1) states that climate change has had a devastating impact on South Africa’s infrastructure, productivity, human resources and limited water availability is at risk. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and financial institutions may reconsider financing fossil-fuel power generation if HELE (High Efficiency, Low Emissions) technology is incorporated in the project (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:64). Africa’s response to climate change and the speed with which action is taken to mitigate it will present an opportunity to address Africa’s socio-economic development against the backdrop of an evolving energy mix, skewed heavily towards renewable energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:174). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:4) supports the transition but advises South Africa requires the enforcement of good governance principles, unwavering leadership and a transition from monopolistic power utilities to a decentralised energy system, driven by renewable energy. The region with the most available renewable energy is the Northern Cape but has exhausted the available grid capacity since Bid Window 5 (Swilling et al., 2023:17). Unfortunately, Africa is exposed to the greatest threat of climate change notwithstanding the fact that Africa contributed the least towards greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Cozzi et al., 2022:174). However, the CCDR encourages the transition from fossil fuel to a low carbon energy system which will produce a wide range of benefits including the elimination of load shedding, enhanced energy security, economic growth and global competitiveness, minimise water, air and soil pollution and reduced carbon emissions (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:1). South Africa’s transition has been gaining momentum as Eskom’s coal procurement has steadily declined from 132.7 million tonnes in 2007/8 to 115.5 million tonnes in 2017/18 (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:1). The South Africa Economic Outlook November report (2022:3) disputes that Eskom achieved this reduction through a concerted effort but was a culmination of high levels of load shedding and private generation. South Africa has an exceedingly high propensity for fossil fuel generation which will negatively impact the country’s global competitiveness as Europe introduces the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:4). Cozzi et al. (2022:174) supports the transition, citing evidence of climate change wreaking havoc with the weather patterns which has already gripped Africa and exposed the African economy to volatility and undermined its ability to attain lasting peace, stability and prosperity. Steps taken to phase-out coal mining will vastly improve food security and significantly minimise contamination of soil (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:21). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:2) asserts that the Global North has the financial capacity, human capital and resources to cushion the impact of the transition to low carbon footprint while the Global South will require significant financial support to shield developing nations from economic hardships. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:6) strongly advises against a deliberate bias towards renewable energy by drawing on predetermined findings and making incoherent recommendations. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) further questions if the carbon emissions for renewable energy was assessed “from cradle to grave”, by including emissions during mining, processing and manufacturing, intercontinental and local transportation, construction and maintenance of renewable energy plants, decommissioning of plants and disposal of waste. The minister of DMRE also warned of consequences of decommissioning power stations as the EPWP (Expanded Public Works Programme) could not replace lost jobs (Minister of DMRE, 2021:4). The Bloomberg study (2021:9) cautions against the political backlash if fossil-fuels are phased out and subsidies for fossil fuel are withdrawn. The minister advocates for the investment in clean coal technologies to maintain the status quo and maximise the exploitation of the natural abundance of coal (Minister of DMRE, 2021:5). The IRP (2023:10) contends that coal will remain the cornerstone of the energy mix due to the abundance of coal resources and the availability of cleaner and efficient technologies to mitigate against the emission of harmful by-products. Africa is not classified as an energy intensive economy except for South Africa, which may present challenges for the continent transitioning to a low carbon emitter (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:4). 2.4.6. Is Small-Scale Embedded Generation the silver bullet? The African continent is vastly enriched with an abundance of natural resources of energy and minerals (Cozzi et al., 2022:136). The transition to renewable energy presents new opportunities and a reduction in the price of electricity, circumventing the addition of carbon tax on goods exported from South Africa (Makgetla, 2021:5). Fossil-fuel exports has been a primary driver of economic growth and development for decades while critical minerals are abundantly available and are crucial for renewable energy technologies such as solar panels, batteries and wind turbines (Cozzi et al., 2022:136). Adding to the argument for renewable energies, renewable energy resources such as bioenergy, solar and wind are in abundance (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa is endowed with 60% of the best solar resources globally (Allen & Overy, 2023:35). Longe (2021:17) presents a convincing case for off-grid renewable energy, citing communities located in rural mountainous areas, are uneconomical to be connected to the grid. The expense of extending the grid would be astronomical, prompting an alternative solution such as off-grid renewable energy micro-grids (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). The implementation of the micro-grid solution can be achieved in a shorter timeframe and at a lower cost (Longe, 2021:17). Energy priorities in the Middle Eastern and Northern African region (MENA region) has propelled the expansion of solar power (Lefore et al., 2021:3). Solar energy in the region is driven by several factors such as high diesel costs, a reduction in fuel subsidies, oil price instability and the reduction of carbon emissions (Bloomberg, 2021:41). Baker and Phillips (2019:179) observed that in recent years, the expeditious adoption of solar energy in South Africa with commercial, high-income residential households and industry installing rooftop or ground-mounted solar PV. Low carbon emission energy generation is predicted to grow at twice the rate observed between 2018 and 2023 and significantly reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA, 2024:11). The Draft Basic Assessment Report (2018:94) however argues that solar PV plants negatively intrudes on the natural landscape which results in visual impact. Lefore et al. (2021:6) advocates for the adoption of micro-grids solar PV which has proven to be affordable and reliable in the agricultural sector for irrigation. Solar-powered micro-irrigation has been directly credited for raising income in the agricultural sector between five to ten times, 300% increase in harvesting yields, 90% water reduction and generating 250kW of clean energy (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:3). However, the Draft Basic Assessment Report (2018:33) asserts that quarterly cleaning requires approximately 5 million to 8 million litres of water per year during operations, which could be more frequent depending on environmental conditions. According to the Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:19), off-grid solar has been touted as the most economical and workable solution to electrify 55% of households without access to electricity within five years. Due to limited grid capacity, the planned acceleration of renewable energy projects faces considerable restrictions and negatively impacts on the number of projects that can be connected to the grid (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The highest demand for energy is largely concentrated in the northeast of the country but superior wind and solar sources are located in the southwest of the country, indicating a mismatch between supply and demand (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:112; Swilling et al., 2023:17). An expeditious expansion of the grid will be critical to transmit energy to where the demand for energy is located, while creating additional grid capacity to accommodate an influx of projects which will maximise the generous wind and solar conditions (SONA, 2024:13). In light of the above challenges, municipalities can play a vital role in promoting the installation of microgrids and SSEGs, improving energy security and minimising the impact of load shedding (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:5). An analysis conducted by PwC revealed that commercial and industrial roof space in the Midrand area in Gauteng amounted to 638,000m2 and if installed with solar PV, could generate 2,000 kWh / m2 per year for 2,500 hours per year (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). The energy generated could potentially total 500 kWh of electricity for 2,500 sunlight hours per year and can be transmitted to the local distribution grid to alleviate the bouts of load shedding, without the constraint of the transmission network (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:5). Swilling et al. (2023:12) advocates for renewable energy fundamentally because renewable energy has been proven to be less costly than coal per kWh sold. Makgetla (2021:1) concurs that the costs associated with the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources is far cheaper than generating electricity from coal. However, renewable energy does not produce energy 24 hours a day as the output is determined by the varying weather conditions, including the sunlit hours in a day (Swilling et al., 2023:12). In order to match the energy produced by coal fired power stations, the renewable energy capacity must be ramped up to produce similar outputs but the cost per kWh of electricity still remains cheaper than energy generated from coal (IEA, 2021:4). The Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:19) supports that position that off-grid technologies are the most economical approach to achieve universal access and is based on geospatial least-cost modelling. A report titled Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:17) has revealed that solar PV has attained grid parity globally and is predicted by IRENA and many other institutions that the cost of solar PV will be further reduced. Advances in technology supported by energy storage, higher efficiencies and improved solar power forecasting, solar PV has become a strong contender and will feature prominently in the energy mix in most countries around the globe (GreenCape, 2021:10). Swilling et al. (2023:21) contends that rooftop solar PV limits transmission grid constraints and cites Vietnam as an example where rooftop solar PV with a capacity of more than 7 GW was installed in 2020. By comparison, South Africa has favourable solar resources, but the adoption of rooftop solar PV has been stagnant and optimistically predicted to reach 7.5 GW of installed capacity by 2035 (Swilling et al., 2023:21). The slow rate of rooftop solar PV adoption is disputed by the authors of a report titled The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis (2022:8) and asserts that municipalities have not taken cognisance of the rapid uptake of rooftop solar PV. However, this omission on the part of the municipalities may be attributed to residents failing to register their installation. The City of Cape town requires all residents to obtain permission prior to installing solar PV and register the installation, notwithstanding the type of installation (Rooftop Solar PV, 2022:7). The City further advises residents that the installer must be registered with The Department of Labour and Employment, and provide a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) after completing the requisite tests and inspections (Rooftop Solar PV, 2022:8). An analysis of customs data by Reuters revealed that South Africa imported R2.2bn worth of solar panels in the first five months of 2022, with the potential to generate 500 MW of energy (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:8; Bavier, Joe and Promit Mukherjee, 2022). The installation of rooftop solar PV will unfortunately have a negative impact on the city’s revenue as more affluent customers who contribute significantly to the city’s income adopt solar PV (Hausmann et al., 2023:75). Municipalities have a critical role to play in plugging the energy deficit by diversifying into energy generation in a sustainable manner to remain relevant and viable (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:2). According to the Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:7), solar installations costs reduced significantly and conversely, installed solar capacity rose substantially. This sentiment is also echoed by International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), reporting that solar PV modules prices have diminished dramatically over the last decade while installed capacity has risen from 40 GW to over 600 GW during the same timeframe, with similar trajectory expected in the future (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:7; Swilling et al., 2023:21). The GreenCape 2022 Market Intelligence report paints a similar picture whereby the rooftop solar PV is expected to balloon at a rate of between 250-400 MW installed per year which translates to a maximum capacity of 7,5 GW by 2035 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:23). The reasons cited for the growth in the South African market is related to cost reduction, maturity of technology and rolling blackouts, with the expectation that the trend will continue on an upward trajectory (IEA, 2021:4). The trend is encouraging as the transition to clean energy technology paves the way for a greener and environmentally friendly future (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:24). Due to the high upfront costs of solar PV, business models are being engineered to support the implementation of rooftop solar PV and are either financed by the installer or through a third-party financing partner, and the amount is settled over a pre-determined timeframe (Swilling et al., 2023:21). There is a tangible business case to pursue this investment when owners of these installations are permitted to export energy back to the grid through net energy metering for energy not being utilised, at a favourable rate to make this option equally attractive (Kuhudzai, 2021:23; IEA, 2022:10). The drawback for the grid operator is the generation and supply of energy to the grid during daylight hours (off peak time) while consuming energy from the grid during peak time (Swilling et al., 2023:21). This drawback can be offset by installing battery storage to negate the effects of the “duckcurve” problem and contribute positively towards the stability of the grid (IEA, 2021:87; Hausmann et al., 2023:58). Makgetla (2021:5) purports that mining companies will be forced to write off coal reserves and capital investment as well as mining jobs as the transition to renewable energy forges ahead. The four districts in Mpumalanga (eMalahleni (Witbank), Steve Tshwete (Middelburg), Govan Mbeki (Secunda) and Msukaligwa (Ermelo)) that rely heavily on coal and coal value chains for economic growth and sustainability, will be forced to seize the opportunity now and start diversifying into new economic activities (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16). A study by Kuhudzai (2021:8) found new settlements in Zimbabwe’s major cities are portrayed by poor planning and lack of enforcement of urban by-laws, which results in poor service delivery to the extent that these establishments may be located close to the grid but remain without access. These residents have opted to install small solar home systems to power up essential devices and lighting (IEA, 2024:20; Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). However, these solar home systems must be maintained from an operational and maintenance perspective which can be significant over the lifespan of the installation (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:20). Factors which affect the performance of the solar installation include local geography, climate conditions, the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation which is directly proportional to soiling of PV modules (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88; Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:20). A survey by Afrobarometer in 2023 found that electricity was ranked third on the list of critical problems that South Africans wanted government to intervene while 60% of respondents wanted Eskom to be privatised to allow other actors to enter the generation and distribution space to stabilise the electricity supply (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:6). The outcome of the last bid window for renewable energy generation, over 3 GW of projects were not approved due to lack of capacity on the transmission network which has further hamstrung future renewable energy projects (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The Renewable Energy Market Update (2023:61) also cited a lack of investment in grid infrastructure as a global challenge which has curtailed new solar PV and wind projects from being implemented. Solar radiation is a natural resource freely available to varying extents globally and the conversion of solar radiation into electricity is largely a function of solar PV plants (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:7). The renewable energy generated by solar PV provides an ideal opportunity for countries and communities to transform their power consumption to a low-carbon energy source and moderate climate change (SONA, 2024:13). China has invested USD 75 billion on average per year since 2010 on grid infrastructure to avoid curtailing variable renewable energy additions to the grid (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:61). In contrast to China’s grid infrastructure investment, South Africa has run out of grid capacity in the Northern Cape which has proved to be the strongest source for variable renewable energy (Swilling et al., 2023:17; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:27). Solar PV is uniquely positioned to be the most suitable yet flexible energy source to provide reliable, affordable and sustainable electricity to a growing number of people globally, to uplift poor households out of poverty while improving their economic development and raising their standard of living (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:11). The Zimbabwean government anticipates a huge spike in demand by 2038 and is promoting solar PV generation to accommodate the demand, as set out in the launched National Renewable Energy Policy 2019 (Kuhudzai, 2021:17). China’s manufacturing sector for renewable energy to supply both domestic and export markets continued to expand at a rapid rate with an increase of 40-50% for wafers, cells and modules and the demand doubled for polysilicon (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:38). Oil prices are subsidised to promote low-cost energy while renewable energy attracts high interest rates in developing countries which favours fossil fuel (Puig et al., 2021:5). Makgetla (2021:10) argues that producers will have to invest in alternative energy source while Sasol and metal refineries will have to source alternative feedstock, a challenge which may require extensive research and innovation. Subsidies may be deemed myopic in the broader context of long-term sustainable solutions as oil price volatility can have devastating effects on electricity tariffs (International Energy Agency, 2022:17). However, solar PV continues to weather the storm and has become the dominant source of renewable energy, capturing 65% of the market growth, with a combination of commercial and industrial applications (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:18). The pitfalls of renewable energy cannot be ignored as the reliability and stability of variable renewable energy (VRE) is of paramount concern (IEA, 2021:115). Variable renewable energy is weather-dependent and delivers an output which can be variable, erratic and can destabilise the grid due to unplanned fluctuations (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). A study titled Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:8) further elaborates on the disadvantages of solar PV and states that solar energy output is influenced by latitude, cloud cover, terrain elevation and shading, atmospheric aerosol concentration, and moisture content in the atmosphere. Nowak et al. (2021:2) posits that the African continent has immense potential and an abundance of energy resources due to the continents geographical location but are hindered from large scale implementation as a result of financial constraints. Michaelowa et al. (2020:3) advises that a distinction between off-grid and on-grid renewable energy projects must be acknowledged as off-grid projects attract higher initial investment costs and are not competitive with large scale projects. A further hinderance is the array of physical and regulatory land-use limitations and a practical solar PV potential assessment can determine the value added after incorporating all these inputs (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:8). The Russian invasion of Ukraine created a global energy crisis and triggered a spike in electricity prices as solar PV installations were positioned as economically viable and cost effective for both commercial and residential clients (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:18; International Energy Agency, 2022:17). The Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country (2022:20) states that the solar PV installation during year 0 performs at the manufactured peak with a degradation of 0.8% for the first year followed by 0.5% thereafter until the end of the anticipated lifecycle of 25 years. There has been growing appetite in South Africa for renewable energy with the government announcing a Solar Panel Tax incentive during the State of the Nation Address (SONA), allowing individuals to claim a 25% rebate on rooftop solar PV panels to a maximum value of R15 000 for individuals and 125% tax deduction for qualifying businesses (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:30; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). The International Energy Agency (2022:17) forecasts a growth of almost 2400GW of global renewable energy between 2022 and 2027, the equivalence of the entire installed capacity of China. The only renewable energy technology that is growing exponentially is solar PV and has been breaking annual capacity records (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:16). However, Puig et al. (2021:5) maintains that there is no silver bullet to achieve universal access as potential solutions must appeal to local conditions. 2.5. Regulations and Regulatory Framework The regulations governing the installation of SSEGs are both essential and mandatory to safeguard the homeowner as well as the distributor’s network, according to the Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998 (Embedded generation policy, 2023:1; Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:8). The Embedded generation policy (2023:7) requires municipalities to enforce regulations where SSEGs are approved by ensuring that the installations are installed, commissioned and signed off by suitably qualified personnel. The “requirements” document specifies the details essential for compliance and the commissioning report must be submitted on the prescribed document to the municipality. Although the rules may vary between different municipalities, the fundamental requirements of an application process and technical compliance has been standardised across the licensed distributors (Filipova and Morris, 2018:3). However, the net-consumer condition attached to the installation mandates the customer to consume more energy than what is exported to the grid on an annual basis to protect the municipal revenue (Filipova and Morris, 2018:3). Conway (2019:13) asserts that Section 74 subsection 2c and 2e of The Municipal Systems Act (2000) directs municipalities to subsidise poor households through cross-subsidisation. The tariffs for high-income, high-consumption customers are elevated to cross-subsidise low-income households which is guided by progressive economic policy to protect citizens living in poverty (Filipova and Morris, 2018:10). The threat of the upper-middle-income and high-income households defecting to SSEGs undermines the ability of the municipality to generate sufficient revenue from a dwindling customer base to cross-subsidise poor households (Low- and middle-income grid-connected solar PV approaches in South Africa: Discussion paper, n.d:1). The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) was prompted by Nelson Mandela Bay pilot project to generate Standard Conditions for Embedded Generation within Municipal Boundaries in September 2011 (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). According to the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006, all generators of electricity must be licensed by NERSA (Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities, 2014:6). Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006 defines the parameters of capacity that must be registered and which systems must be licensed by NERSA (Embedded generation policy, 2023:3). However, the regulations at the time allowed private electricity producers with a capacity of less than 100kW to operate without a generation license (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). Therefore, the municipalities were empowered to approve SSEG systems less than 100kW in the absence of NERSA approval (Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities, 2014:6). Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act 2006 (DoE 2020) was amended and gazetted on 26th March 2020 which modified SSEG license exemption and registration with NERSA (Status of small-scale embedded generation, 2020:3). The amended Act permitted generators up to 1MW from being exempted from obtaining a license from NERSA (Status of small-scale embedded generation, 2020:12). The Electricity Regulation Act under schedule 2 was further amended to exempt SSEG with a capacity of up to 100MW from licensing requirements (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:12). The Embedded generation policy (2023:1) asserts that the Association of Municipal Electricity Utilities (AMEU) and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) have formulated standardised procedures and supporting documentations to support municipalities to champion and smoothly navigate the process in conjunction with national policies and regulation. According to Section 156 (1) and Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution, municipalities have been empowered with the legislative and executive authority to manage and regulate electricity reticulation (Embedded generation policy, 2023:2; Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Renewable Energy Guideline, n.d:8). The Small-scale embedded generation in South African Municipalities (2014:5) defines Anti-islanding as “the ability of the inverter to isolate from the distribution network when the network power is off, thus ensuring the safety of technicians working on the network” and must be enforced by the municipality. The Embedded generation policy (2023:3) states that embedded generation must not impact safety, quality of power and grid operational specifications which can be achieved through the compliance and enforcement of technical specifications and standards. The standards and specifications can be sourced in the Grid Code, NRS097-2 series of specifications for SSEGs, the SANS 10142-1-2: The wiring of premises and Specific requirements for embedded generation installations connected to the low voltage distribution Network in South Africa (Embedded generation policy, 2023:3). 2.6. Case Studies 2.6.1. Case study 1: Why did the Boomplaas renewable energy project fail? SSEGs in South Africa were not subsidised through government policy or regulations but were driven by the national electricity crisis and waning public confidence, rapidly rising tariffs and declining solar PV costs which favoured wealthy consumers (Baker and Phillips, 2019:191). This contrasts with high-income countries such as the UK and Germany where adoption is encouraged by regulation and worthy subsidies. In South Africa, Boomplaas informal settlement located near Keimoes in the Northern Cape was an exception and was chosen as a pilot project for the installation of domestic rooftop solar PV in 2012 (Kumar et al., 2019: 170; McEwan, 2017:10). A total of sixteen houses were identified as beneficiaries of the solar PV project where two 240W solar panels combined with a 1000W inverter and six 2V batteries were installed at a total cost of R1 million (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). In addition to the solar PV installation, internal wiring was installed in each house as well as fittings for pull switch lights and plug sockets for appropriately rated household appliances. The project was implemented due to political pressure from a senior member of South African Communist Party (SACP) which is a part of the ruling alliance (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The project proved to be a dismal failure as a result of unrealistic promises made regarding the solar system’s capabilities by politicians with no technical expertise in this field (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The units performed below expectation of the end users and lacked support and a maintenance plan which caused several units to fail (McEwan et al., 2013:6; McEwan, 2017:10). The project incorporated two community members who received a week’s paid training and were expected to perform basic maintenance services. The trainees were constantly being bombarded by the community to provide maintenance, diagnose and repair the system without compensation (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). Furthermore, the trainees had limited technical knowledge devoid of any support from the installers and no spares. Although the installers committed to proving post-installation repairs, potential infringement on the warranty terms and conditions caused the warranty to be null and void, converting an asset into a liability. 2.6.2. Case study 2: Pilot project in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, South Africa The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) is a metropolitan municipality located in the Eastern Cape and incorporates Gqeberha (formerly known as Port Elizabeth), Kariega (previously known as Uitenhage) and Despatch (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, n.d). According to ICLEI Case Studies (2015:1), the NMBM initiated a pilot project of SSEG consisting of solar PV and wind energy for the sole purpose of generating energy and dispatching the power to the grid and measuring the production through a net energy meter (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:1). NERSA approved the application for the pilot project which consisted of 1kW wind and 1kW solar PV which was later raised to 5kW (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). The findings of the experiment of the pilot project were that SSEGs were not financially viable but sustainable from a technical perspective (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). The pilot project was initiated at a time when electricity tariffs were affordable and renewable energy was in its infancy stage and the costs of renewable energy was exorbitant (ICLEI Case Studies, 2015:2). However, the project became feasible as the cost of electricity begun escalating while the cost of renewables begun declining aggressively. 2.6.3. Case study 3: iShack Project The iShack Project was the brainchild of the Sustainability Institute just outside Stellenbosch and the initiative was a social project to provide residents in informal settlements with off-grid solar electricity in 2012 (iShack Project, n.d). The project was executed in conjunction with Stellenbosch University’s TsamaHUB and funding was provided by the Gates Foundation (Hweshe, 2012). The “i” in iShack means an improved shack which was retrofitted with a solar panel and the first demo was built in Enkanini in 2012 (Glasser, 2017:34). The installation had limited capacity to supply three led lights, a cellular phone charger and a motion sensor security light (Hweshe, 2012). Although the solar system cannot power up a stove or fridge, the installation has improved the lives of the residents who did not previously have access to electricity. According to the Glasser (2017:34)., clients are presented with two options, the “Free Basic system” which powers three lights and a charger or the contract system with an upgraded capacity which can additionally power up a LED television set, radios, tablets and smartphones. The iShack project prides itself on building local capacity, developing renewable energy skills and creating “green jobs” within the communities that are being serviced (iShack project, n.d). The iShack agents are members of the community who receive weekly training from the Sustainability Institute to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to deliver a high-quality service to the community (Sustainability Institute, n.d). The pilot phase consisted of electrifying 100 shacks with solar PV over a period of 18 months in the Enkanini informal settlement and proved to be highly successful (Hweshe, 2012). The full-scale rollout of renewable energy electrification was initiated in 2019 to electrify 580 homes serving over 3000 residents in informal settlements of Malawi Camp and Freedom Farm (Hweshe, 2012). The communities were expected to pay a subsidised joining fee and a monthly service fee to drive the sustainability of the service delivery project. The project costs per shack ranged from R7 000 and R10 000 per installation (Hweshe, 2012). 2.7. The Energy-Poverty-Climate Nexus 2.7.1. Energy Poverty 2.7.1.1. Energy Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) estimate that 3 billion people globally are energy poor and resort to utilising combustibles such as wood to meet their cooking and heating needs. In sub-Saharan Africa, energy poverty affects predominantly females as women and girls are delegated the responsibility of acquiring and utilising traditional biomass energy sources for cooking and heating (Longe, 2021:1). Exceptionally high levels of poverty can be attributed as the key reason for unaffordability of modern energy services even though the energy may be subsidised (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:50) estimates that the demand for energy on the African continent will double the growth of the global average. Rising energy prices is also a contributing factor to energy poverty as high prices undermines the ability of people to pay for energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). Allen & Overy (2023:36) assert that the recent global developments including the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war had a ripple effect on the cost of food and fuel prices, which caused debt in most African countries to rise exponentially. An analysis of the average residential rates in several sub-Saharan African countries in 2020 found that electricity prices were higher than the average Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries before making allowance for the differences in purchasing power between the economies (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The energy transition landscape has endured fundamental changes worldwide with varying significance attached to elements of the “energy trilemma” representing energy affordability and accessibility, energy security and reliability, and clean and sustainable energy (Sasol Climate Change Report, 2023:19). Predictably, in some African countries with lifeline tariffs, the average exceeded the OECD even with purchasing power parity adjustments (Cozzi et al., 2022:204). The ramification of higher energy prices amplified energy poverty in Africa and curtails utilisation of modern-day energy service, even if they have access (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:141). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:1) assert that energy poverty reduction and universal access to energy is a fundamental right which lays the foundation for a low carbon transition and creates an economy which is environmentally friendly. There are two key elements which are essential to address household poverty: access to adequate and affordable energy to meet the basic human needs of the household (General House Survey, 2021:42). The Survey further determined that the basic human needs encompass lighting, cooking, space heating and water heating which is a diverse set of criteria utilised to determine access and affordability. A reasonable standard of living would require electricity for cooking, refrigerator to store food, water heating, for communication purposes and entertainment (Ye and Koch, 2020:16). Applied social scientists have come to the realisation that households embrace flexibility to some degree and do not limit their energy source exclusively to a single source of energy (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). This realisation is prevalent in rural communities whereby households’ resort to utilising inefficient combustion of biomass for preparation of the main meal for the day (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). The General House Survey (2021:42) utilises this information to influence future electrification planning programmes to provide adequate capacity and determine what are the future energy needs from a generation capacity. The rapid transition from inefficient biomass cookstoves to low-carbon and sustainable technologies on the African continent cannot be delayed any longer (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). Rural areas in South Africa can be classified into two well-defined classifications, one being the traditional areas which falls under the responsibility of the tribal chief and the second area known as commercial farms (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:12). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) adds another layer to the grouping of informal areas by incorporating informal settlements and backyard dwellers who migrated to burgeoning urban informal settlements in the quest for better economic opportunities. According to the South African constitution, “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” which gave rise the RDP housing, built in economically disconnected areas (Hausmann et al., 2023:94). Rapid urbanisation from rural areas to informal urban settlements on the urban periphery has created another dimension to the universal access programme as the unplanned settlement created a burden for municipalities to provide services which were not initially planned and budgeted for (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). Unfortunately, informal dwellers residing on the urban periphery of cities, are not residing on proclaimed land for housing and are therefore not entitled to the provision of basic services (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:5). Lack of investment in rural areas by the private sector and utilities can be attributed to the exorbitant costs and risks linked to electrifying sparsely populated areas and low consumers of energy (Jeuland et al., 2021:3). Due to the slow pace of electrification of rural areas, a spike in urbanisation has been witnessed, as communities desperately seek a change in their economic future (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). The electrification programme is unable to provide grid connection in remote rural areas within the short or medium term and can only offer non-electrification grid connection such as solar PV (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). The perception of the provision of services and access to energy in urban areas is misleading as municipalities are often under-capacitated and do not have the financial means, amongst other challenges, to provide basic services (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:1). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) commends municipalities which have risen above their challenges and implemented innovative solutions through the “maypole method” in informal settlements whereby several households are supplied with electricity which is drawn from a pole using a single transformer. Ngarava et al. (2022:9) attributes historic racial and employment discrimination coupled with dysfunctional schooling system as the key drivers of impeding economic opportunity and obtaining credit as contributing factors to energy poverty, predominantly amongst Blacks and Coloureds in South Africa. A study by Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:3) found that energy poverty has the biggest impact on low-income household based on several factors but not restricted to income levels. Allen & Overy (2023:37) concur that developing countries face extreme challenges with alleviating energy poverty. However, energy poverty can be extended to include low literacy levels, power dynamics within the household, distance and lack of transport, as well as the lack of energy subsidies (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:3). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:14) argue that cooking has been singled out as the activity that utilises the most amount of energy in low-income household in South Africa. The level of poverty has impacted on their ability to pay for basic electricity services as people resort to unconventional means for cooking and heating (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). All staple foods must be cooked before consumption and whole grains are examples of foods which produces higher nutritional values but consumes more energy due to lengthy cooking times (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) supports this view and further states that, although low-income households have access to electricity, such households resort to utilising different sources of energy (energy stacking) due to several important factors. According to a study by Longe (2021:3), women in rural areas had to develop creative strategies to deal with energy poverty although not necessarily producing the desired results. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) acknowledges these challenges and added that ranking high up amongst the challenges is availability and affordability of energy, type of foods being prepared, and their dependence on unclean sources of energy such as wood and paraffin when the energy units in the electricity meter are exhausted. They have employed cooking techniques to reduce their cooking duration, time of consuming meals, change in diet, utilising lower fuel-intensive cooking processes, cooking with unhealthy sources of energy and lastly, eating cold foods and leftovers (Longe, 2021:3). After the depletion of electricity credits, the limited options available to poor households is cooking with polluting sources of energy (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). The Gender Snapshot (2023:17) states that clean cooking fuels and technology and access to electricity is beneficial for women as they will enjoy improved health and a reduction in poverty. Households without access to a refrigerator or own a refrigerator but have no energy credits, cannot purchase, and store raw foods or store leftover food to be consumed the next day (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:14). Jeuland et al. (2021:7) argues that low-income households may be influenced by energy technologies providing multiple advantages such as cooking on a traditional stove will provide secondary benefits of distributing heat in the home. Key drivers to a rapidly rising energy demand are the population growth and economic activity (Cozzi et al., 2022:59). A total of 9 percent of the global population lack access to electricity and more than a quarter utilise polluting fuels and technologies (The Gender Snapshot, 2023:17). The African continent is home to 1.3 billion people in 2020 and experienced a yearly growth rate of 2.5%, a figure that is twice the average global rate (Cozzi et al., 2022:59). Notwithstanding the alarming growth rate, Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:3) argue that energy poverty should not be contingent upon the individual’s or household’s wealth status but contend that the lack of access to energy exacerbates poverty and impedes human development and survival. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:16) advocates for addressing energy poverty through a two-pronged approach: Firstly, households should be in a position to access the minimum amount of energy required to raise their standard of living and embark on more productive and entrepreneurial activities which can boost their income. Secondly, the energy utilised by the households must be safe and clean, and sources of energy from paraffin and firewood should be totally avoided. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:5) supports this approach as the risk of using paraffin and candles have led to numerous shack fires which have destroyed entire informal settlements. Ledger (2021) states that the constrained energy system does not support the country’s transformation and socio-economic development goals by providing universal access and sufficient energy (Ledger, 2021; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:5). Ngarava et al. (2022:6) postulates that many households face energy vulnerability in South Africa with the highest exposure risk of being cut-off (disconnected) for non-payment of electricity. In the United States, Memmott et al. (2021:190) found that energy insecurity affected approximately 4.8 million low-income households who were unable to service at least one energy bill during the past year, with more than two in five families unable to service their account which resulted in their energy being disconnected. Ngarava et al. (2022:7) cited high tariffs have led to disconnections as the cost of energy rises beyond the means of poor South Africans. South Africa has made monumental progress in achieving universal access to electricity but faces an unprecedented 43% households that are energy poor (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:141) concedes that, although the electrification rate hovers around 84%, energy poverty has confined people to dirty fuel sources such as paraffin, dung, coal and wood. Di Falco and Lynam (2023:1) states that economic forces directly impact on the source of energy and the transition to a more efficient fuel. Failure to address the widening gap caused by energy poverty will enforce the triad of poverty, inequality and unemployment, a problem that is rapidly spiralling out of control (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1: Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:1) advocates for a just energy transition that will drive energy equity while achieving a low carbon footprint. A higher living standard will generally accelerate the transition to a cleaner and more efficient energy source (Di Falco and Lynam, 2023:1). Allen & Overy (2023:34) assert that some segments on the African continent have launched claims of environmental colonialism based on two reasons, firstly citing that developing countries that have succeeded in reducing the levels of poverty have simultaneously intensified the rates of per capita carbon emissions and secondly, a third of the population on the African continent lives in abject poverty, rendering the call to minimise GHG emissions as unfair and unjust. The pursuit of a low carbon footprint would not necessarily inflate the cost or affordability of electricity (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). Solar photovoltaic and wind energy resources are delivering the cheapest electricity, largely due to their falling costs and technological advancements and as a fringe benefit, reducing the carbon footprint of the energy sector (IEA, 2021:4). The true cost of electricity, incorporating avoided environmental externalities, results in astronomical savings whilst pursuing an ambitious decarbonisation pathway (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:60). Nowak et al. (2021:23) argues that challenges arising from inefficient governmental institutions coupled with excessively high levels of corruption is derailing governments’ plans to achieve universal access to electricity. This results in disillusioned stakeholders who are apathetic and become impervious to critical matters of national importance. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:60) however cautions against withdrawal of subsidies which customers have historically benefited from, as tariffs may spike while evolving to a low carbon energy network. Nowak et al. (2021:23) supports the investment in electrification to improve GDP per capita and an improved Human Development Index (HDI index). Creecy (2022:4) advocates for exploiting the opportunities of cheap and reliable electricity which is abundantly supported by a surplus of natural resources (sun and wind) and support from the international community to decarbonise the energy sector. 2.7.1.2. Impact of Covid-19 on Energy Poverty The African continent economies performed exceptionally well between 2010 and 2019 and grew at an average rate of 3%, until the Covid-19 pandemic struck and derailed growth, plummeting the continent into its first recession since the 2009 global financial crisis (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). The coronavirus pandemic decimated economies globally and South Africa was not spared the hardship although the country was already undergoing economic challenges and was saddled with a high unemployment rate (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused a global crisis with pronounced impacts on the health of the populations and contraction of economies, largely due to restriction of movement and shutting down of borders (World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results, 2022:1). The pandemic had a negative impact on society and further led to embedded energy poverty which impeded people’s ability to pay for electricity for cooking, lighting and space heating (World Development Report, 2022:3). A study by Memmott et al. (2021:190) concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated energy insecurity which was attributed to the economic dislocation and the inability of households to meet their energy needs. (Cozzi et al. (2022:15) advocated for an accelerated transition to cheaper and cleaner sources of energy which was driven by the global energy crises. The Covid‐19 pandemic had already placed significant strain on the African economies (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10; IEA, 2021:90) and was further impacted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). The invasion sent shockwaves through the global economies, spiking food, energy and commodity prices (Hepburn et al., 2020:16). The pandemic exposed the magnitude of inequality and poverty in the country with the state introducing programmes to address poor people’s inability to pay for food, basic services and education (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). According to World Development Report, the pandemic exacerbated the ability of lenders to analyse the credit risk of borrowers while lenders were constrained when borrowers defaulted on their loans (Klapper et al.,2022:15). Fig. 2.1: COVID-19-related conditions and energy insecurity. Source: Sociodemographic disparities in energy insecurity among low-income households before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021. Figure 2.1. illustrates how the various categories were impacted by the public health crisis and more particularly, the three levels of energy insecurity experienced by households (Memmott et al., 2021:189). A significant portion of households were either served with a disconnection notice, could not pay their energy account or were ultimately disconnected, a rather harsh approach adopted by the service providers in the face of the crippling pandemic (Cozzi et al., 2022:15). Ledger & Rampedi, (2022:4) discovered that the economic shock, as a consequence of the national lockdown, exacerbated poverty and inequality to the extent that poor households lacked the ability to pay for a basic bouquet of essential services with electricity being the most prominent casualty. Middle-income households were not shielded from the economic turmoil with household incomes diminishing by a minimum margin of 5% and had a ripple effect on their ability to service their municipal accounts (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:99). The harsh reality conflicted with steps the government had undertaken to cushion the blow of the pandemic, especially for poor households (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). The effects of Covid-19 led to economic and social impacts which resulted in substantial job losses and devastating impact on the global economy (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:10). Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:6) further stated that low-income households developed strategies to address energy poverty by pleading for assistance on social media or tagging celebrities with details of their meter number, with the hope of receiving assistance. Lu et al. (n.d:15) asserted that the lockdown had a devastating effect in the renewable energy field as labour shortages were acutely felt, supply chains were disrupted, leading to material shortages and new installation were delayed. The lockdowns implemented during the height of covid-19 diminished economic activity and resulted in low energy demand with non-conventional demand patterns (IEA, 2021:90; Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:15). Hepburn et al. (2020:4) avers that the citizens were pressuring governments to take decisive steps prior to the onset of the pandemic but experienced a momentous setback as the virus spread rapidly. The cascading impact of abandoned projects negatively undermined the progress to achieving universal access, with 4% more people descending into the lack of access grouping in 2021 than 2019 (Cozzi et al., 2022:15). However, the Covid-19 pandemic also provided an opportunity to transform the energy sector to a low carbon and climate resilient sector in a just, inclusive and sustainable manner (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:12). The health crisis further compounded the fragile economy and accelerated public debt which prompted governments to act with urgency to contain the economic, environmental and social risks facing the country (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:22). However, the lack of competent economic and social policies coupled with “state capture” exacerbated fiscal debt to a staggering 70.2 percent of GDP in 2020 (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:3). The Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action (2023:22) claims that significant progress has been achieved in recent years, however, the African continent faces a myriad of challenges. Although Africa was derailed from reaching significant milestones on the journey of SDG7 (access to electricity and clean cooking), the pandemic proved to be a hurdle of epic proportions as projects were hampered by delays and household incomes dwindled (Cozzi et al., 2022:35). The health crisis was found to have a disproportionate impact on lower-income and middle-income countries as the public health systems were stretched to breaking point and social packages displaced climate action to take precedence in the national budget (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). The Covid-19 pandemic created a health crisis that crippled economies around the world, with Africa facing the brunt of the impact (World Development Report, 2022:20). The challenges were further exacerbated by climate change and increasing public debt reaching unsustainable levels, with governments scrambling to address the economic, social and environmental risks plaguing the continent (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:22). Cozzi et al. (2022:35) concurs with the Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action report and further asserts that the pandemic negatively impacted on new grid and off-grid connection rates. The root cause was multi-faceted, from the logistical and financial hinderances to supply chain disruptions and social distancing (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). 2.7.1.3. Demystifying Energy Affordability People living in extreme poverty are burdened with energy costs ranging from 15% to 35% of their annual household income when resorting to off-grid solutions for the purpose of cooking and heating (Cozzi et al., 2022:114). According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the cost of electricity has ballooned by 177% from the period of 2010 to 2020 in the municipal environment (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:68). However, government, labour, and civil society groups have raised pertinent issues regarding privatization of the energy sector under the auspices of a transition to renewables, thereby depriving the poor and marginalised communities’ access and affordability (Supporting Just Transitions in South Africa, 2020:22). According to Akrofia and Antwi (2020:3), the energy infrastructure is fragile and aggravated by rising levels of energy poverty which deprive the utilities of desperately needed income to modernise the network. According to Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, expenditure on electricity affordability for minimum requirements for cell phone charger, four light bulbs (4 hours per day), fan (3 hours per day) and a television (2 hours per day) accumulating to 500 kWh per year should not exceed 5% of household income (Ledger & Rampedi, 2022:24). Electricity subsidies and lifeline tariffs across African countries does not cater for the cooking and heating needs of low-income households (Cozzi et al., 2022:120). Eskom remains the dominant provider of electricity and the cost of energy has risen to unaffordable levels (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:12). Rural women in South Africa are responsible for sourcing biomass and had to devise strategies to deal with the varying levels of energy poverty they encountered (Longe, 2021:3). The strategies devised included minimising the cooking times, consuming cold foods, changes in diet, utilising lower fuel-intensive processes for cooking and procuring alternative cooking fuels (Longe, 2021:3). Affordable electricity is crucial to enable low-income households to reap the full social, economic and health benefits and improve their standard of living (Cozzi et al., 2022:120). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) assert that affordability remains a critical element of the energy conundrum and the theoretical approach to access does not adequately address the problem. The GreenCape (2021:9) avers that it is imperative to contain rising electricity costs and manage the grid to restore reliability of supply. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) acknowledge that connection to the grid is essential in achieving universal access but the cost recovery is often a long-drawn-out process. Hausmann et al. (2023:56) believes that the South African government should bolster the entire system financially but concede there will be trade-offs between access and affordability. Many countries, including South Africa, partially or fully subsidises the connection fees, with the expectation that the user pays for consumption (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:21). Cozzi et al. (2022:119) posits that policies, measures and programmes are crucial to switching to clean cooking technologies. The nexus of the energy source and poverty must be carefully evaluated as unaffordable electricity may drive households into consuming less nutritious food contingent upon cooking times (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:22). However, the cost of conversion can be exorbitant in the context of a low-income household with an improved charcoal cooking stove consuming approximately one-third of monthly income, 50% of monthly income for LPG, and 75% for electricity (Cozzi et al., 2022:119). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:21) maintain that affordability remains the greatest obstacle for low-income households and small enterprises, negating the benefits of having access to energy. Low-income households are financially challenged and can only afford low electricity consumption (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:22). The State of Energy in South African Cities report (2020:43) states that the consumption of electricity is declining due to fuel switching in response to spiralling electricity costs. Small-scale farmers and small businesses are faced with a similar challenge but cannot afford increased consumption to boost productivity or participate in any additional value-added activities to grow their businesses and increase employment (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:22). However, Cozzi et al. (2022:121) argues that cooking with electricity will improve electricity sales and profitability for utilities and will generate a higher investment in growth strategies and support lower energy tariffs. Innovative solutions were developed by businesses to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies and spreading the upfront costs over a period of time to address to issue of affordability (Cozzi et al., 2022:121). However, many cities are circumspect with the installation of solar PV in residential areas as the reduced electricity sales have negatively impacted municipal revenue (State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:72). According to the Presidential Climate Commission report (2023:25), municipalities are responsible for the planning, maintenance and management of electricity distribution which is a major revenue stream but suffers from a variety of challenges and is reduced to a loss-making entity. The PayGo business model for solar home systems (SHS) is touted as a solution whereby the upfront costs are recovered through payments in instalments (Cozzi et al., 2022:121). 2.7.1.4. High-Emission Fuel Sources Chanchani and Oskarsson’s (2021:4) study of the Indian villages of Raipur and Korba identified several different household sources of energy in low-income areas namely coal chunks, coal cakes, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), firewood, cow dung, husk cakes and electricity. In rural households, utilising dirty biomass fuels in inefficient traditional cookstoves to cook the main meal for the family is a common practice (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). Solid biomass fuel consists of fuelwood, waste and charcoal which is used as an energy source in a three stone fire coupled with a basic inefficient stove (Cozzi et al., 2022:65). Lakdi (firewood) can be sourced from urban peripheries or purchased in a processed form of wood chips from the furniture manufacturing industry and Lakdi can be used solely as a fuel or alternatively as a starter for different coal fuels or as a combination of fuel with cheena (dung cakes) (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Longe (2021:4) posits that in South Africa, unclean sources of energy for cooking include firewood (7.7%), coal (0.4%), and paraffin (3.6%), while clean sources of energy for cooking are gas (3.6%), electricity (76.8%), and solar energy (0.1%). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:73) contends that households which are connected to the grid additionally utilise energy sources such as coal and firewood for cooking. The traditional utilisation of biomass fuel in sub-Saharan Africa is the dominant source of energy in residential areas, with more than 80% of the population depending on this inefficient energy source (Cozzi et al., 2022:65). The energy source utilised depends largely on the availability and affordability as more than one energy source or a combination of energy sources are used for cooking (Longe, 2021:4). The utilisation of dirty fuel sources can provide secondary services when considering open flame for cooking which can also heat the home and provide warmth and will influence the household decision in respect of the choice of fuels (Jeuland et al., 2021:7). The efficiency of three stone fires that burn biomass fuel is exceptionally low with efficiencies from as little as 10% rising to a maximum of 25% and due to their low efficiencies, solid biomass in three stone fires consume more than 95% of the total residential energy use in sub-Saharan Africa stoves (Cozzi et al., 2022:66). Longe (2021:4) asserts that solar cook stoves are not popular and account for only 0.1% of the energy mix for cooking in South Africa. According to le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo (2021:24), residents in informal urban areas do not have the luxury of time and access to forests to collect wood and traditional biomass fuels. The fuels required to achieve the desired result means a longer duration consumed for cooking and much more fuel must be gathered, translating to significantly more time to collect firewood (Longe, 2021:4). Residents are therefore compelled to move up the energy ladder, shifting to electricity, gas or paraffin (le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:24). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:141) asserts that while access to the grid has soared to 84%, the reality is that many households cannot afford the cost of electricity and are compelled to resort to utilising wood, coal, paraffin, candles and dung. Figure 2.2: Percentage distribution of main sources of energy used for cooking by year, 2002–2021 Source: General House Survey, 2021 The General House Survey (2021:44) revealed the main sources of energy utilised for the period of 2002 to 2021 for cooking are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The trend in cooking utilising electricity rose from 57,5% in 2002 to 77,7% in 2021. There was a noticeable decline in the utilisation of unclean fuels such as coal, paraffin and firewood. The decline in the use of paraffin for cooking dropped considerably from 16,1% in 2002 to 3,5% in 2021, while firewood followed the same trajectory, declining from 20,0% in 2002 to 7,7% in 2021. On a positive front, the utilisation of gas for cooking rose marginally from 2,2% in 2002 to 4,8% in 2021. The utilisation of dirty fuels can have dire consequences on low-income households from the adverse impacts of indoor air pollution, poisonings, burns, shack fires and deaths, with women and children falling victims to these hazards (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:141). These impacts can have devastating consequences on the availability of human capital to empower countries to flourish economically and become competitive in future (Fisher et al., 2021:686). 2.7.1.5. Sourcing of Harmful Energy Sources In the Indian village of Korba, low-income households scavenge for coal chunks at local coal mines and along transport routes (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) do not have access to electricity and find it incumbent to source firewood to meet their energy requirements but face grave risks and hostilities from host communities who witness the devastation of their environment and deforestation (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:31). In sub-Saharan Africa, as much as 81% of the population energy needs hinges on traditional biomass to meet their heating and cooking requirements (Nowak et al., 2021:3). In South Africa, scavenging for solid biomass is also culturally gendered as women and girls are responsible for collecting firewood to meet the energy requirements of the household (Longe, 2021:5). Longe’s (2021:10) research further discovered that the collecting of firewood was dependent on the proximity of the source, the quantity required and the nature of the energy demand. Nowak et al. (2021:4) shares a similar view and further adds that time was a factor in sourcing and maintaining biomass, a fundamental task assigned to women and children, causes indoor air pollution, leads to deforestation and soil degradation. Appropriating coal for household use is gendered in India and women rise early in the morning to accomplish this task as competition for free and limited energy source is high (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Deforestation in nearby bushes and mountains has led to the depletion of good wood for cooking, resulting in longer periods of time dedicated to this task as good firewood is located further away (Longe, 2021:5). Ngarava et al. (2022:1) agrees that women are burdened with the responsibility of collecting energy fuel due to power relations, social dynamics and lack of access and control. Lakdi (firewood) can be collected on the outskirts of urban areas or through social contacts from private properties (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:4). Collecting firewood was found to be extremely risky, as women and girls face the risk of rape and kidnapping, wild animals and snakes and injuries (Longe, 2021:17). Mulugetta et al. (2019:3) shares this view and elucidates fuel sourcing by women and children elevates the risk of injury and personal security and deprives them of leisure time or income generating activities. A significant portion of the day (2 to 9 hours) is consumed by women in developing countries collecting fuel and fodder and are further compelled to prepare meals for the household (Ngarava et al., 2022:1). The unfortunate situation is that the opportunity cost whereby income-generating activities could be executed are lost to menial household tasks (Ngarava et al., 2022:5). The time could be better utilised by engaging in productive activities that has the potential of generating an income and raising their standard of living (Longe, 2021:10). The report on the State of energy in South African municipalities (2020:103) maintains that households generally preserve the traditional gender roles whereby women carry the burden of gathering energy fuel amongst other duties. There is undoubtedly a need for the collection of energy fuel to be spread evenly across household members and gender equity must be embraced (Longe, 2021:10). The lack of access to electricity places a significant burden on women in low-income households in rural areas to secure fuel for the household’s energy needs (State of energy in South African municipalities, 2020:103). The presence of men and boys in the collection of firewood would safeguard the women and girls against attacks from predators patrolling the forests, preying on helpless victims (Longe, 2021:10). The division of chores would balance out the time spent by both women and men while achieving gender equity and lead to more girls remaining in school and completing their studies. 2.7.1.6. Unauthorized Power Connections: A Threat to Utility Stability Eskom defines non-technical losses as “energy losses due to electricity theft through illegal connections, tampering and bypassing of electricity meters as well as the purchase of electricity tokens from unregistered or illegal vendors. It includes meter reading and billing errors” (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:137). Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:4) assert that electricity is solely used to power up small appliances and lighting due to rising costs and limited budget. Therefore, alternative means are devised for the purpose of daily cooking in the Indian village of Dhuvan Basti where illegal connections to the overhead electrical conductors provided free electricity. In comparison, the US power grid has encountered 4 493 attacks between 2020 to 2022, with half of the attacks targeting substations (IEA, 2024:86). In sub-Saharan Africa, a significant investment is required to address the technical and non-technical losses resulting from cable and energy theft, vandalism and destruction of networks caused by armed conflict (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). Ledger & Rampedi (2022:76) posit that illegal connections are not necessarily free as syndicates operating in these areas have to source material and construct the network to effect a connection to the shack. The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges (2022:3) states that organised criminal groups are liable for the rise in losses from theft of cable, illegal connections, vandalism of substations as well as other means to circumvent payment for electricity. Cozzi et al. (2022:125) have discovered that over half of sub-Saharan African utilities fail to recover their operating costs arising from high network losses, poor revenue collection strategies and under-pricing. The City of Johannesburg calculated nontechnical losses and illegal connections, costing the utility a staggering R2bn per annum which could have been utilised in upgrading the electricity infrastructure (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:3). The City of Tshwane nontechnical losses amounts to an astronomical amount of R470 million per year, predominantly emanating from illegal connections (Ledger & Rampedi, 2022:104). Eskom, the state-owned power utility in South Africa, publicly condemned the escalating incidents of theft and vandalism on the distribution infrastructure (Eskom Media Statement, 2022:1). Perpetrators stand accused of vandalising and stealing transformers, substations, control room security fence, copper cables and bypassing energy meters which undermines the security of supply. Illegal connections were identified as the fundamental reason for network overloading and high levels of infrastructure failure, triggering lengthy power outages which disadvantage businesses and disrupt household activities. Eskom is portrayed as fighting a losing battle as illegal connections which are removed by the field technicians are immediately replaced after the technicians leave site. In another media statement (Eskom Media Statement, 2022:1), Eskom appealed to the community to report acts of sabotage and criminality as the replacement costs of infrastructure runs into billions of rands and negatively impacts on the economy. Eskom further warns the public that it is a criminal offence to steal electricity, vandalise infrastructure and sabotage critical network infrastructure. Eskom employees were also cautioned to desist from tampering with their own energy meter and pay for energy that they are consuming. Lack of investment in electricity infrastructure is rooted in the utilities perilous financial state due to a myriad of challenges (Cozzi et al., 2022:130). Utilities are suffering from extremely high energy losses, averaging 15% across the African continent in 2020, almost double of the global average of just 8%. However, municipalities are expected to take decisive action to reduce leakage and non-technical losses by enforcing stringent security measures and crystallize the relationship with the community to help combat the scourge of vandalism and theft (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:6). Operating losses are estimated to exceed USD 150 billion in 2020 amongst African utilities and can be attributed to theft, costs increase including cost of capital, poor payment collection rates, operational challenges and supply chain restrictions which are responsible for raising debt and diminishing cash flows (Cozzi et al., 2022:134). According to Eskom, in 2015 electricity theft posed an elevated threat to South Africa as a result of illegal connections, energy meter bypassing and tampering which resulted in loses to the value of between 3730 GWh to 5968 GWh, the equivalent of between 1.57% and 2.52% of total energy generated (Ye and Koch, 2020:18). According to Eskom Integrated Report (2022:89), the technical energy losses reduced from 25 078GWh in 2021 to 24 802GWh in 2022, which included electricity theft and errors in transmission and distribution. Figure 2.3: Network performance Source: Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:101 The network performance report depicted in figure 2.3. illustrates how networks have performed against predetermined targets with distribution energy losses causing significant concern (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:102). Although energy losses have been reduced from 10.11% in 2021 to 9.62% in 2022, the target of 9.45% was not achieved. Continued interventions by the power utility have made inroads in arresting the non-technical energy losses from 20.2TWh in 2021 to 19.8TWh in 2022, which amounted to a staggering R2 291 million for 2022. Eskom lamented the rising levels of energy losses emanating from illegal connections and theft has added to the woes of the power utility, struggling to meet the energy demand (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:24). The report further stated that consumers who don’t pay for electricity are prone to wasting electricity instead of consuming the energy frugally. Accompanying the energy losses, network assets are vandalised, theft of equipment and overloading of networks have all contributed to an increase in breakdowns, maintenance costs and ascending safety risks to the general public and employees. In a Media Statement released by Eskom on Monday 18 September 2023 (Eskom Media Statement, 2023), four suspects were arrested in Kagisanong View, Ga-Rankuwa after discovering illegal connections to Eskom transformers. The suspects were detained at the Ga-Rankuwa police station. Eskom has expressed concern that during the joint operation with South African Police Service (SAPS), Public Order Police (POP) and a private security company to remove the self-built electricity network, the community mobilised and the technicians were forced to flee the area. Even more disturbing was the fact that the community followed the Eskom technicians back to their Ga-Rankuwa offices, whereby the entire building had to be evacuated with urgency. The power utility condemned these acts of intimidation and harassment and stated that the safety of the employees is the utility’s primary concern. The power utility has taken several steps to combat the rampant energy theft by conducting meter audits on all categories of customers and driving the implementation of smart meters as well as replacing the online vending system (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:102). Eskom has further identified areas contributing to high energy losses, conducts investigations and remove illegal energy consumptions which leads to reduced energy losses and an increase in collection of revenue. 2.7.1.7. The Impact of Polluting Fuels on Public Health Research conducted by Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:8) highlight the plight of participants who were negatively impacted by the deleterious effects of fly ash, emissions from coal-fired power plants and industry, dust and waning green vegetation and smoke from solid fuels utilised for household energy consumption. Di Falco and Lynam’s study (2023:1) focussed on the effects of indoor air pollution on the health of occupants who inhale fine particles which are emitted during combustion. There is growing public awareness and solicitude in South Africa pertaining to the quality of air and carbon emissions (Government Gazette No. 44606, 2021:7). The risk of developing respiratory and cardiovascular diseases is significantly intensified on account of air pollution and acutely raises the level of complications and deaths (Myllyvirta and Kelly, 2023:24). This in turn has a ripple effect on the quality of life and negatively impacts the economic productivity of people suffering from air pollution illnesses, ultimately raising healthcare costs and burdening a collapsing healthcare system (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:3). Breathing in polluted air has culminated in shortness of breath, skin allergies, burning sensation in the eyes, respiratory tract infections and fatigue (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:8). Although the community is acutely aware of the negative impact on their health, they are limited in terms of choice of energy fuel which largely depends on their finances. Cooking with unclean solid fuels is a major source of indoor air pollution in sub-Saharan Africa and exposure to indoor air pollution has generated portentous economic costs (Cozzi et al., 2022:122). In 2019, air pollution was attributed to the cause of 1.1 million deaths across Africa (Fisher et al., 2021:681). Air quality emissions emanating from Eskom’s coal-fired power station are forecasted to be responsible for 79 500 air pollution-related deaths from the period of 2025 to end of lifecycle (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). Health implications beyond 2030 will include 140 000 asthma emergency room visits, new asthma cases increasing in children by 5 900, 57 000 premature births, a projected 35 million days of absence from work and 50 000 years of living with disability (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). Household air pollution was the leading cause of premature air pollution deaths, accounting for 697 000 deaths caused by non-communicable diseases. Ambient air pollution related deaths are on an upward trajectory, rising from 361 000 in 2015 to 383 000 in 2019 (Fisher et al., 2021:681). In rural households in South Africa, burning of biomass fuel has heightened the effects of indoor air pollution (IAP) which has negatively impacted on human health and the environment (Longe, 2021:4). In many low-income households, burning of solid fuels indoors generates greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) which consists of carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), particle matter (PM2.5), black carbon and carbon monoxide (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:12). The inflammation of lungs and airways causes a reduction in capacity of blood to carry oxygen and compromises the immune system (Longe, 2021:4). Approximately 500 000 premature deaths on the African continent can be associated with the exposure to indoor air pollution (household) and a further 300 000 deaths can be attributed to outdoor air pollution (ambient) in 2020, which has been classified as the fundamental cause of premature deaths (Fisher et al., 2021; Cozzi et al., 2022:122). Dirty polluting fuels as an energy source for cooking has been classified as the leading cause of indoor air pollution on the African continent and has contributed negatively to economic costs (The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa, 2022:3). A study by Fisher et al. (2021:681) revealed that the economic loss due to air pollution in 2019 was $3·02 billion in Ethiopia (1·16% of GDP), $1·63 billion in Ghana (0·95% of GDP), and $349 million in Rwanda (1·19% of GDP). The study further elaborated on lost IQ points in African children in 2019 to be M2·5 1·96 billion caused by air pollution. In another study by Jeuland et al. (2021:16) found that air pollution could be linked to the negative impacts map relating to air quality and personal health, climate, quality of forest and ecosystem and gender empowerment. Longe (2021:4) established through her study that green-house gas (GHG) emissions as well as small particulate matter stemming from indoor air pollution (IAP), leads to inflammation in human lungs and airways, restricting the blood capacity to transport sufficient quantity of oxygen and negatively impacts the individual’s immune system. Exposure to air pollution during pregnancy and early development after birth has found to have a critical impact on cognitive function (Fisher et al., 2021:686). The total loss of cognitive function was estimated at 1·96 billion PIQ points due to air pollution on the African continent in 2019 (Fisher et al., 2021:686). PIQ refers to the fluid cognitive abilities which is the ability to solve novel problems. Lu et al. (n.d:17) asserts that fossil fuels caused environmental pollution which in turn caused some people to become more vulnerable to COVID-19. The minimum emissions standard (MES) should be mandatory for Eskom without exception as the argument of financial constraints for expensive clean coal technology are in contravention of the atmospheric emission licences (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:11). Fisher et al. (2021:681) asserts that ambient air pollution across Africa is rising and the consequence will lead to a rise in mortality and morbidity rates, reduce economic productivity, minimise development and harm human capital formation. The transition to renewable energy to attain net-zero carbon emissions will protect the environment as well as human life and transition the economy into a sustainable and competitive powerhouse, repurposed for accelerated growth and development (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Cleaner generating energy sources will minimise air pollution and are environmentally friendly, supporting a healthier environment. 2.7.2. Universal Access 2.7.2.1. Is Universal access possible? According to Cozzi et al. (2022:106), more than three‐quarters of the global population are deprived of access to electricity and more than a third resort to utilising solid biomass as a source of energy in Africa. Approximately 600 million or 40% of inhabitants on the African continent did not have access to electricity, predominantly located in sub-Saharan Africa as of 2023 (IEA, 2024:20). Baker and Phillips (2019:178) argue that significant progress has been made since the dawn of democracy as grid connection rates accelerated from a third of the population pre-1994 to 87 percent post 1994. There is strong coherence between policies and strategic plans to infer that the South African government has intimate knowledge of the nexus of universal access to electricity and empowering the citizens through job creation, economic development, reduction in poverty and raising their standard of living (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:56). The electrification programme since the dawn of democracy in South Africa has been tremendously successful with the growth of access to electricity rising from 36% in 1994 to close to 87% in 2021, falling short of the initial target of 100% access by 2014 (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). Cozzi et al. (2022:21) posits that the African continents’ growing need for electricity has outpaced the ability of governments to meet the demand for access to safe, secure and affordable modern energy needs. Nowak et al. (2021:1) asserts that access to electricity in Latin America or Middle East and North Africa countries ranges between 80 to 90%, while Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Seychelles have attained universal access although still being classified as developing countries in Africa. Figure 2.4. Percentage distribution of households connected to the mains electricity supply by province for selected years between 2002 and 2022. (Source: Stats SA, 2022:43) The lack of investment in electricity in informal settlements by policy makers fundamentally serves to foster economic inefficiencies and social inequality, as depicted in Figure 2.4. (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). Cozzi et al. (2022:21) asserts that South Africa is the most advanced and industrialised economy on the African continent and accounts for 16% of the continent’s consumption. The reasons submitted for the ongoing delays in achieving universal access to energy can be attributed to the completion date being moved further into the future although programmes and policies are in place to realise this target (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:7). The challenge of universal access is not limited to rural areas but includes urban areas, and where access is possible, affordability remains a major hurdle to everyday consumption (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). The World Bank report (2022:34) supports this finding and further states that the lack of access to electricity has a negative impact on investment, undermines people’s economic opportunities and inculcates inequality. A study by Longe (2021:1) also found that South Africa accounts for approximately 2.5 million households, which are predominantly located in urban informal settlements and rural areas, do not have access to electricity. Ngarava et al. (2022:1) supports this finding and states that 87% of the 842.47 million people without access to electricity living on the African continent are mostly located in rural areas and are predominantly households headed by females. The problem is further exacerbated when energy is required, the girl child is burdened over the boy child to fetch fuel from the forest, resulting in the girl child being withdrawn from school and contributes to the high illiteracy rates (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:13). The situation on the African continent is horrendous as 64% of inhabitants on the continent resort to utilising solid biomass fuel such as wood, and agricultural and animal wastes for cooking (Cozzi et al., 2022:21). The proportion of electricity calculated in final consumption has reached a paltry 20% in 2023, although a positive increment from 18% in 2015 (IEA, 2024:8). In order to change the current trajectory to enhance prosperity and social change, policy makers must realign their strategies with access to energy at the centre of service delivery policies (Jeutland et al., 2020:6; le Roux and Choumert-Nkolo, 2021:4). The Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: State of the Sector (2022:17) optimistically predicts, based on the current electrification rate, that it will take a minimum of 17 years to achieve universal access to clean and modern sources of energy. Loadshedding clearly illustrates that South Africa lacks capacity to provide universal access to electricity to all citizens as the rolling blackouts continues unabated (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:60). Loadshedding is defined as the “scheduled and controlled power cuts that rotate available capacity between all customers when demand is greater than supply in order to avoid blackouts” (Eskom Integrated Report, 2022:136). During the Department of Energy IEP Planning Report Workshop: Overview of Universal Energy Access Strategy, over 5.7 million households were electrified between 1994 and 2013/2014 (DoE, n.d:4). However, the rollout of electrification in rural areas through the Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP) programme shuttered in recent years primarily due to the absence of capacity in substations and overhead high and medium voltage lines (Implementations guidelines for INEP, 2020:7). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:140) argued that the INEP programme was funded by the DMRE to electrify rural and peri-urban areas by means of grid or off-grid solutions to achieve universal access. According to Nowak et al. (2021:4), electricity provides the impetus to drive economic and social growth globally. However, Clark (2021:6) argues that the cost of electrification to achieve universal access surpasses the benefits but contends that electrification has potential to drive economic development through household productivity, specifically in rural and agricultural areas. Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) asserts that energy is acutely required to propel economic transformation and social wellbeing. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:9) provide a compelling argument for attaining SDG 7 to root out poverty, enhancing food security, embracing clean energy and supporting improved health. The per capita consumption of electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is on a downward trajectory which has been attributed to low access to energy as well as the demographic boom (Nowak et al., 2021:4). Approximately 80% of people who do not have access to electricity reside in informal areas or informal urban settlements which is plague by the lack of infrastructure and services (Mulugetta et al., 2019:3). These settlements are prone to the cataclysmic impacts of global warming and have resulted in droughts, extreme weather events and destruction of agricultural crops (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Nowak et al. (2021:4) maintains that the electrification process utilising fossil-fuel makes a negligible contribution towards carbon dioxide emissions and global warming. Mulugetta et al. (2019:2) disputes this notion and charges that humanity must change the trajectory to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and develop a sustainable model. 2.7.2.2. Benefits of Small-Scale Embedded Generation Due to the rising cost of electricity, crises at the national power utility and declining prices of solar PV technology, the adoption of SSEG by industry, high-income households and commerce have been rapidly growing (Baker and Phillips, 2019:179; Hausmann et al., 2023:51; Off-grid solar market trends report, 2020:39). The energy crises at the power utility have repeatedly plunged the country into darkness through load shedding, a strategy to protect the grid from total collapse (Swelling et al., 2023:9). Ritchie et al. (2023:1) argues that some households install inverters and batteries, excluding solar panels and rely on the grid to charge the batteries. In this scenario, the demand after load shedding rises exponentially due to drained batteries requiring charging. Proponents such as Lefore et al. (2021:3) anticipate renewable energy replacing fossil-fuels and reduce oil-based carbon emissions, reduced energy costs and boost food production. Makgetla (2021:10) asserts that renewable energy is cost-effective, clean, modern and safe source of energy will drive economic growth and improve the quality of life for producers and households. In a bid to achieve universal access to electricity by 2030 as countries committed to the United Nations SDG 7, 90 million people primarily located in sub-Saharan Africa will have to be connected to the grid yearly from 2022 (Cozzi et al., 2022:108). A total of 80% of these people reside in rural areas where access to the grid would be a costly exercise and impede progress (Mulugetta et al., 2019:2). The installation of mini-grid systems with the benefits of rapid access to electricity and approximately two‐thirds of new connections can be achieved through this technology (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140; Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14; Kuhudzai, 2021:21). Lefore et al. (2021:6) argues that solar irrigation reduces operational costs and off-grid solar technologies can be further extended to enhance production process, extend the shelf-life of produce and process raw goods. An off-shoot of these process is the growth in the employment rate and the potential to create income-generating opportunities (Hartley et al., 2021:13). Renewable energy will mitigate the risks of climate change and produces no pollution when converting energy from the sun to electricity (Makgetla, 2021:10). Solar energy is not only enticing due to the low cost for domestic and production functions but holds immense benefit for the environment and provides a solution for the water-energy-food security triad (Lefore et al., 2021:4). Jeuland et al. (2021:16) posits that off-grid solar PV will not generate sufficient energy to transform traditional cooking practices and therefore will have negligible impact on arresting the harmful effects of household indoor air pollution. Access to electricity is a driving force to achieving inclusive and equitable education through elevated access to information (radio and ICT), longer hours of studying during the night due to access to lighting, and the benefits boosting the Human Development Index (HDI) (Mulugetta et al., 2019:3). Solar PV technology, which converts solar radiation from the sun, is a resource which is freely available globally and presents an ideal opportunity for countries to transform their energy infrastructure to a low-carbon solution while achieving universal access (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:1). Economic benefits include cheaper and a reliable electricity grid while having uninterrupted access to export markets without incurring carbon tax penalties (Makgetla, 2021:10). Access to energy is a fundamental requirement to achieve economic growth and solar PV is expected to be at the forefront of renewable energy (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). The debate of growth in the solar PV market is determined by electricity demand, supportive policies enhancing growth, initial costs and payback time, risks due to climate change, stability of the grid, forecasting of solar PV output and interconnectivity (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:1). However, Clark (2021:15) argues that electrification provides benefits beyond the traditional access for basic requirements such as transforming gendered social norms whereby access to information through watching television has the potential to change intrahousehold bargaining power. Restrictions and regulations may cause a constrained effect on the rollout of utility-scale solar PV plants where regulations may be geared towards agricultural land conservation with the primary function of ensuring food security (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:13). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:27) envisions a significant amount of new renewable energy capacity connected to the grid to balance out the current deficit in generation capacity. Utility scale solar PV will consume large swathes of land and may potentially impact agricultural production (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). However, agrivoltaic systems have produced positive outcomes when combining solar PV generation and agricultural production (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:13). The costs of electricity generation from utility-scale solar PV plants are predicted to follow a downward trajectory by 2024 but not substantially enough to below pre-Covid-19 values (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:57). Solar PV has already been declared the cheapest source of power throughout the African continent and is expected to outpace all sources of energy by 2030 (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) disputes that renewable energy can decarbonise electricity generation in totality and alludes to the fact that no country has achieved full decarbonisation on renewables. The benefit of solar PV extends beyond scalability, versatility and having the shortest construction time to include socio-economic development (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:37). These factors primarily promote the acceleration of growth of the solar PV market to benefit developing countries (Hepburn et al., 2020:8). Assertions surrounding the deployment of nuclear power stations by the PCC Draft Report in relation to long construction times, cannot be substantiated as France, China and Sweden constructed nuclear power station within short time frames (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:9). China on the other hand has ceased to support new-build coal-fired power stations abroad (Cozzi et al., 2022:17). Utility scale solar PV projects have the shortest average build times of between 18 to 24 months (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). There is substance to the claim that countries should achieve synergies with renewable and non-renewable energy in the energy mix to the extent of achieving grid stability and reliability of supply (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:36). A case in point is hydro connected PV power plants, whereby hydro compliments solar during raining seasons when there is sufficient water and vice versa (IEA, 2024:55; Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). Although solar PV technology has transformed the energy sector, no technology currently exists that can provide the full theoretical potential of solar resource (Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country, 2022:22). The limitations stem from the conversation rate of PV modules, shading, soiling of modules and configuration of the system. Clark (2021:17) states that the health benefits from electrification far outweigh the disadvantages and solar-powered cookstoves provide substantial health benefits and is one of the cleanest options. Zimbabwe was considered to be one of the first African countries to introduce net metering which allowed for vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-home electricity generation, with excess energy generated exported to the grid with a ceiling of 100 kW (Kuhudzaik, 2021:23). Smart meters, which are bi-directional, are being rolled out in South Africa to facilitate load-limiting and allow customers to export excess energy to the grid (Smart Meters, 2023:5). The net metering scheme in Brazil contributed significantly to the surge in the distributed PV market due to the attractive energy export rates to the grid (IEA, 2022:10). The installation of small-scale embedded generation (SSEG) in rural areas in South Africa has the potential to address the challenge of energy poverty and universal access to electricity (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5; State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:69). The benefits of SSEGs can lead to the establishment of SMMEs in the manufacturing, installation, and service sectors (GreenCape, 2021:8). The energy generated from SSEGs will contribute significantly to the energy deficit and minimise the bouts of load shedding (The cities’ role in managing the energy supply challenges, 2022:5; South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). Prosumers would be encouraged to become legal energy customers and benefit financially from exporting energy to the grid (Ritchie et al., 2023:1). The financial attractiveness of this system will discourage illegal connections to the grid and customers will be compelled to pay special attention to demand side management to reap the benefits of the system. Customers who were not connected to the grid will now have access to electricity and raise their standard of living and improve their health (GreenCape, 2021:3; Nowak et al, 2021:23). The installation of small-scale embedded generation in rural areas in South Africa should be subsidised due to prohibitive initial costs of acquisition and installation. Government should subsidise 60% of the initial costs while the recipient should contribute 40% of the costs which would encourage recipients to demonstrate ownership and accountability. Personal investment would solicit a greater involvement in the project and support for the initiative while discouraging resistive behaviour. Financial institutions could offer favourable loan options to cover the 40% contribution from recipients at minimal cost as aligned to their vision for a low carbon footprint. The implementation of small-scale embedded generation would enable customers not having access to the national grid, to have access to electricity (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:140). Therefore, the entities responsible for electrifying these specific areas can redirect the budget for maintenance and upgrades to the existing grid. Decentralised and off-grid solutions serve to enhance the electrification of rural customers at a fraction of the cost (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:14). Customers connected to the national grid will be compelled to manage the demand for energy and alleviate pressure on the national grid (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:4). Excess energy can be exported back onto the grid transforming customers into prosumers (Bichof-Niemz, 2019:2). An enticing rate of energy exported through net energy metering would encourage behavioural change towards compliance and legitimacy. Figure 2.5: Solar PV installation on RDP house Source: Author's own design based on Bichof-Niemz, 2019 Figure 2.5. illustrates a typical RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) house bearing dimensions of 7.1 m by 7.3 m with a gently sloping corrugated roof, providing a roof surface area of approximately 50 m2 (Bichof-Niemz, 2019:2). The load bearing capacity of the roof can support the installation of ten 400W solar PV panels, generating a capacity of 4kW which translates to 20kWh per day or a yearly production of 7 300kWh. If the customer consumes an average of 2 400kWh per annum, the excess of 4 900kWh can be exported back to the grid and earn a lucrative amount of R14 700 per annum (based on the assumption government will reimburse the customer at R3 per kWh). 2.7.2.3. Navigating Socio-Economic Challenges with Solar PV Adoption Due to a variety of factors, grid-tied SSEG has become an attractive option for businesses and wealthy residential households (Baker and Phillips, 2019:181; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). A mass deflection of these customers will deprive the utilities of much-needed revenue (Cozzi et al., 2022:43), notably to cross-subsidise the low-income households by protecting these customers from escalating tariffs and driving them into energy poverty (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:68; Makgetla et al., 2019:16). The South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA) collaborated with GEOTERRAIMAGE (GTI) to maps out solar installations throughout South Africa and found in excess of 5.5GW of installed solar PV capacity, as illustrated in Figure 2.6. (SAPVIA, 2024). Residential installations (0-30kWp) accounted for 11% of the installed capacity while CoT leads the way with the highest number of installations (22 956) while CoJ has the highest installed capacity at 586MW. Figure 2.6: Cumulative Installed Capacity Source: https://sapvia.co.za/dataportal/dataportal-public The resultant decline in utilities revenue stream will heap pressure on the utility’s ability to generate sufficient revenue to service the operational and fixed costs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:181). The Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) suffered a major setback when the Pretoria High Court ordered ELM’s large power users (LPUs) to pay their electricity bills directly to Eskom in July 2023, as the municipality failed to adhere to previous payment arrangements with Eskom (Eskom Media Statement, 2023:1). In another Media Statement (October 2023), City of Tshwane (CoT) and Ekurhuleni (CoE) Municipality owed Eskom a total of R4.7 billion, with CoT responsible for R3.2 billion and CoE’s electricity debt totalling R1.5 billion. According to Cozzi et al. (2022:131), the power grids in Africa experience high technical and non-technical losses and exceptionally poor reliability, primarily due to underinvestment and aging infrastructure. Deflecting customers adopting solar PV and other renewable sources of energy will place the utility under financial pressure as low-income customers and non-paying consumers will dominate the customer base, undermining the financial sustainability of the utility (Baker and Phillips, 2019:190). Hausmann et al. (2023:75) argues that the rolling blackouts have placed an immense burden on the system as customers have become disillusioned and are reluctant to service their accounts. The expenses incurred due to network maintenance and refurbishment and support for basic services to the citizens will warrant alternative income to cover these costs (Baker and Phillips, 2019:190). Municipalities receive income from two broad catgories:1) Income is generated through rendering of services and receive revenue from property taxes, service charges, traffic fines and 2) Income from government grant and subsidies or from public donations and contributions (Statistics SA, 2021:1). The above figure 2.7. illustrates that the highest income generated through services rendered is the sale of electricity which accounted for 27% of the total revenue generated, lagging the government grants and subsidies by a mere 1.8% (Statistics SA, 2021:4). Out of a total of 257 municipalities, 71% of the total income was self-generated while the balance of 29% was provided by government through subsidies and grants (Statistics SA, 2021:1). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:51) concur that the delivery of services including property rates and taxes, should be the main source of revenue followed by a small funding top-up from the national fiscus to plug the deficit. Non-technical losses of electricity caused by cable and energy theft, vandalism and destruction caused by armed conflict, has played a motivating role for end-users to self-generate electricity to avoid unplanned outages (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). Unfortunately, the utility bears the brunt of the migration of commercial and industrial customers, reducing revenue while raising the cost-of-service delivery, higher non-technical losses, underinvestment in infrastructure and deteriorating reliability (Hausmann et al., 2023:75; IRP, 2023:3; State of Energy in South African Cities, 2020:106). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:48) challenges municipalities mandated to implement the FBE policy, as the onus of registration rests solely at the discretion of the municipality. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) raises concerns regarding the trade-offs absent in the report but plays a crucial role in decarbonising the environment. Fly-ash is a by-product of burning coal, extensively utilised in the generation of electricity and is a crucial ingredient in the cement industry (Chanchani and Oskarsson, 2021:8). Kuhudzai (2021:26) counters these claims and states that renewable energy will prompt the workforce to be skilled and developed which will enhance industrialisation while reducing unemployment. However, the Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) finds this approach myopic and disputes the non-inclusion of nuclear plants as emissions would be significantly lower for nuclear. The transmission and distribution networks lack investment, especially since the start of the pandemic which prevents the extension or addition of additional capacity (Swilling et al., 2023:5). Countries such as Ghana and Kenya with an oversupply of energy are disadvantaged and have no alternative to exporting this energy or transmitting the energy to domestic demand epicentres (Cozzi et al., 2022:43). South Africa is endowed with an abundance of fossil fuel and nuclear energy resources and should consider the ramifications of wholly committing to renewable energy in the wake of the country’s current energy situation (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:3). 2.7.2.4. The Eskom Conundrum 2.7.2.4.1. Eskom's Stability: A Pillar of National Energy Security Eskom was established in 1922 to deliver electricity supply to the country and was primarily expected to support the mining industry (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:6). Eskom is a state-owned vertically integrated power utility consisting of generation, transmission and distribution divisions, delivering power to predominantly black townships and some traditional rural homelands (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). The Financial Times Global Energy Awards held in New York awarded Eskom the renowned title of “Global Power Company for the year” in 2001, primarily for the organisations technical, executive, maintenance and operations (Wasara, 2021:378). Eskom generates approximately 86% of electricity in South Africa, extensively from coal-fired power stations and has been declared one of the highest carbon emitters in the energy sector globally (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The power utility distributes 40% of electricity in South Africa while municipalities distribute the remaining 60% (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). As the largest electricity supplier on the African continent, Eskom manages approximately 48 000 km of distribution lines, 296 000 km of reticulation power lines and 7 500 km of underground cables (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The power utility is crucial to the South African economy and operates on an annual procurement budget exceeding R25 billion (Wasara, 2021:378). While Eskom holds the monopoly in the generation and transmission environment, government has embarked on the process to separate the organisation into three separate entities according to their functions (generation, transmission, and distribution) (Swilling et al., 2023:4). The National Transmission Company South Africa (NTCSA) is legally separated from Eskom, incorporating the System Operator and Transmission (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:21). Government declared during the budget speech in 2022 to ultimately absorb the R254 billion of Eskom’s debt to allow Eskom to invest in infrastructure and conduct deep maintenance to strengthen the EAF trajectory (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:31). Hausmann et al. (2023:64) believes that political patronage through the cadre deployment policy of the ruling party were fundamental in reducing SOEs to surviving on government bailouts. The VGBE report (2023:30) declared through its assessment that low morale, lack of motivation, extended working hours with the burden of unbearable workload in a high-pressure environment as well as the hiatus in the training and development programmes as aggravating factors for the utility’s poor performance. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:98) alluded to the fact that Eskom was at the centre of state capture as the power utility was looted in a feeding frenzy, DMRE reluctance to support Eskom’s venture into the renewable energy generation and Eskom’s balance sheet saddle with enormous debt. The position of Eskom’s balance sheet was shared by Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:12) and further stated that investment required to transition to a low carbon footprint was improbable. Eskom’s substandard operational performance was also attributed to deterioration of unplanned outages, record number of plant breakdowns and extended periods of load shedding which crippled the economy (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:62). Eskom’s fleet of coal-fired power stations were poorly maintained and were driven to the point of collapse in a bid to avoid load shedding (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:4). 2.7.2.4.2. Rolling Blackouts Electricity outages are experienced by people in many sub-Saharan countries which have become more frequent and unpredictable and negatively impacted their lives (Nowak et al., 2021:5). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) assert that reliability and quality of supply are primary requirements to drive economic growth and small business enterprises. South Africa is not immune to the energy deficit which has stalled economic growth and has had a cascading effect on job creation at a time where economic recovery from the pandemic is crucial (The cities’ role in managing the energy crisis, 2022:2). The agricultural sector harvesting fruits and vegetables, are wholly dependent on a stable and constant supply of electricity for post-harvest storage (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). The agricultural sector provides employment to approximately 60% of the Africa’s population and has the potential to build intrinsic resilience and deflate poverty between two to four times faster than any other sector (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:27). The agricultural sector is the anchor of the continent’s economy and the vast majority of the population is dependent on this sector for their livelihood (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:23). An erratic supply of electricity can have a devastating impact on the harvest and result in devastating losses (Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:20). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:11) posits that the economy cannot diversify and grow without a stable and reliable electricity supply. An economy in the contraction phase will reinforce poverty, unemployment and inequality (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:1; Ledger and Rampedi, 2022:10). (Nowak et al. (2021:5) concurs and further adds that a substandard supply of electricity has a massive impact on small businesses as a result of foregone sales and services and failure of equipment, low productivity and suboptimal economic growth. South Africa faces energy insecurity and citizens endure over six hours of rolling blackouts per day (Swilling et al., 2023:4; Ritchie et al., 2023:1). Although the country can be accredited with making giant strides towards achieving universal access to electricity since 1994, the electricity crises known locally as load shedding struck in 2008 and has become a regular feature (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). Eskom implements load shedding as the last resort to protect the grid from total collapse by removing demand, thereby preventing demand from exceeding the supply (Ritchie et al., 2023:1). If Eskom does not proactively implement load shedding, the grid will collapse resulting in a total blackout which could take two weeks to fully restore supply (Hausmann et al., 2023:50). Swilling et al. (2023:4) claims that load shedding has cost the economy and shaved off 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). PwC echoes similar sentiments stating that real GDP was reduced by five percentage points in 2022 due to load shedding (South African Economic Outlook, 2023:2; Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:8). Allen & Overy (2023:43) asserts that the rolling blackouts cost the economy R899m a day in 2023 according to the SARB. Makgetla (2021:7) posits that South Africa’s exceptionally high GHG emissions negatively impacted on economic growth, as the effects of climate change in 2010 became more pronounced. While South Africa is lagging in the transition to renewable energy, there is an accelerated global drive to lower the carbon footprint by transforming the energy sector (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:35). Allen & Overy (2023:34) attributes these challenges to the elevated demand for energy and infrastructure development while necessitating the implementation of mitigation against climate change. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:100) argues that the Northern hemisphere emitted the highest volume of GHG and should therefore be the first to implement realistic strategies to reduce their carbon footprint. The current load shedding crises is a result of a deficit of between 4 to 6 GW of generation capacity, largely due to the loss of ~3.5 GW of capacity linked to diminishing plant performance and decommissioning of ageing coal-fired plants (Swilling et al., 2023:5; Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:11; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:119; Swelling et al., 2023:5). Rotational load shedding was implemented on 208 days, alternatively four days every week in 2022 which equated to 11,797 Gigawatt hours (GWh) of unavailable power (South African Economic Outlook, 2023:3). Figure 2.8: Annual hours and total GWh of load shedding 2018 to 2023 year-to-date Source: Creamer Media Engineering News, 2023 Figure 2.8. clearly illustrates the horrendous picture with 2022 besieged by 4000 hours of load shedding while 2023 fared much worse with approximately 7 000 hours and the year has not ended yet. Load shedding in 2021 represented a meager 2 000 GWh compared to 2022, which spiralled to 8 000 GWh, a staggering four times the energy shed in 2021. However, the worst load shedding undoubtedly dominated 2023 with an astounding 16 000 GWh, a figure of eight times the load shed in 2021 and illustrated the severity of the crises. Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:12) stated that 1.3TWh of energy was shed in 2019 and the first half of 2020 which indicated at the time that load shedding was significantly intensifying. According to the Statistics of utility-scale power generation in South Africa (2023:110), 2022 experienced the most intensive load shedding surpassing 2021 by more than fourfold. The President acknowledge that load shedding was on a upward trajectory and South Africa experienced the most severe load shedding since the dawn of rolling blackouts in 2007 (Swilling et al., 2023:9). The IEA (2024:82) asserted that load shedding in 2023 at the end of September exceeded the total volume of energy shed in the previous eight years combined. According to Hausmann et al. (2023:47), the load shed in the first three months of 2023 surpassed the total energy shed from 2018 to 2021 as load shedding was implemented daily for three consecutive months. The deterioration of power cuts reached startling milestones as load shedding registered an average on 626 GWh per month from January to September 2022, thrice the average energy shed in monthly in 2021 (South Africa Economic Outlook November, 2022:3). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:1) painted a similar picture, concluding that 1 950 hours were shed in the first nine months of 2022, translating to an unimaginable three months of power cuts. The loss of an estimated 12 GW of coal-fired generation capacity from 2013 exacerbated the level of energy insecurity and was replenished with a flawed ~1.5 GW generational capacity (Swilling et al., 2023:10). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:26) attributes the energy deficit to a combination of insufficient and lagging maintenance, constantly changing leadership, state capture, lack of financial resources, delayed and deferred decisions and protracted delays in implementing and executing the new build programme. Ledger and Rampedi (2022:20) dispense mutual factors such as lack of or poorly maintained infrastructure and failure to build additional capacity to match end-user demand cycles, as the leading causes of load shedding. Swilling et al. (2023:4) proposed a feasible course to end load shedding requiring significant investment in the transmission infrastructure to create additional capacity to accommodate oversizing renewable energy to meet demand. This can be considered a sensible option given that renewables are the quickest form of new generation that can be added to the grid (Supporting Just Transition, 2020:14). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:11) disputes that an industrialised country like South Africa should transition to intermittent weather-dependent technologies that are not suited to sustain baseload capacity and drive energy security. However, the report fails to incorporate battery storage which can support renewable energy such as solar from sunset to sunrise (IEA, 2021:87; Kuhudzai, 2021:20). Load shedding is implemented in stages with each stage equating to 1 000MW and a predetermined timeframe: Stage 1 = 1 000 MW, Stage 2 = 2 000 MW, Stage 3 = 3 000 MW, Stage 4 = 4 000 MW, Stage 5 = 5 000 MW, Stage 6 = 6 000 MW (Statistics of utility-scale power generation in South Africa, 2023:110). The energy intensive industries in South Africa dictated a generally flat demand profile as these industries operated 24 hours per day and seven days a week in the past (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:23). The Kenyan electricity market has the opposite challenge with a constant oversupply of energy 24 hours a day and resorted to offering favourable Time of Use tariff to encourage energy intensive industrial users to shift the profile into the evenings and during the night to prevent venting their geothermal power plants (Kuhudzai, 2021:19). However, over time, the South African demand profile was transformed considerably to peaks in the mornings and evenings as the government embarked on the journey to attain universal access (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:23). Load shedding has had an adverse effect on business survival and revenue and the chronic electricity crisis has resulted in sunken costs, damaged equipment, low productivity, low economic growth and lower than expected GDP (Nowak et al, 2021:5). The constant power cuts have had a negative impact on foreign direct investment which has had a ripple effect on the quality of life and wellbeing of the citizens (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:8). The South Africa Economic Outlook November report (2022:8) has conceded that load shedding is the primary driver of weak economic growth and high unemployment rate which has aggravated the level of poverty and inequality. 2.7.2.4.3. Generation Capacity and Performance Analysis A report released by VGBE (2023:44) stated that Eskom Generation Division’s (Gx) management system including the processes, structure and governance, as dysfunctional and convoluted (VGBE, 2023:44). Faced with mounting pressure to retrofit ageing and polluting power plants at a cost of R300 billion to comply with the MES, Eskom opted to apply for exemption and decommission the worst performing plants ahead of schedule as the investment would outweigh the benefits (Makgetla, 2021:14). The Nationally determined Contribution (NDC) self-imposed target of 280 Mt CO2 emissions will compel Eskom to decommission the coal fleet and replace the lost generation capacity with a minimum 40GW of renewable energy (Marquard et al., 2021:26). Allen & Overy (2023:43) postulates that South Africa’s energy landscape is dominated by an ageing fleet of coal fired power stations and generates approximately 70% of power. A total of 10 GW of coal fired generation capacity is anticipated to be decommissioned over the next decade with the energy deficit expected to be plugged with renewable energy (Swilling et al., 2023:20). Consultants addressing the community at Komati highlighted the age of the station and frequent unplanned outages which resulted in load shedding (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:25). According to a survey conducted by Afrobaraometer (Mpako and Govindasamy, 2023:9), the findings indicate that government’s performance received a bleak rating with citizens signalling for a halt of governments monopoly on electricity production. (Mamorobela (2021:10) concurs and recommends that Eskom should be privatised as the parastatal is failing to deliver on its mandate. The largest emitter of GHG in South Africa (Figure 2.9.) is undoubtedly Eskom and the power producer failed to retrofit the fleet of power stations with emission controls to comply with the MES (Minimum Emissions Standards) (Myllyvirta and Kelly, 2023:24; Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:25). However, the immediate crises, which could paralyse Eskom, is that nine out of a total of fourteen power stations are non-compliant with MES while Eskom has opted to appeal the ruling (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28; Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:29; Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:17). The stations risk being shut down as these stations are in violation of the ruling and could wipe out 16 GW – 30 GW of installed generation capacity between 2025 to 2030 (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:28). The quagmire policymakers face is deciding on a balancing act between energy security and economic growth versus the detrimental impact on health and degradation of the environment as well as global warming (Swilling et al., 2023:5; Hausmann et al., 2023:50). Taken on review, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment’s (DFFE) decided to grant Eskom a postponement of the MES and the National Air Quality Officer granted Eskom a license for Atmospheric Emission (Eskom Media Statement, 2023). The postponement granted to Eskom also included Kusile’s operation of three units without a Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) plant while undergoing repairs to the flue gas ducts to 31 March 2025. One of Eskom’s Air quality improvement initiatives is the retrofitting of stations in line with Eskom's Emission Reduction Plan (Eskom Air Quality Implementation Plan, 2023). Eskom is compelled to comply with MES standard as mandated by the atmospheric emission licences and technology is readily available to retrofit existing stations (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:11). Eskom’s plan involves the implementation of particulate matter (PM) reduction projects, specifically targeting Kendal, Matimba, Lethabo, Tutuka, Duvha, Matla, and Kriel (Eskom Air Quality Implementation Plan, 2023). The second stage incooperates the introduction of oxide of nitrogen (NOx) burner retrofits at Majuba, Lethabo, and Tutuka. The third stage will include the addition of sulphur dioxide (SO2) reduction at Medupi. Figure 2.9: EAF trajectories and actuals (%) Source: Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8 The System Operator (SO) anticipates a negative trend in plant performance, with an Energy Availability Factor (EAF) of 57,8% for the week ending 16 October 2022 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). The higher EAF with an average of 67% depicted in Figure 2.9. is linked to the generation plan to add more capacity and further assumes the Reliability Maintenance Recovery Programme maintenance will improve plant performance (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:8). The management of Eskom fleet of generators being over-run and undermaintained, has led to an EAF of 52% for week 9 of 2023, underperforming and drastically short of the 75% target (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:26). The Eskom Weekly System Status Report (Week 28)– (2023:1) paints a dismal picture with the EAF of 58% for 2022 and a decline to 54.08 for 2023 to date, out of a total generation capacity of including imports and emergency generation resources of 49 191 MW. Swilling et al. (2023:10) charge that a healthy fleet of coal-fired power stations should operate at an EAF of 80% but the reality at Eskom, due to an aging coal plant with an average age of 41 years, lack of maintenance, substandard repairs and sabotage of plants, managed to achieve 59% for the period April – October 2022 (Swilling et al., 2023:10). The Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook (2022:9) further expects a depletion of 5 288 MW of generation fleet capacity as plants reach their turbine dead-stop dates (DSD) between 2023 and 2027. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:18) contends that Eskom has supplemented its power generation with 8GW of coal-fired power, 7GW of renewable energy, 2GW of diesel open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs), and 1.3GW of pumped storage since 2010, yet the power utility can only muster up enough generation capacity equivalent to the 1980s. VGBE was commissioned to investigate the poor coal fleet performance whereby the EAF hovered around 50.83% as of April 2023 and advance plausible solutions to elevate the EAF (VGBE, 2023:26). Although no new nuclear power generation is planned for South Africa, the Koeberg nuclear power station is scheduled for an extension to its 40-year lifespan which would have been realised in 2024 (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:9). Delays to the project to extend the plants lifespan will jeopardise the 1 860 MW capacity and add to Eskom’s woes in meeting demand, particularly from the fleet’s most reliable base station (World Nuclear Performance Report, 2023:47). The evidence is crystal clear that Eskom’s EAF is descending on a downward trajectory and rapid intervention is desperately required to arrest this situation and reverse this trend to achieve a tangible performance (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:25). The transition from fossil-fuel polluting generation to renewable energy with a low carbon footprint will ensure sustainability and ensure that Eskom remains competitive in the global markets (Makgetla, 2021:14). 2.7.2.4.4. Consequences of Mismanagement and Corruption Eskom is tethering on the verge of collapse due to maladministration and corruption over the last decade and has plunged the country into rolling blackouts (Mamorobela, 2021:4). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:68) concur that Eskom is beset with mismanagement and corruption, calling it a “horror show” and has led to steep increases in tariffs. The power utility which has constantly experienced perennial losses has amassed over R400 billion in debt and only remains operational due to government bailout to the value of R128 billion (Wasara, 2021:378). The construction of Medupi and Kusile power stations became the epicentre of rampant corruption which invariably delayed the completion of these projects and the costs overruns ballooned to twice the initial estimate (Hausmann et al., 2023:52). The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (2022:558) found that Eskom’s precarious situation emanated from corrupt executives and managers in the procurement domain who fleeced Eskom for billions of rands. The Fundudzi report (2018:168) found that Eskom management was biased towards Tegeta and prejudiced Glencore by refusing to sign the Coal Supply Agreement (CSA) which amounted to an abuse of power, violation of trust and a violation of the Prevention and Combating of Criminal Activities Act. Wasara (2021:379) asserts that Eskom hired Bowmans’ attorneys to investigate rampant corruption at Medupi and Kusile in 2018, only to bring the investigation to a grinding halt a year later after credible evidence of high-level corruption was uncovered. Another forensic investigation into corrupt activities at Eskom revealed that corruption infiltrated the entire organisation, from the new build programmes to transmission projects, coal supply contracts, transportation of coal and service providers including consultancies such as McKinsey, Trillian and Regiments Capital, the contracting of IT companies and private manufacturing companies (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). In his response to the State of Capture Report, President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that a group of people infiltrated crucial departments, state-owned entities, law enforcement, security services and private companies with the sole purpose of looting public funds on a grand scale and ultimately undermine and bankrupt state-owned institutions (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:1). There is merit to President Cyril Ramaphosa’s response as Eskom was the epicentre of state capture in South Africa whereby private and public actors conspired to extract undue benefits which ultimately paralysed the power utility’s operations and finances (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). Testimony from the late Mr Jabu Mabuza at the state capture judicial commission, who served as the chairman of the Eskom board in 2018, confirmed the existence of a pervasive culture of corrupt practices, mismanagement and malfeasance which had been prevalent and infiltrated the organisation. (State of Capture Report: Part 4, 2022:1039). These corrupt practices were facilitated by the Eskom board and Executive Management, further diffusing throughout the organisation (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The recovery programme to dismantle these networks and irradicate corrupt practices had to focus on procurement processes and people complicit in endorsing state capture (State of Capture Report: Part 4, 2022:1039). Further investigations revealed that internal controls had to be strengthened, accountability and consequence management had to be reignited, strengthen corporate governance practices, and review of vague policies which lent themselves to abuse. The state capture which enabled the looting of Eskom directly resulted in the enormous debt, undermined the power utility’s ability to sustainably deliver on its mandate and grow the economy (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The President appointed Special Investigating Unit (SIU) Special Tribunal to retrieve funds looted from state institutions and had recovered over R8.6 billion (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:1). In his response, the President claimed that law enforcement agencies have been successful in securing preservation orders to the value of R12.9 billion (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Eskom took decisive steps to recovery funds from entities improperly awarded work and retrieved R1 billion from McKinsey and R600m from Trillian and served Deloitte Consulting with court papers, demanding the return of R207 million (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). The total value recovered from entities participating in state capture amounted to R2.9 billion and a further R4.8 billion has been recouped from entities owing SARS, through the work of the commission (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Attempts to terminate the contract between Econ Oil and Energy (Pty) Limited and Eskom was met with elevated resistance from then Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) Mr. S Tshitangano, who resorted to levelling a series of allegations against then Group Chief Executive (GCE) Mr. A de Ruyter (Inquiry into allegations by the Chief Procurement Officer of Eskom Holdings SOC Limited, 2021:6). The inquiry, chaired by Advocate Semenya SC, found allegations favoured by Mr. S Tshitangano to be wrong, egregious, false, baseless, and lacking any substantiation and could make no recommendations to that effect (Inquiry into allegations by the Chief Procurement Officer of Eskom Holdings SOC Limited, 2021:29). Although substantial efforts are being undertaken to arrest the situation, fraud and corruption which is deeply entrenched at Eskom continues unabated. On Thursday, 31 March 2022, the Palm Ridge Commercial Crimes Court sentenced a former employee and a supplier to 20 years’ imprisonment (Eskom Media Statement, 2022). The convicted thieves were found guilty on 53 counts of fraud and theft, totalling R35 million. In another case registered with the Edenvale Police Station with case number: CAS 278/08/2023, after an alleged attempt was made on the life of a former fixed-term contract employee (Eskom Media Statement, 2023). The power utility stated that it was deeply troubled by the threat to the former employee and offers protection to its employees who fight against corruption through the Eskom Whistle Blowing Policy. The Investigating Directorate (ID) which operates within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has made significant progress in enrolling 26 cases in court, declared a total of 89 investigations and has secured the appearance of 165 accused in court for alleged state capture offences (President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2022:5). Eskom has stated in its Annual Report that forensic report into 1 980 Eskom officials have been concluded and were found not to have declared their business interests (Roadmap for Eskom in a reformed electricity supply industry, 2019:29). Further investigations have revealed that 131 of these culprits have transacted with Eskom to the value of R 5.7 billion, while several matters have been referred for criminal investigation and prosecution. Hausmann et al, (2023:55) cited Eskom’s preferential procurement requirements which raised the cost of operations as substandard and expensive coal had to be procured which was located far from the power stations. Poor coal quality which consists of impurities including rocks have caused extensive damage to the mills and resulted in a rising number of unplanned outages which depleted the available capacity and led to load shedding (VGBE, 2023:76). The acts of sabotage featured regularly in the media which did not deter truckers from selling high grade coal destined for Eskom power stations and replacing it with inferior grade of coal with the addition of rocks (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:181). In a Media Statement (2023) released by Eskom on Friday, 22 September 2023, Eskom detailed the arrest of a coal truck driver and two weighbridge clerks for committing acts of fraud and theft of coal. The truck laden with 34.9T of coal was diverted to an illegal coal yard where the coal was offloaded and the truck driver was able to produce a valid weighbridge ticket for Majuba power station, although not having reached the power station. In another Media Statement (September 2023), SAPS arrested nine people at Kusile Power Station for theft and fraud, eight weighbridge operators (ERI) and a coal truck driver. The coal haulers were found to bypass Kusile Power Station without offloading the coal ordered and the weighbridge operators would process the coal deliveries, even though the coal truck never entered the power station. SALGA contends that it would be a “fool's errand” to defend Eskom as corruption free as the state capture commission report detailed the deeply rooted corruption and maladministration which bedevilled Eskom for years (Pretoria High Court Case no: 005779/2023, 2023:51). Ledger and Rampedi (2022:68) classified the corruption and mismanagement at Eskom as a “horror show” which has been clearly established and documented in detail. Supporting Just Transition in South Africa report (2020:25) revealed the real reason for the resistance to the rollout of renewable energy, as powerful figures who have devised strategies to extract profit and rents from coal-fired power stations at Eskom. This is a shocking revelation when the South African president acknowledged the existence of state capture and the adverse impact that it had on the performance on the power stations and the spiralling costs of the new-build projects (SONA, 2024:4). 2.7.3. Generation of Employment 2.7.3.1. The Evolving Employment Market: Opportunities and Challenges Africa is under tremendous pressure to create monumental employment opportunities for a rapidly growing population facing a bleak future with an ever-escalating unemployment rate (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). According to the South Africa Economic Outlook report (2023:3), skilled workers accounted for a meagre 25% of all employment in South Africa with 4.1 million skilled workers in the economy, followed by 7.5 million semi-skilled workers and an unskilled labour force of 4.6 million workers. The second quarter of 2023 benefited from an economic expansion of 1.6% (y-o-y) and a contraction of the unemployment rate (narrowly defined) to 32.6%, mainly attributed to a reduction in load shedding (PwC, 2023:5). The African continent is home to the youngest population globally and accounts for 15 million people seeking employment yearly with the hope and ambition of becoming productive and meaningfully contributing to the growth of the African continent (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). The African continent ambitious target of least 300GW of renewable energy by 2030 faces a myriad of challenges including technical skills deficit, institutional capacity and finance to aspire to the 2050 net zero carbon emissions (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). The South Africa Economic Outlook November edition (2022:8) found that economic exclusion attributed to unemployment and fickle institutions with poor governance can be credited for the slow demise of South Africa’s social cohesion. The Auto Green Paper on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa (2021:3) indicates that the South African automotive sector faces similar challenges and has reached the inflection point, recognising the acute need for reinvestment to reskill and upskill the automotive workforce to embrace New Energy Vehicles (NEV). The transition to renewable energy will inflict inherent risks to the South African economy, predominantly impacting on the coal value chain (Makgetla, 2021:10). The coal mining value chain is the source of approximately 400 000 jobs, with the coal mines directly employing 80 000 workers and between 200 000 to 300 000 indirect and induced jobs (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:35) expects job losses predominantly in the petroleum and coal sector and is anticipated to employ minimal workers by 2050. Notwithstanding the current levels of employment in the coal sector, the future trajectory indicates dwindling employment levels on account of a depressed economy, technological and environmental factors (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:13). A conservative estimation links a mine worker to an average five dependants, but the figure can be as high as ten dependents, translating to the sector supporting between two to four million households (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The sudden transition could have dire consequences for the families and their livelihoods without support and alternative employment for these workers (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16). Mulugetta et al. (2019:4) however argues that although the transitions carry extensive risks, carbon taxes will unwittingly result in higher prices being imposed on carbon intensive goods. The costs will undoubtedly be passed onto the consumer and have an inordinate impact on poor households, further relegating them into extreme poverty (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:14). The majority of Africans (80%) work in the informal sector earning a meagre salary and are constantly facing job instability (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:10) is confident that the renewable sector will generate approximately 30% of newly created jobs in the manufacturing sector. The establishment of the renewable energy value chain from extracting the raw material to manufacturing of components and end products will have a positive impact on the economy and reverse the unemployment trends (GreenCape, 2021:8). However, the employment opportunities created should be derived from decent work and well-paid jobs to catapult the population out of poverty and be instrumental in accelerating the economy (Supporting Just Transition in South Africa, 2020:16; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Forty-five percent of the workforce in the agricultural sector work in harsh conditions and earn on average one dollar per day (Cozzi et al., 2022:194). Air quality, energy security and global warming have become a focal point for the public, not only globally but in South Africa as well, primarily due to the ongoing bouts of load shedding. The international commitment to reducing carbon emissions has prompted the South African automotive industry to accelerate the transition as export markets intend banning the imports of internal combustion engines (Auto Green Paper on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa, 2021:7). The increase in revenue from VAT on imports can be attributed to the spike in imports of solar panels and alternative power supplies to counter the ongoing stages of load shedding (PwC, 2023:7). However, the spike in imports signals the exporting of jobs against the backdrop of rising unemployment (PwC, 2023:7). The Urban-Econ Development Economists report (2022:156) advocates for various partnerships to be established to promote reskilling and development such as South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA) and the South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA). Eskom has already entered into a partnership with the South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre (SARETEC) based at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) (The Presidential Climate Commission Report, 2023:6). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:10) supports this initiative and asserts that the introduction of programmes to upskill the workforce and unemployed youth will align them to job opportunities presenting themselves in the renewable sector. The Minister of DMRE (2021:4) advocates for employment protection and diversification of the economy and compensation for employees impacted by the socio-economic changes. 2.7.3.2. Harnessing Africa's Natural Resource Potential The African continent is endowed with enormous amounts of mineral resources which are critical for component manufacturing of a variety of clean energy technologies (Cozzi et al., 2022:146). South Africa is a major player in the global market supplying platinum‐group metals (PGMs) and is also a dominant producer of manganese and chromium (Makgetla et al., 2019:32; Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). Lu et al. (n.d:13) posits that renewable energy technology requires significantly more raw mineral resources than fossil fuel technology. An example amplifying this point is the mineral resources required for onshore wind generation is eight times more than mineral resources required for gas power plants when equal capacities are compared (Lu et al., n.d:13). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is endowed with 70% of the global cobalt reserves while Zimbabwe is enriched with an unrivalled deposit of lithium on the African continent (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12; Kuhudzai, 2021:37). The African continent has a surplus of raw minerals such as lithium, cobalt, manganese and graphite which is critical in manufacturing batteries for renewable energy storage (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). Raw minerals required for manufacturing of renewable energy components is intensely concentrated in South Africa, accounting for more than 40% of world’s chromite and 35% of Manganese being mined in the country (IEA, 2024:59). Significant deposits of untapped resources such as lithium and nickel hold massive potential of growing the economy and creating employment (Sack and Phore’, 2021:12). The benefits derived from exploiting these minerals include local economic and social development, improved infrastructure and job creation (Cozzi et al., 2022:147). South Africa accounts for more than 90% PGM global reserves and benefits from quasi-monopolistic position (Makgetla et al., 2019:32; Hausmann et al., 2023:134). The country also mines a significant amount of chrome and manganese and forms an elite group of oligopolist countries (Makgetla et al., 2019:32). Unfortunately, the manganese mined in South Africa is refined into intermediary products and exported to China (Bloomberg, 2021:50). The market for minerals including lithium, cobalt, platinum, vanadium and copper is set to grow exponentially as the demand for batteries in the transition to cleaner energies gains momentum (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:12). Kuhudzai (2021:37) contends that the Electric Vehicle (EV) market is on an upward trajectory globally and lithium will be one of the raw materials in high demand, driving employment absorption, growth in foreign exchange due to exports, skills development and transfer of technology and a boost for tax revenues. Lu et al. (n.d:13) concurs and adds that the demand for raw material for EVs, wind turbines and solar panels will spike as well as the prices for these mineral resources. However, a much greater benefit can be extracted from the process if the mineral beneficiation and value addition were firmly entrenched on the African continent, creating an opportunity for battery cell production to be initiated (Kuhudzai, 2021:37). The mining operations are a key driver of infrastructure projects such as railways, roads and capacity of the national grid as the mining sector hinges on supporting infrastructure to move the raw material and assumes the role of the anchor investor to develop and upgrade infrastructure which would be beneficial to local communities and value chains. (Cozzi et al., 2022:147). The Renewable Energy Market Update report (2023:68) states that new manufacturing facilities (85%) principally focus on integrated, module and thin-film manufacturing while waning manufacturing capacity exists for manufacturing for new cells (less than 1%), ingots and wafers (9%) and polysilicon production (6%). The Strategic Plan 2020-2025 (2020:12) cautioned against mining critical minerals in an unsustainable manner and encourages the departure from limiting the country to an extractive economy and exporting raw minerals without beneficiation. Africa is endowed with key raw minerals for the renewable energy market and accounts for 40% of the global reserves of manganese, platinum and cobalt which are utilised in the manufacturing of batteries and hydrogen technologies (Cozzi et al., 2022:18). South Africa, in particular, has rich deposits of manganese, cobalt, iron ore, nickel, titanium and exhibits a quasi-monopolistic position for manganese (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). The South African manufacturing industry has outstanding experience and expertise in beneficiation of minerals but exercise little beneficiation of minerals mined to the level of battery grade (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:3). Cozzi et al. (2022:18) argues that, although Africa holds significant undiscovered mineral reserves, the investment in mineral exploration is following a downward trend due to a host of factors. The African continent largely resembles an extractive economy as an exceeding high quantity of minerals mined in Africa are exported and beneficiated outside the continent (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:5). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:61) assert that South Africa’s wind and solar energy is rated amongst the best globally and has an excellent endowment of green minerals which will facilitate a smoother transition to low-carbon energy generation. South Africa can reposition itself to be a global leader to supply renewable energy components manufactured from green minerals and dominate the low carbon energy value chains (Hausmann et al., 2023:133). The GreenCape (2021:36) echoes similar sentiments and reinforces the beneficiation of raw materials and reignite industrialisation. 2.7.3.3. The Future of Employment: Trends and Predictions Semelane et al. (n.d:19) asserts that renewable energy employment has expanded since 2012 and the solar photovoltaic (PV) experienced the strongest employment growth in 2017. Job creation linked to the installation of infrastructure and supply chains in providing households with access to modern energy services in rural areas is expected to grow significantly which will fundamentally require local workers to support the construction and installation, as well as operations and maintenance (Cozzi et al., 2022:197). Renewable energy industrialisation will facilitate energy security now and in future and will generate sustainable employment, specifically targeting workers in the electricity and coal value chains who are most at risk (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:10). The transition to renewable energy holds the potential to generate employment through ownership, project planning and design, procurement, construction/installation, operation and maintenance of small- and large-scale construction projects (GreenCape, 2021:7). By comparison, the solar PV sector generated 3.6 million jobs in 2018 while the wind energy sector created 1.1 million jobs (Semelane et al., n.d:19). Cozzi et al. (2022:197) projects a total of 2.8 million jobs will be created in the renewal energy sector in Africa between now and 2030 with the aim of providing universal access to energy and operations and maintenance is expected to secure 55% of those jobs. However, the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:14) acknowledges that the transition of the electricity sector carries inherent transitional risks to the economy as well as job security across the electricity and coal value chain. Semelane et al. (n.d:19) argues that the renewable energy sector is the source of socio-economic benefits in a vast number of countries with employment benefits narrowly converged in countries such as China, Brazil, the United States, India, Germany and Japan. Hallowes and Munnik (2022:94) disputes that more jobs will be available in the transition and cites the loss of 80 000 coal miner jobs as well as jobs linked to the coal value chain such as coal truckers and power station workers, 100 000 in manufacturing of internal combustion engines (ICE) vehicles, 200 000 mechanics and 150 000 petrol attendants, 500 000 jobs in the tourism sector and 110 000 small enterprises. Cozzi et al. (2022:197) anticipates the creation of 1.8 million jobs in Africa as the continent picks up the tempo to achieve universal access by 2030. Cozzi et al. (2022:197) distinguishes the jobs created and classifies them as 700 000 to support fast tracking grid connections, construction and infrastructure development, 700 000 linked to mini-grid assembly and connections and the balance of the 400 000 jobs generated in the manufacturing and installation of solar PV installations. For the three 115MW solar PV projects, an estimated 40 and 50 skilled and 200 and 250 unskilled labour will be required during the construction phase and between 20 skilled and 40 unskilled labour for maintenance and operations over the lifespan of the plant (Draft Basic Assessment Report, 2018:32). The GreenCape (2021:14) states that the direct, indirect and induced job-years created will rise to 252 616 for the construction of Solar PV as predicted by the IRP 2019 while the wind sector will generate 594 098 during the construction phase. The World Bank (2022) predicts the generation of 500 000 net-direct jobs if South Africa embarks on an ambitious journey to become carbon neutral by 2050 (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:65). Calculations by Hallowes and Munnik (2022:56) indicate that solar PV could create 600 000 jobs while wind energy could generate 250 000 in construction, maintenance and operations if the IRP2019 was fully implemented. Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:10) supports the approach for local manufacturing of new energy and technological systems and must be protected by regulations to allow the sector to develop from infancy to a mature industry. However, this approach will require government intervention and support, strong governance to allow this sector to flourish in the face of strong global competition (GreenCape, 2021:34). Local renewable energy industries can thrive and create employment opportunities while reducing imports and build expertise to compete globally (Cozzi et al., 2022:18). The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:8) cautions against a hasty surrender to renewables as this approach will result in economic suicide and obliterate 2.3 million jobs in South Africa. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:65) agrees that the transitions to renewable energy will require a range of government interventions to generate more employment opportunities as these jobs will not be created automatically. The interventions required include reskilling, upskilling and renewable energy programmes to cater for at risk workers and the future workforce and industrial policies which will attract foreign direct investment (GreenCape, 2021:49). Decision-making should not only reside in government’s domain or with the private sector but must include vulnerable members who will be impacted the most (Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). 2.7.3.4. Navigating the Solar PV Ecosystem The raw material production focuses on the material utilised in the manufacturing of equipment to support the solar panel construction and installation (Semelane et al., n.d.:22). A fully-fledged manufacturing sector will be the engine driving sustainable growth through the low carbon sector as demands reached unprecedented levels in preparation for net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 (GreenCape, 2021:3; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:8). Bernstein (2021:1) argues that South Africa has the tendency or “over propensity” to export raw material and import finished goods which deprives local industries of growing economically and establishing local value chains. The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:18) claims that load shedding due to demand outstripping supply was the rationale for mothballing multiple beneficiation facilities. Components for solar module manufacturing are imported into South Africa and assembled locally (Semelane et al., n.d.:23). The destiny of the South African manufacturing sector is in a precarious situation as a consequence of many factors but not limited to policy uncertainty, cheap imports flooding the market, rising import costs, narrow skills base and the shrinking domestic market (GreenCape, 2021:34). Currently, the manufacturing industry in the renewable energy sector exhibits an excessive dependence on China, with Europe and the United States as well as other countries importing significant volumes of batteries and solar PV modules from China (Lu et al., n.d:15). The solar PV construction sector generates bulk of the employment opportunities and incorporates design, selection, procurement and construction of the plant (Semelane et al., n.d.:23). However, more than 50% of the global demand for solar PV equipment is imported from China while China and Europe combined supply approximately 60% of the global demand for wind energy equipment (Lu et al., n.d:15). CDE Insight (2022:2) advocates for initiating changes in small business policies and replicating success stories from other countries whereby associations representing township and informal businesses exert pressure on government to amend policies in their favour. The renewable energy industry continues to exhibit financial tenacity in the wake of energy security challenges, volatility in commodity prices, supply chain limitations and trade policies (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). South Africa has the largest deposits of vanadium globally but vanadium is an aggressive toxic metal and plants in eMalahleni (Vanchem) and Brits (Vamteco) processing vanadium release heavy pollutants (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:113). Bernstein (2021:4) reflection on localisation acknowledges the country’s future growth predominantly counts on elevated exports, but contends that localisation will lead to increased delays, inferior quality and rising costs. The Renewable Energy Market Update (2023:53) does not share this view and encourages government to strengthen policy to support the industry as demand is growing and commodity prices are cooling off, creating room for higher revenue margins. The CDE Insight (2022:8) also promotes localisation and encourages government to protect small businesses by introducing exemptions from certain regulatory requirements such as complying with the national minimum wages or with being compelled to implement centralised bargaining council outcomes. Government has passed legislation which encourages local beneficiation before permitting raw material to be exported (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:23). The removal of onerous restrictions and mandatory compliance will level the playing field and empower small business to compete against well-resourced major players in the market (CDE Insight, 2022:8). The increased demand for solar PV and throttled polysilicon supplies have resulted in a spike in price of over 400%, reaching the highest price since 2010 (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). Hallowes and Munnik (2022:61) assert that electric vehicles require thrice the amount of copper and twenty times the volume of nickel than the equivalent fossil-fuel engine. South Africa has opted to establishing a lithium-ion battery value chain to primarily supply the energy storage sector as well as NEVs (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:53). The Development and Innovation Programme was established in 2011 based on the broader Energy Storage Research initiative to develop the lithium-ion battery value chain (Opportunities to develop the Lithium-Ion battery value chain in South Africa, 2021:2). The solar PV manufacturing sector anticipates an elevated growth trend in 2023/2024, largely driven by government’s announcement of subsidies and ambitious plans to increase the capacity in each bid window for renewable energy auctions (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:55). The localisation of supply chains translates into sourcing, producing, and distributing goods and services domestically in a strategic manner to build resilience, stability and sustainability (South Africa Economic Outlook January, 2024:6). Local manufacturers are faced with the additional burden of dealing with the country’s crumbling infrastructure which raises the cost of doing business and throttles economic growth (Bernstein, 2021:2). The International Energy Agency (2022:135) posits that China and ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia) have dominated the market, bearing the lowest costs for all elements of the solar PV supply value chain. However, China has benefited from economies of scale, an integrated supply chain, reduced energy costs and low labour costs has earned China the title of being the most competitive global solar module manufacturer (International Energy Agency, 2022:135). Reconfiguration of local supply chains will essentially cause production to be closely linked domestically with the end market and avoid volatility of international markets (South Africa Economic Outlook January, 2024:6). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:8) differs with the country’s localisation and import substitution policies, intimating the myopic stance of protecting jobs in the short run while exposing South Africa and the rest of the continent to the negative impact. There have been considerable investments in the renewable energy sector in countries such as India, United States and Europe and governments are expected to protect these new businesses from global competition and nurture them to maturity through trade policy instruments (Renewable Energy Market Update, 2023:55). The International Energy Agency (2022:135) asserts that higher investment costs are the key reason for India’s lack of competitiveness with China, while the United States struggles with higher overhead and labour costs. Europe, on the other hand, is facing escalating energy prices due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which is undermining the country’s ability to compete with China (International Energy Agency, 2022:135). Bernstein (2021:2) argues that South African businesses do not have the capabilities of manufacturing all the components in the renewable energy value chain. The GreenCape (2021:3) believes that industrialisation is the foundation for quality and higher paying jobs, relatively stable sector and the manufacturing sector can significantly improve economic productivity. The minister was appalled, after engaging with stakeholders in the renewable energy sector, that the overwhelming conclusion was that manufacturing was not blossoming and demanded change (Minister of DMRE, 2021:5). South Africa could emerge as a leader in the renewable energy sector due to the availability of rich green minerals, the country’s contiguity to African countries with an abundance of green minerals and the industrial capacity and expertise to become the continents beneficiation hub (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:19). 2.7.4. Climate change 2.7.4.1. The Implications of Delaying the Move to Renewable Energy South Africa is undoubtedly the highest emitter of GHG emissions per capita on the African continent and emits 7.2 tCO2e/capita, fractionally lower than China (8.0) and France (8.7) but far exceeding the sub-Saharan African average (World Inequality Report, 2022:218). Makgetla (2021:5) supports this view and states that South Africa is guilty of emitting excessively high levels of GHG from coal relative to global standards. The impact of climate change has the most pronounced effect on the marginalised and poor communities encompassing informal labourers, indigenous people, forest dwellers, peasant farmers, people residing in informal settlements and women of all ages (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156). Dasgupta et al. (2023:12) shares a similar view and states that climate change has had an asymmetric impact on the elderly, low-income earners, children, women and socially marginalised groups. In addition, global warming has been found to expose workers to hotter temperatures, resulting in a negative impact on labour health and productivity (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:1). Michaelowa et al. (2020:2) states that vast sums of climate finance must emanate from the private sector to accentuate the country’s ambitious target of limiting global warming to exceedingly below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, according to the Paris Agreement (PA). Global carbon dioxide emissions were on an upward trajectory from the first industrial revolution, with one billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents being emitted in 1850 (World Inequality Report, 2022:117). The report further states that the emissions rose to 4.2 billion tonnes by 1900, and by 1950 emissions reached 11 billion tonnes, by 2000 35 billion tonnes and a staggering 50 billion tonnes by 2022. South Africa’s GHG emissions are expected to peak in 2025, ranging from 398-510 Mt CO2 -eq while 2030 will witness a distinct reduction ranging from 350-420 Mt CO 2-eq (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:66). Cozzi et al. (2022:179) posits that the risks associated with a 2 °C rise in temperature will have a varying effect in different regions on the African continent. The grouping of people facing the highest impact of climate change are also underrepresented in decision-making and have minimal impact on shaping the future in mitigating the effects of climate change (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156; Mohlakoana and Wolpe, 2021:2). Dasgupta et al. (2023:12) asserts that climate change accelerates inequality and inequality further entrenches climate change impacts on marginalised members of society, as they become more exposed and vulnerable. Low-income employees working in high exposure sectors such as construction and agriculture will be most vulnerable to global warming and will be negatively impacted economically (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:1). The temperature fluctuations and frequency of warm extremes is anticipated to rise astronomically to over tenfold in the Sahara and Sahel while comparatively by approximately 600% in Southern Africa (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). Water remains a critical resource in a water scarce country and the production of energy requires vast amounts of water which is negatively impacted throughout the process (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). Evapotranspiration rates are projected to increase as temperatures rise which will cause the volume of water available for cooling to diminish (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Fossil-fuel fired power stations and nuclear power plants require substantial volumes of water and coal mining negatively impacts on the quality of water (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). Additional impacts of climate change include the mounting risks of drought, which affects food and water scarcity, forced human migration and rising political instability (Cozzi et al., 2022:46). Decisions regarding energy investment will be critical and is expected to provide impetus to the adoption of renewable energy to protect the planet (Supporting Just Transition, 2020:9). Beukman and Reeler (2021:11) argue that renewable energy requires a fraction of the amount of water utilised by fossil-fuel power stations and should be a dominant factor when planning the future energy mix in a water scarce country. However, the Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:9) compares the CO₂ emissions per MWh of France and Sweden (nuclear power) versus Germany and found that France’s CO₂ emissions (57g of CO₂ per kwh) is six times lower than Germany (366g of CO₂ per kWh). The risks linked to energy production from renewable energy due to climate change should not be ignored as wind patterns change, cloud cover and rainfall will negatively impact on renewable energy production (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:11). However, the production of energy through hydropower is at the highest risk as climate change influences a drier future with reduced amounts of precipitation (IEA, 2024:55). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:62) cautions against the adoption of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies as short-term relief to mitigate the pressure of compliance, as this route will cause the cost of electricity rise beyond the reach of poor households. Extreme precipitation on the African continent is expected to intensify while more frequent and intense coastal flooding in low-lying areas will become the norm (Allen & Overy, 2023:34; Creecy, 2022:2). However, North Africa is expected to experience an average of 10-25% decline in precipitation while East Africa is projected to be exposed to a 50% increase in frequent rainfall events (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). Sub-Saharan Africa experienced one of the most impactful years of climate change in 2022 which included the floods in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces and was ranked as the third most costly climate-related disasters globally (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:5; Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:5). Figure 2.10: Physical hazards and consequential impacts associated with a global 2 ⁰C temperature rise in African regions around 2050. Source: Africa Energy Outlook, 2022 Figure 2.10. paints a bleak picture for the African continent if humanity cannot rein in global warming and exceed the 2 ⁰C temperature rise. Quite alarming is the number of extreme events that in all probability are expected to impact the continent negatively, notably +930% frequency of warm extremes in the Sahara and Sahel regions, followed by 600% in the Southern African region (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). A total of 85 million people is expected to be displaced due to extreme weather events and an additional 120 million people living below the poverty line (Cozzi et al., 2022:179). The African continent is facing an existential threat due to global warming and will be most impacted although Africa contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions (Cozzi et al., 2022:174; Michaelowa et al., 2020:2; Allen & Overy, 2023:38). Nowak et al. (2021:3) asserts that Africa is most at risk to climate change and the impact on farming will be the most devastating. Farming is the basic sector in most African countries but loss in subsistence farming will witness many people descending into extreme poverty and hunger (World Bank, 2022:103). Extreme weather events in West Africa resulted in heavy rainfalls and floods while South and East Africa experienced Tropical Storm Ana and Tropical Cyclone Batsirai, dumping excessive amounts of rain when making landfall (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:5). The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:13) advocates for the mitigation and adaptation to climate change by addressing socio-economic risks and reducing GHG emissions with elevated attention to the carbon-polluting energy sector. Cozzi et al. (2022:174) concurs and calls for the evolution of the hard-to-abate energy sector. The agricultural sector will be burdened with the adaptation to climate-resilient interventions such as drought-resilient crops and mitigations against flooding (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:13). These interventions are expected to shield the at-risk groups in society such as the poor, women and children and create jobs and facilitate economic growth (SONA, 2024:13). Nowak et al. (2021:3) alludes to the fact that developing countries face a trilemma of choosing between growing the economy, social development, and environmental sustainability. The private sector has a vital role to play in partnership with financial institutions whereby businesses develop new technologies to mitigate climate change and banks finance these projects (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:8). Global warming is anticipated to generate significant incidence of specific diseases coupled with deteriorating working conditions (Dasgupta and Robinson, 2023:3; State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:5). Studies regarding declining health of agricultural and construction workers will help shape policies to protect workers and determine the burden on the healthcare system (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). Proponents such as Mohlakoana and Wolpe (2021:2) advance the just energy transition with a two-fold purpose of protecting and rehabilitating the environment and transforming the economy to function in an environmentally sustainable manner. 2.7.4.2. The Ongoing Debate on Climate Change: Key Insights and Arguments The burning of fossil fuels, agricultural production, deforestation, waste management and certain industrial processes emit carbon dioxide (World Inequality Report, 2022:117). Semelane et al. (n.d.:62) states that coal is a dominant fuel source globally and accounts for a quarter of all energy utilised, further elevating up to 38% for the production of electricity. Commercial interests have been promoting “clean coal” technology to extend the existence of fossil-fuel energy generation globally, but the reality of the matter is there is no “clean coal” (The Myth of Clean Coal, 2019:1). Proponents such as Chanchani and Oskarsson (2021:2) argue that the transition away from fossil-fuel is critical to mitigate the effects of climate change and improve public health. Households should not be excluded from the transition away from solid fuels as the negative impact on health affects the quality of life and the ability to be productive. The Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:17) supports this assertion and further states that global warming will accelerate extreme heat events, flooding as well transforming disease patterns which will amplify the risks to human health. According to Brown and Spiegel (2019:163), humanity is faced with an ecological crisis of epic proportions fuelled by political instability, coal remains a source of controversy and polarisation. The Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:5) cautions the South African government from succumbing to pressure from foreign governments driven by commercial gains. Extreme weather events and global warming have triggered academics, entrepreneurs, financiers, civil society and innovative groupings to formulate new policies and generate new ideas to deal with the impacts of climate change (Bloomberg, 2021:2). The impacts range from damage to infrastructure, low productivity, declining human capital and vulnerable water resources which have prompted the South African government to identify climate risks and mitigate against the effects (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:1). However, many states and corporations repudiate cautionary warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other formidable bodies and plan on expanding the sector (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:163). Low-cost fossil fuels such as coal were readily available to drive industrialisation and political leaders found coal to be tantalizing and unyielding to accelerate the economy and compete globally (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:154). According to the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 2004 (Act No. 39 of 2004), Eskom was mandated to comply with the minimum emissions standard (MES) which translated to 15,9 GW to be immediately shut down while 29,9 GW to be terminated after April 2025 but appealed the decision (Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook, 2022:21). Advocates for the coal sector have promoted “clean coal” after shifting their stance from an outright denial of climate change, and further justifying their position by promising increased efficiency, carbon offsets and trading, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) to extend the lifespan of the coal sector (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:62). During former US president Donald Trump’s term in office, he threatened to withdraw from the Paris climate accord with the intention of supporting the coal industry to generate more jobs (Brown and Spiegel, 2019:156). The transition to solar PV technologies holds a wealth of benefits but the most critical advantage is the water efficiency in a water scarce country, requiring less than 95% water in comparison to nuclear and coal (Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:89). Climate change has negatively impacted on weather patterns causing areas to face more frequent and prolonged droughts, low rainfall trends and earlier snowmelt which resulted in a 2% drop in hydropower generation in 2023 in comparison to 2022, a huge deficit in renewable energy production (IEA, 2024:55). The Colorado river in the US has been classified as one of the highest overworked rivers globally and is rapidly being depleted along the path to the Bay of California with significant reduction water volumes and cannot be utilised to drive hydropower generation (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:5). Locally, the Western Cape was subjected to the worst drought on record between 2015 to 2018, as the province approached “Day Zero” in 2018 (Country Climate and Development Report, 2022:22). Scholes and Engelbrecht (2021:6) posit that Southern Africa is water scarce but in addition, suffers from poor quality water which triggers increased biological oxygen demand, algal blooms, and the accumulation of pathogenic microbes. The horn of Africa has not received rains for the last four years and this has been the longest drought experienced over the last few decades, forcing residents to seek relief at displacement camps which are in deplorable conditions (Hallowes and Munnik, 2022:7). Beukman and Reeler (2021:11) raised concerns over dedicated crops grown to supply biofuels necessitate adequate amounts of water and large-scale arable land but risks diverting these scarce resources from food production. Further consideration should be given to the negative impact (socially and economically) on the transition and the plausible scenario of South Africa possessing different conditions and being at a different phase of economic development (Response to the Draft Report of the Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:5). However, a window of opportunity exists if the green hydrogen sector being piloted in South Africa, to mature and become a global leader to dominate the market by producing over 100 Mt per annum (Beukman and Reeler, 2021:20). There is consensus from a scientific perspective that Southern Africa temperature is notably becoming warmer due to higher levels of GHG and rising sea levels surrounding the continent (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). The Country Climate and Development Report (2022:3) has concluded that South Africa desperately needs to implement mitigation and adaptation measures against climate change or face subdued economic growth and unprecedented poverty and inequality. The Presidential Climate Commission (2023:13) shares a similar sentiment and encourages the reduction of GHG emissions across all sectors with greater focus on the energy sector. Human activities are directly responsible for and the highest contributor to the release of GHG in the atmosphere and climate change and requires urgent intervention to slow down the warming of the planet (Scholes and Engelbrecht, 2021:1). 2.7.4.3. The Dynamics of Energy Sector Finance The bulk of the energy finance nests in private institutions which are ungoverned and remain resistive to fulfilling the populations social needs (Newell et al., 2022:2). Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) is one of the four key programmes that are rolled out by the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) (Michaelowa et al., 2020:2). Policies must be drafted to privilege leveraging and de-risking private investment, resembling the establishment of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (Newell et al., 2022:2). As of May 2023, twenty-two countries in sub-Saharan Africa were in financial distress while the total public debt for the African continent was the equivalent of $1.1tn (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:3). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:6) asserts that the majority of the $250bn will be required as investment in new energy infrastructure and the private sector should play a leading role in financing. Public finance should be directed to accelerate the initial scope of the work, specifically for transmission to reassure potential investors of government’s commitment to the transition (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:11). However, pledges in future from developed countries should not accelerate the debt on the African continent and create unsustainable debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio (Cozzi et al., 2022:53). Philanthropic and donor capital should be directed at ensuring justice for the transition by supporting workers and coal-dependent communities who stand to lose the most as coal mines wind down its operations and permanently shut down (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). However, Newell et al. (2022:2) disputes efforts of a top-down approach as the ability to address energy injustice and inequality will be compromised. According to the Sasol Climate Change Report (2023:21), developed countries are supporting developing countries with significant financial investments to transition to renewable energy, including sharing of technology and building capacity to achieve a carbon neutral footprint by 2050. Lefore et al. (2021:5) argues for greater participation and involvement of the community in shouldering the financial responsibility of SSEGs. Financial innovation such as the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) solar irrigation is a success story which can be replicated with solar home systems (Off-grid solar market trends report, 2020:39). The African Development Bank (AfDB) had endorsed a total of 23 projects worth USD 0.8 billion on the African continent in 2018, funded by the World Bank Climate Investment Fund (CIF) with an additional USD 2 billion designated for the continent (Michaelowa et al., 2020:2). Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) can receive climate finance from donor countries and become the implementing agent to accelerate the just transition to renewable energy while ensuring climate justice (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6; Swilling et al., 2023:43). Donor countries (France, Germany, European Union, United Kingdom and United States) have pledged $8.5bn to accelerate South Africa’s just energy transition programme in November 2021 at COP26 (Swilling et al., 2023:4; Cozzi et al., 2022:53; Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:15). The president announced that financial pledges to support the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan in the last year grew from R170 billion to approximately R240 billion (SONA, 2024:14). Although the pledge is a fraction of the $250bn required to transition to a low carbon economy, it’s a step in the right direction to harness the capital and fruitfully utilise the funds and demonstrate to the world South Africa is capable of applying good governance principles (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:6). The aim of such institutions is to create a vehicle to mitigate the effects of climate change and address the end goal of whose energy needs will be met and how (Newell et al., 2022:2). Macmillan-Scott et al. (2022:11) believes that the South African government should kickstart the energy transition programme and illustrate governments commitment. South Africa is home to mature public financial institutions and highly regulated markets recognised globally (Bloomberg, 2021:49). These public financial institutions have vast experience from investing in the coal and energy sector and have evolved to invest in renewable energy (Supporting just Transition in South Africa, 2020:15). Unfortunately, South Africa remains constrained due to the exceedingly high credit-to-GDP ratio standing at 138% and may hamper the country’s ability to secure additional concessionary loans to fund the low carbon transition (Country Climate and Development Report: South Africa, 2022:9). Nowak et al. (2021:23) recommends donor countries and institutions to design focussed projects and programmes to promote electrification on the African continent (Nowak et al, 2021:23). Credible institutions including the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), Public Investment Corporation (PIC), Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) have significant reserves and should be at the forefront in financing South Africa’s energy transition (Macmillan-Scott et al., 2022:11). South Africa requires approximately $100bn over a five-year timeframe to achieve a just energy transition and will require funding from all available sources (Financing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Climate Action, 2023:15). 2.7.4.4. The Impact of Environmental Degradation The natural environment has been the bedrock of human prosperity spanning human existence on earth (O’Callaghan and Murdock, 2021:32). Countries on the African continent are guilty of placing significant reliance on natural resources which is the backbone of the African economy, but depletion of natural resources has placed weaker economies at risk and reversed the gains of poverty reduction and social development (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:56). Nowak et al. (2021:3) posits that 81% of sub-Saharan population utilise traditional biomass energy for cooking and heating with ramifications of deforestation, and soil degradation. Governments globally have comprehended the need and urgency to protect the environment from degradation as the environment supports economic growth and recovery but must be executed in a responsible and sustainable manner (O’Callaghan and Murdock, 2021:32). The demand for wood as a source of energy is placing significant pressure on forests and is not sustainable (Di Falco and Lynam, 2023:1). TMX’s pipe-building activities for a gas pipeline in Canada led to the cutting down of 1308 trees in 2021 which destroyed the nests of species of hummingbirds which are legally protected (Spiegel, 2021:11). The response from TMX was disingenuous citing an inspection was conducted prior to the felling of trees in the working areas and no nests were visible or identified, even though Community Nest Finding Network (CNFN) provided proof contradicting TMX’s statement. TMX’s activities further threatened the salmon on which local Indigenous people depend on as well as the entire ecosystem. The company responded to these complaints by building artificial “fish farms” to accommodate the salmon and continued with their activities. Energy poor communities and communities without access to electricity utilise biomass on a traditional stove to cook meals and discharge on average 1 kilogramme of carbon dioxide equivalent (kg CO2‐eq) (Cozzi et al., 2022:123). The African continent is languishing at the bottom rungs of the energy ladder as universal access appears to be a distant goal and communities have no other option but to harvest wood for fuel, often unsustainably (Strategic Plan 2020-2025, 2020:55). Cooking a meal with a clean source of energy such as electricity utilising an induction stove, can vary drastically in terms of CO2 emissions depending on the source of electricity production as a comparison can be drawn between Ethiopia, where electricity generation is dominated by hydroelectricity and Chad which depend on fossil-fuels for electricity production (Cozzi et al., 2022:123). According to Longe (2021:16), communities understand the impact of their actions on the environment but unfortunately do not have a choice and are forced to resort to burning biomass for their heating and cooking needs. Cozzi et al. (2022:21) states that a colossal 64% of Africans are dependent on wood, agricultural and animal wastes as a source of energy for cooking. The participants’ response to the survey conducted by Longe when asked about the impacts of utilising firewood included deforestation, soil erosion, air pollution, global warming, threat to the existence of animal life and environmental pollution (Longe, 2021:16). The production of charcoal through inefficient and unsustainable methods may accelerate deforestation which highlights the urgency of providing access to clean energy for cooking (Cozzi et al., 2022:178). The benefits of transitioning to modern cookstoves by 2050 will realise benefits beyond the environment and holds the potential of reducing 6.5 million annual deaths due to indoor air pollution (The Gender Snapshot, 2023:17). The Supporting Just Transition in South Africa report (2020:10) introduces a debate between protecting the planet or protecting the livelihoods of workers and the economy but further reiterates “There are no jobs on a dead planet.” The Global Photovoltaic Potential by Country report (2022:15) contends that the location of solar PV plants in forests will be counterintuitive because deforestation to accommodate the plant will undermine the positive contribution of renewable energy. However, the Presidential Climate Commission (2023:63) challenges this train of thought as water consumption for renewable energy generation is negligible compared to thermal energy generation. Solar PV does not utilise water for energy generation but requires water for cleaning of the panels to secure maximum energy conversion and output from the plant (State of the Climate in Africa, 2019:3; Presidential Climate Commission, 2023:88). Commitments by governments globally must be translated into action as delays in mitigation will further prolong achieving the end goal, making targets difficult if not impossible to attain as the intensity of climate change regresses (King, 2021:1). One of the goals of the Paris Agreement is the conservation, protection and restoration of nature and ecosystems, incorporating the arresting and reversing of deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 (Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023:6). 2.8. Available Literature 2.8.1. Gaps in literature A study by Omowunmi Mary Longe (2021) focused on energy poverty in rural areas in SA and the impact of utilizing unclean fuels on the health of women and girls. Another study titled “Sustainable solar energy for rural development in South Africa” identified 5 projects with the Boomplaas project being most relevant in which 16 houses were electrified with renewable energy (Solar PV). The project was a dismal failure, and the lifespan of the installations were compromised (McEwan et al., 2013). In South Africa, the Boomplaas informal settlement located near Keimoes in the Northern Cape was chosen as a pilot project for the installation of household rooftop solar PV in 2012 (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). A total of sixteen houses were identified as beneficiaries of the solar PV project where two 240W solar panels combined with a 1000W inverter and six 2V batteries were installed at a total cost of R1 million (Kumar et al., 2019: 170). In addition to the solar PV installation, internal wiring was installed in each house as well as fittings for pull switch lights and plug sockets for appropriately rated household appliances. The project was implemented due to political pressure from a senior member of South African Communist Party (SACP) which is a part of the ruling alliance (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The project proved to bleak failure as a result of unrealistic promises made regarding the solar system’s capabilities by politicians with no technical expertise in this field (Kumar et al., 2019: 172). The units performed below expectation of the users and lacked support and a maintenance plan which caused several units to fail. The project incorporated two community members who received a week’s paid training and were expected to perform basic maintenance services. The trainees were constantly being bombarded by the community to provide maintenance, diagnose and repair the system without compensation. Furthermore, the trainees had limited technical knowledge devoid of any support from the installers and no spares. Although the installers committed to providing post-installation repairs, potential infringement on the warranty terms and conditions caused the warranty to be null and void, converting an asset into a liability. A study by Baker and Phillips (2019) found that SSEGs in South Africa were not subsidised through government policy or regulations but were driven through the national electricity crisis and waning public confidence, rapidly rising tariffs and declining solar PV costs which favoured the wealthy consumers. This contrasts with high income countries such as the UK and Germany where adoption is encouraged by regulation and worthy subsidies. Ngarava et al. (2021) conducted a study based on energy poverty experienced by female headed households and focused on race and ethnicity in South Africa. Although a limited number of the studies mentioned above provided a framework, most studies merely provided recommendations and did not provide a model to specifically address universal access to energy. Furthermore, the projects installed through the INEP and the pilot project in Boomplaas did not adequately decode the energy requirements of the community, leading to the installation being wholly inadequate (480W to 500W) which did not meet the basic needs of the recipients. The studies did not incorporate job creation through the implementation of renewable energy and localisation. 2.8.2. Demarcation of scholarship (criteria) The criteria utilised for demarcation of scholarship excluded literature older than five years but included seminal work conducted by McEwan et al. (2013). Key constructs which were used in the search function included universal access to energy, energy poverty, renewable energy and climate change. The type of renewable energy was limited to solar PV and deliberately excluded other forms of renewable energy as these forms of energy have not reached technological maturity or feasibility, nor was the type of energy suitable for the South African landscape. The research incorporated literature such as journals, reports, studies, books, publications from subject matter experts, Eskom, policy briefs and government websites. 2.9. Conclusion According to the Normative Ethical theory, every citizen should have access to energy as a basic human right. Renewable energy has the potential to overcome the hurdles experienced by grid access, to achieve universal access to energy, solar PV has proven to be a mature technology suitable for local conditions in South Africa. Installing solar PV will significantly reduce energy poverty, drive innovation, and foster local entrepreneurship to stimulate micro-enterprises. The rollout of solar PV can re-ignite the local manufacturing sector and create sustainable employment opportunities with decent pay for people living in rural areas. Sourcing energy from renewable energy will reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, promote environmental sustainability, and minimise the impact of global warming. A once-in-a-lifetime opportunity has arisen to address past injustices and improve rural communities' living standards while mitigating climate change. Chapter 3 will follow with the presentation of the research philosophy and methodology as well as justification for the respective selections.

What are the key findings?